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**University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)  
International Studies and Overseas Programs  
ISOP**

**MEMORIES OF THE HOLOCAUST:  
KISHINEV (CHISINAU)  
1941 - 1944**

**SAMUEL ARONI**

**January 1995  
November 1955 (2nd ed.)**

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Monument near the entrance to the Kishinev Ghetto (1941-42)  
(Architect: Simeon Soihet; Sculptor: Haim Epelbaum)  
"Martyrs and Victims of the Kishinev Ghetto!  
We, the Living, Remember You"  
(in Romanian, Yiddish, Russian and Hebrew)



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## INTRODUCTION

In April 1994, after an absence of almost 53 years I visited my native city of Chisinau (Kishinev), now the capital of the independent Republic of Moldova. When I left it in 1941, as a young teenager, I was running for my life, escaping from the Kishinev Ghetto which was being liquidated and its prisoners deported on a death march to Transnistria (the Ukraine). Now, I came back not just on a nostalgic trip to the past but representing UCLA in newly established academic contacts with the Moldovian Academy of Sciences and the State University of Moldova. Indeed, in collaboration with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and some other cosponsors, we are planning to hold in September 1995 a joint symposium on "Jewish History, Language and Literature". Such an international symposium has not occurred in Kishinev for many decades.

While in Kishinev, I was given by Professor Izia Levit of the Academy of Sciences a copy of two original reports, in the Romanian language, written by a high commission appointed by Marshal Ion Antonescu in December 1941. These are the most detailed available documents on the Kishinev Ghetto, other camps in Bessarabia and on the deportations to Transnistria. To my knowledge, they have never been translated and published in the English language. The first report, the longer of the two, is not to be found in the valuable compilations of documents related to that time and place (Carp, 1946, and Ancel, 1986). The second report, dealing with more dramatic and sensitive events, has been reproduced in these two publications (Carp, 1946, Vol.III, pp.61-65, and Ancel, 1986, Vol.V, pp.192-196).

There are very few who have survived the Kishinev Ghetto and, to my knowledge, none have written about it. The events have been described in a few publications but none in the English language (Korn, 1949, pp.228-236; Korn, 1971, pp.429-492; Doron (Spector), 1977; and Levit, 1993, pp.102-123). The latest paper by Professor Levit is based to a great extend on the above Romanian reports. The holocaust in Transnistria, while mentioned in these publications, has also been relatively neglected particularly in the English language. The first paper was probably written by my father David Cervinschi who, in August 1942, while interned in the nearby camp of Dumanovca, was able to see the death camp of Acmecetca and write about it later (---, 1944, pp.27-30). I translated his paper and am enclosing it here in Appendix 4. Julius S. Fisher called Transnistria "*the forgotten cemetery*" (Fisher, 1969), and the latest book on Transnistria is by Dr. Avigdor Shachan and is being translated now into English (Shachan, 1988).



Having received the two reports, which brought back many terrifying memories, I decided to translate them, and to add some of my eyewitness recollections as well as a few other relevant documents and references. I believe that the study of the Holocaust is an important lesson for all of us in understanding the terrible dehumanizing dangers that exist in the extreme in any kind of prejudice, discrimination and persecution of particular groups of people. In order to have hope for the future, we must fully face the past. As stated by Professor Dan Bar-On, "... the quest for hope has to do with confronting the truth". (Bar-On, 1989, p.13)

The province of Bessarabia, covering 17,151 sq. mi. (44,421 sq. km.), is bordered on the south by the Danube delta and the Black Sea, on the west by the Romanian province of Moldavia and the Prut river, and on the north and east by the Nistru (Dnestr) river and the southern part of the Ukraine (Transnistria). It is approximately rectangular in shape with a width of about 70 miles and a length of about 240 miles. Bessarabia was captured by the Turks during the 16th century and held until 1812. It was under the Czarist Russia for 106 years, between 1812 and 1918. After the Bolshevik revolution, it became part of Romania until 1940 when it was returned peacefully to the Soviet Union plus a significant part of Bucovina as "compensation" for the 22 years of Romanian "occupation". From June 28, 1940 until the attack of the Soviet Union by the German and Romanian armies on June 22, 1941, it was under Soviet rule. The fascist armies marched east quickly, bringing death and destruction to the Jewish communities of Bessarabia, Bucovina and the Ukraine. As the fortunes of the war changed, the Soviets returned during the second half of 1944. Finally, under its new communist government, Romania ceded Bessarabia to the USSR in 1947.

The capital city of the province of Bessarabia is Kishinev (Chisinau). It was first mentioned in 1424 and, during the 19th century grew significantly in size and regional importance. It was inhabited by Jews at least from the 16th century and during the 19th century became a large Jewish city. For example in 1897, the year that my late father was born, it had a Jewish population of 50,237 people representing 46% of the city. In June 1940, when it was returned to the Soviet Union, the Jewish population had grown to an estimated 60,000 because of the influx of Jews from Romania which began to turn fascist. With the killings and the deportations, within one and a half years "Jewish Kishinev" was left with only 86 Jews (see p.18)!

The persecution, pogroms and murder of Jews in that part of the world was unfortunately endemic. Consider three generations of my own family. My paternal grandfather, Aaron-Iosef Cervinschi, was born in 1872 in the Ukraine in the village of Borshagovca near Kiev. At the age of nine he was probably hiding during the epidemic of pogroms that struck the Ukraine in 1881. My father,



born in 1897, told me of his recollections of the infamous 1903 pogrom of Kishinev. He was six years of age, the same age as my younger brother was in 1941. Once, while in the Ghetto of Kishinev in July 1941, my brother found himself with our whole family against a wall with his hands raised ready to be shot by Romanian soldiers. Fortunately for us, the soldiers changed their mind! There may be some moral in comparing the reaction of the world to the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 and to the events that took place 38 years later. During the Kishinev pogrom there were 49 Jews killed, 38 men and boys and 11 women and girls. It was an event carried out by mobs and not by organized armies and it was exceedingly vicious<sup>1</sup>. As described and exemplified by numerous books and publications of the time, the reaction in America was loud, angry, widespread and not confined only to the Jewish community (Davitt, 1903; Adler, 1904; Korolenko, 1904; Singer, 1904). It was later a subject of memoirs (Slutskii, 1930) and of historic books in recent times (Judge, 1992). The pogrom resulted in a change of the Russian Governor within a couple of month. The incoming Governor wrote a fascinating memoirs which is extremely informative of the society of Kishinev and Bessarabia of that time (Urusov, 1908).

While this paper focusses on the events during the Holocaust, it must not be forgotten that before the Second World War Kishinev and Bessarabia were vital, energetic and important Jewish communities containing a spectrum of economic, religious and intellectual groups. Its people contributed much to the development of Zionism, Jewish education and culture, and a Jewish agricultural cooperative movement (Korn, 1949; Korn, 1971).

The reports translated and presented in this paper cover the period of July to December 1941. The German and Romanian armies occupied Kishinev on July 18, 1941, and the Ghetto was established on July 22-23. It lasted about two months. According to the report, it had a population of 11,525 Jews, 64% of which were women and

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<sup>1</sup> "When the soldiers came into the city on Tuesday, April 12th, the bloodshed stopped. It was raging until noon of that day. The soldiers made 1,002 arrests, but twenty times that number participated in the murders and tortures and nameless indignities on the people of my faith.

When my mother and father, sisters and brothers and their four little children dared come out of our place of concealment in the cellar of the friendly cooper who sheltered us, the streets of the city were a shocking sight. Dead bodies were everywhere, many of them horribly mutilated, and in most cases with the clothes torn off. There were ears, fingers, noses lying on the pavements. Many of the bodies had been covered with leaves or with the feathers which had strewn the streets like snow.

Before I secured shelter I saw scenes of torture for an hour or more which I can never forget. Babies were tossed in the air to be caught on the points of spears and swords. Young girls were horribly mistreated before death came to end their torture. I saw these things with my own eyes. No pen or tongue can add anything to the fiendishness of the mobs who swarmed through the streets, crying: "Kill the Jews! Burn their houses! Spare not at all!"

Reported by Abraham Polnovick, a survivor of the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 (Stiles, 1903)



children and 28% old people. The deportations from the Ghetto to Transnistria started on October 12, 1941, on what proved to be a death march. Transnistria was the southernmost part of the Ukraine, between the rivers Nistru and Bug. It was renamed as such to indicate the conquered area "given" by the Germans to their Romanian allies. Exactly how many Jews perished during 1941 to 1944 in the areas of Bucovina, Bessarabia and Transnistria will never be known. Estimates run between 200,000 to almost double this number. Everyone of them, men, women and children, was an innocent victim of the Holocaust and the murder of most of them was the responsibility of the Romanian regime of Marshal Ion Antonescu.

Consider the destruction of the Bessarabian Jewry. When the war started with the attack on the Soviet Union, the German and Romanian armies encountered Jews escaping from burning cities. A great number of these were executed immediately. According to Matatias Carp: "*On July 17, 1941, along the two roads into the city [Kishinev] the arriving Romanian and German troops killed 10,000 Jews. The roads were Sculeni in the north and Hancesti in the south.*" (Carp, 1946, Vol.I, p.27). Carp also mentions 4,000 Bessarabian Jews who evacuated from Kishinev and were caught and killed by the advancing armies in the Ukraine. Julius Fisher describes the death of some 11,500 Bessarabian Jews in July and August, 1941, as they were driven back and forth between the Germans and the Romanians before some were interned in the camp at Vertujeni (Fisher, 1969, pp.46-47).

After these initial events, there were in Bessarabia some 75-80,000 Jews interned in the Ghetto of Kishinev and at nine other camps listed in the report (see p.43). Of these, again as reported here, 55,867 were counted at the various points of crossing the Nistru river into Transnistria. They joined 45,538 Jews deported to Transnistria from Bucovina, for a total of 101,405 people. The report states that: "*As far as the Jews from Bessarabia, it follows that, between those interned of 75-80.000 and those deported of 55.867, there is a difference of 25,000 Jews, who died a natural death, escaped, or were shot by the methods that we will describe below.*" (p.43, emphasis added). These perished within about three to four months.

Let us consider in turn the suggested fate of these "missing" 25,000:

- (i) By "natural means" the report mentions 441 Jews who died in the Ghetto, including 20 suicides before the deportations, and 1,800 Jews at the camp of Vertujeni. Many died at the other Bessarabian camps. This "natural death" is better described as hunger and starvation!
- (ii) How many managed to escape? A very minute number. While the report describes many "*infractions associated with the Ghetto*", none involved crimes associated with hiding escaped Jews. Unlike Western Europe, the environment was hostile and aggressive



towards the Jews. The conclusion reached by the report was that, during the deportations, there were "...robberies committed by the population of the communities located along the routes of the convoys. The cart drivers exploited the circumstances, trying to extort, by all available means, money and objects from the Jews." (p.20)

There were only two cases mentioned in which "Cart drivers, in addition to carrying out robberies, also served as accomplices of the Jews, to harm the state, by hiding valuable objects owned by the Jews." (p.33) Their names were Ioan Handarenco and Gh. Neamtu, both of Kishinev. Unfortunately there were not many Righteous Gentiles to be found! The only case that I know of escaped Jews being hidden by Romanians for long periods of time was that of my uncle and aunt, Mischa and Ida Apotecher, who survived the war in Bucharest hiding in the home of a Romanian Colonel.

The report mentions in various places people who have escaped the Kishinev Ghetto. This adds up to 37 persons, including my family, most of whom were captured. They were helped by others to escape, almost always for large sums of money. The report even blames the Germans for helping the escapes! (p.24) Personally, I probably owe my life to the three "police agents Ion Rohan, Neamtu and Stoenescu" who helped us escape. Most of the other criminal cases described in the report included extortions, entrapments, simulated escapes and other abuses.

(iii) We are left with the great majority who "were shot". The report describes three specific cases:

1. On August 1, 1941, 411 Jews from the Ghetto were shot "near Visterniceni". The report highlights the fact that it included "the Christian Ion Carmen from Ploesti" who was there because of his Jewish wife.
2. Early August 1941, 325 Jews from the Ghetto perished at Ghidighici.
3. On August 9, 1941, the camp at Tataresti was liquidated and all 451 Jews executed. Cpt.Rez. Gh.Ion Vetu, who together with the German Sub.Lt. Heinrich Frohlich brought the order of Marshal Antonescu to the commander of the camp, carried out the executions and proceeded to rob the dead Jews of some of their valuables.

Undoubtedly, there were many more such cases the details of which we will never know. Thousands others died during the death march to Transnistria. This was clearly planned before the deportations. Under the instruction of "*The manner of dealing with those who do not comply? (Alexeanu)*". General Topor undoubtedly meant the elimination of those who could not walk the distance under the inhuman conditions. The report makes this explicitly



clear by describing the preparations along the deportation routes: "... each 10 kilometers a grave for about 100 persons where those lagging the convoys will be gathered. shot and buried." (p.47)

The Jews deported from Bessarabia and Bucovina joined, in the camps of Transnistria thousands of Russian Jews. Earlier, tens of thousands were burned to death in Odessa and executed at Bogdanovca and Dumanovca. From 1942 to their liberation by the Russians in second half of 1944, tens of thousands continued to perish in death camps like Acmecetca and others throughout Transnistria.

The situation did not remain unknown for long in the West. David Wyman reports that in January 1943 a telegram arrived in the United States "... from Gerhart Riegner in Switzerland, written in collaboration with Richard Lichtheim, an official of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. It disclosed an intensification of the systematic killing ... Of the 130,000 Rumanian Jews deported to the Transnistria region in 1941. 60,000 were dead. The other 70,000 were destitute, sleeping in crowded, unheated rooms, prey to diseases, and dying of starvation." (Wyman, 1984, p.80)

He describes how "On February 13, one day before the Riegner-Lichtheim information came out in the press, a report of great interest to those concerned about the European Jews appeared in the New York Times. By coincidence, it exactly meshed with the Riegner-Lichtheim description of the dreadful condition of the 70,000 Rumanian Jews still alive in Transnistria, and it threw a ray of hope into the darkness. A dispatch from C. L. Sulzberger in London disclosed that the Rumanian government had offered to cooperate in moving 70,000 Jews from Transnistria to any place of refuge chosen by the Allies. The Rumanians suggested Palestine and offered to provide Rumanian ships for the voyage. In return, Rumania asked to be paid transportation and related expenses, amounting to 20,000 Rumanian lei (about \$130) per refugee, along with additional funds should Rumanian ships be utilized." (Wyman, 1984, p.82)

It seemed that the Romanian government was unsure of an Axis victory and wanted to shift "...into the good graces of the Allies..." (Wyman, 1984, p.82) Wyman continues and suggests that the American and British governments may have "looked upon the release of large number of Jews as a threat, not an opportunity"! The proposal was apparently brought to various high levels of government and rejected. Wyman concludes that "The main issue is not whether the plan might have worked. The crucial point is that, against a backdrop of full knowledge of the ongoing extermination programs, the American and British governments almost cursorily dismissed this first major potential rescue opportunity" (Wyman, 1984, p.84)

The two reports presented in this paper were written, probably in January 1942, by a special commission appointed by the order of Marshal Ion Antonescu. Its members were high military officers, and high legal and banking officials. Although the reports are one sided and present only the official Romanian point of view, they have become most valuable historic documents and evidence. The motivation of appointing the commission was not to investigate the crimes against the Jews but to look into the "damaging acts to the State (which) were made possible and were performed...", in other words to make sure that no one will steal the property of the Jews which only the State was allowed to steal! The trigger was apparently the arrest



of Kisiel Kremer as he was trying to escape from the Ghetto, the large amount of gold found in his possession and particularly the fact that some of the local officials proceeded to steal this gold. In addition to the valuable evidence that the commission reports now provide, I believe that they have also resulted in saving some lives! A number of Jews were kept from being deported, some were apparently returned from the roads or from Transnistria; all this in order to be available as witnesses for the commission.

Many crimes and criminals were discovered and described by the commission, leading even to the suicide of a former Commander of the Ghetto. They found that "...the Jewish question and the possibility of exploiting them, as people who apparently ceased to benefit from the protection of the law, helped the development of a spirit vicious, corrupted, and inclined to abuse and self indulgence." (p.35) It is not surprising that persecution and "legal lawlessness" leads to societal lawlessness and a special societal mental state!

In their legal wisdom, the commission proceeded to be concerned about "the abandoned property" and the fact that "...the forced deportation of the Jews over the Nistru can not represent the situation envisaged by the law - i.e. finding abandoned goods - because the owners did not abandon, on their free will, the goods which belonged to them, but were forcibly deported." (pp.44 & 45) Also they worried that, since all identifications were removed from the Jews as they were transferred into the hell of Transnistria, following the Romanian law of expropriating real estate and establishing compensation criteria and needed legal procedures would be difficult "...because of lack of identification in which the deported Jews presently find themselves." (p.44) They worried not about the State crimes being committed but about "...some future situations, in which, for the supreme interest of the Country, renewed discussions could arise with respect to settlement of the Jews who lived in Bessarabia and Bucovina at the time of reunification, it would be possible by those interested to exaggerate purposefully the number of these people over the real number and to make substitutions of persons, because of lack of any statistics and identifications." (p.45) There was no apparent concern about the farce of "buying" the Jewish money and valuables on transfer to Transnistria.

The description of the scale and nature of the shocking crimes was left to the shorter second report. There are some glaring differences between the two reports. In the first report they write that during the deportation "...in general, humanity and good treatment were the criteria of behavior towards the Jews by the officers and guarding troops and also by the escorting gendarmes. Soldiers were observed who, during the deportations, helped Jews with the loading of the carts or gave them their bread." (p.40), while the second report details the preparation for the killing of Jews along the way every 10 kilometers and the execution of these plans.



Finally, the reports conclude that during the deportations "...the preparations and particularly the execution of the given orders created such dramatic moments that those who took part will carry with them for a very long time the memories of these events." (p.47)

We will also never forget them!

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**REPORT OF INQUIRY  
OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY ORDER OF  
MARSHAL ION ANTONESCU, THE LEADER OF THE STATE,  
FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF IRREGULARITIES IN THE  
GHETTO OF CHISINAU<sup>1,2</sup>**

The Commission, made up of Division General Constantin Niculescu, the Military Commander of the Capital, as Chairman, and Attorney General Stroe Stefan, the Inspector of Military Justice, Laurentiu Preotescu, the President of the Appeals Court of Chisinau, Traian Niculescu, Chief Prosecutor of the Appeals Court of Chisinau, Lt. Colonel Alexandru Madarjac, Managing Prosecutor at the Military Court of the Capital and Inspector General Paunescu of the National Bank as members, all appointed by the order of Marshal Ion Antonescu, transmitted as Nr.217 of December 4, 1941, by the General Secretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, started their work on the 4th of December, 1941, related to the investigation of irregularities in the Ghetto of Chisinau.

As basic documentary material, we were presented with the following by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers: an information memo, the report Nr.741/941 of the Council of Lapusna<sup>3</sup>, the report of December 1, 1941, of the General Secretary of the Presidency to the Marshal, a copy of the investigation report of the Commission established for the inquiry into the disappearance of a quantity of gold obtained from KISEL KREMER and others from the Ghetto and a summary note entitled "The Ghetto". In this note, under the title of "Organized Robbery", the types of irregularities committed are described, thus delineating the objectives of the inquiry as follows: the lack of organization in the Ghetto, the assistance of illegal acts through the mixture of Christians with the Jews of the Ghetto and the lack of support in the situation of the internees, escapes from the Ghetto, the entrance into the Ghetto of different suspicious persons without control, as a result of which damaging acts to the State were made possible and were performed, the lack of organization by the B.N.R.<sup>4</sup>, robberies and crimes committed during the evacuation and the crossing of the Nistru.<sup>5</sup>

In addition, the Minister of Justice made available to us report Nr.512, of December 3, 1941, by the Chief Prosecutor of the Appeals Court of Chisinau, together with a number of appendices referring to some irregularities and illegal acts, also committed in connection with the Jewish camps in Bessarabia.

After the program of work was established, to fulfill our mission the Commission travelled to Chisinau on December 6, 1941. It was decided to proceed in stages, the initial phases of the illegal acts and irregularities connected with the establishment, the organization and the evacuation of the Ghetto, as well as the investigation along general lines of all the consequences arising out of the activities mentioned above, such as:



- The work of protecting and conserving the valuables and buildings received by the State, performed by the administrative authorities of Bessarabia;
- The legal conditions arising out of the deportations and the properties left behind, based on Governmental actions and enacted legislation;
- Contradictions in prerogatives, resulting from the superposition of powers as a result of laws of the Government of Bessarabia and of the High Military Command;

During its operation, the Commission travelled to the Ghetto and to Orhei, interviewed 137 witnesses, some of them in confrontation with each other, and obtained all official documents connected with the camps and ghettos of Bessarabia.

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Before describing our observations and conclusions, as a result of the investigations which we performed, we consider it necessary to discuss some phenomena which characterize the general atmosphere and activities in the province over the river Prut<sup>6</sup>. These are considerations relevant in weighing the decisions which will be taken and which refer to the following:

#### **A. Special psychosis, leading to excesses and exaggerations.**

The recent social upheaval, partly caused by some initial difficulties of administrative organization, feelings of revenge, and the lack of scruples and conscience of many, have released in Bessarabia a real avalanche of informers which, by means of letters, denunciations or gossip, have created an atmosphere of permanent suspicion which contributes, on one hand, to making the work of reconstruction and return to normal life more difficult, and on the other hand to an incomplete and sometimes an unreal view in the mind of the State Leadership of the real situation in Bessarabia.

To a great extend, the unsatisfied ambitions of some locals who expected their appointment to various public functions have contributed to the atmosphere described above.

The factors which generate such manifestations are:

1. Elements from among the public who, under the guise of anonymity or false identity, send written communications to the representatives of the administration or the Military Command, and various information, real or invented, expressing them in an exaggerated form or often through sentiments of revenge or jealousy.



Such denunciations have not spared even the most eminent public figures such as General Zwiedineck, former Sub Secretary of State of Romanization and General Athanasiu, the Commander of the Third Army Corps.

Counsellor Dardan, of the Appeals Court of Chisinau, confined to us that he was told that even the communist NKVD was frightened by the large number of denunciations in Bessarabia. They received 50,000.

2. Some intellectuals, who claimed to be well informed, felt the need to pursue self interest or to satisfy their feelings of revenge.

Let us present two enlightening examples:

(a) The lawyer Ilie Cernautianu, of Chisinau, communicates to Reserve Captain Cepescu, of the Bessarabian Government, that he knows many things related to the illicit trade in the Ghetto.

The Commission, taking into consideration the position of the volunteered informer and the serious prospect that it represented, decided to interview him.

During his interrogation, he told us that he "heard talk" among the clerks of the Court of Appeal that one can obtain a postponement of the evacuation of Jews for 10,000 lei. He gave no details, made no checks and spread the news.

In addition, he also told us that Clerk Adascaliti of the court of Appeal told him on the day of the Plebiscite<sup>7</sup> that Lawyer Hogas, from the Town Hall, speaking to Mr. Salceanu, told him that the Jew Schur has at his disposal a million lei so that he could help him remain in Chisinau.

Here also, he conveys hearsay information communicated to a third person and which is not reliable.

(b) Reserve Lieutenant Constantin Badescu, a clerk in the Ministry of the Interior and currently living in Craiova<sup>8</sup> presented himself to the Mayor of Chisinau and asked for an immediate raid on the house on Mihai Viteazu No.23<sup>9</sup>, the domicile of Int. Captain Roescu, a member of the Government, where many precious objects could be found as well as a large quantity of gold. The raid was executed and nothing was found, a fact which raised the suspicion that the valuables existed but were removed.

Asked by the Commission what caused him to make this verbal accusation, he replied in a written deposition that, simply, he wanted to take revenge on Captain Roescu, with whom he has had an incident, finishing his deposition as follows, which characterizes fully his mentality: "... considering myself fully satisfied, also



giving him a future lesson, that he should remember that I have also caused him ill".

3. State informing agents. In the absence of serious control of their recruitment and their insufficient professional training, they provided information lacking seriousness and objectivity. In many cases they illicitly traded with their own function. Let us give some examples:

(a) On December 9, 1941, the Commission received a note from an informer with the explicit mention that it comes from "personal observation" and stating that on the above date he saw two trucks loaded with furniture and carpets leaving Chisinau, through the gate of Hancesti, and in one of them, next to the driver, was Colonel Eugen Dumitrescu.

However, it is known that since December 5th, Colonel Dumitrescu was arrested at the Military Jurisdiction C.M.C. and the trucks, searched by all Gendarme Legions along their probable route, were not found.

(b) The special informing agents Constantin Madan, Ion Cojocaru, Ion Nedu, Gheorghe Marin and Constantin Ionescu, attached to the Government for informing purposes, staged the escape of some Jews, with the knowledge of their superiors and for the purpose of discovering those that deal with such practices, and with this occasion appropriated an important quantity of gold from the Jews, the subjects of the staging. They are all under arrest and under investigation at the Prosecution Office of the Lapusna Tribunal.

#### 4. Subversive action by the legionnaire movement<sup>10</sup>.

Lt. Colonel Pallade provided us with the informational note No.2505, of November 10, 1941, where it is mentioned that the legionnaire movement in Moldova, Bessarabia and Bucovina sent instructions to all county centers to create and sustain an unfavorable atmosphere to the present regime; for this purpose:

(a) Where there were Jews, reclamations should be formulated which should show that the rich ones have bribed officials and military commissions in order to be exempted from forced labor.

(b) Reclamations should be formulated, on the subject of the wealth left by deported Jews, indicating facts emphasizing interested favoritism.

In this activity, it was recommended to use only legionnaires who fought on the front and are presently demobilized and the insinuations should be spread among the lower classes and specially among the wives of those mobilized, in order to create a mass of dissatisfied people for future demonstrations.



In addition, we were given another informational note, No.2748 of November 27, 1941, and report No.2770 of December 2, 1941, of the Iasi Military Statistic Office, addressed to the General Staff, Section II, indicating that an action of defaming the army was also started by the legionnaire movement. A number of specific cases were mentioned which lead to the conclusions emphasized above.

#### B. The supporting environment leading to wrongdoing.

Until the occupation of Odessa<sup>11</sup>, an atmosphere of war existed in the whole of Bessarabia. This was a normal consequence of movements of troops, trains loaded with wounded and security measures aimed at assuring the rear of the front, etc.

Under these conditions, the exercise of the law and order function of the administrative structure was more difficult.

On the other hand, the situation of the Jews, which were subjected to restrictions imposed by higher imperatives, exited in a large measure the inclination towards abuse. This was accentuated as the living needs of the Jews increased the pressure on them, and the desire for freedom led them to pursue all possible means, thus encouraging the temptation of those who could provide any advantage that would benefit them.

Also, the unanimous feeling that they were already out of the protection of the law, led any authority to amplify its power and to encourage its independent abuse.

In particular, during the deportations, both before the departure and on the way, on the routes followed, when the convoys of Jews were reduced to simple anonymous masses, without personality and without identity, when their life ceased to represent a notion worth defending, the abusive atmosphere grew in intensity contaminating as a plague, with or without reason, almost all conscience in such operations.

The idea of irresponsibility predominated, provoking and waking up primitive instincts. Under its cover, even remarkable aspects of honor and honesty were derailed and became entangled in the ambiance of infringements of the law. A case in point is that of Captain Alexandrescu which we will present later in this report.

All of the above was undoubtedly helped by the agitation and natural flight to delivery of the Jews, which devoted to their despair all the ancestral habits which characterize them.

Although, to a great extent, the informational material on the illegal activities in Bessarabia, connected with the Jews, was corrupted by the lack of seriousness and often overwhelmed by sentiments of revenge, nevertheless the Commission was able to obtain from its complexity some valuable indications which were



able to lead us on the road of fulfilling our mission.

Helped by this information and covering the full range of investigations involving research, we succeeded in presenting in this report facts, the majority of which are precise, related to the establishment of the Ghetto in Chisinau and the camps in Bessarabia, the life in the Ghetto and camps, the deportations, and the illegalities and infractions which occurred in connection with this situation, as follows:

I. The Establishment of the Ghetto in Chisinau  
and of the Camps in Bessarabia

A. The general situation in Chisinau in the first days after occupation.

On July 18, 1941, the Romanian troops captured in their successful advance the capital of Bessarabia which was consumed by fire, with its foundations shaking, dynamited by the retreating Red Army.

Colonel D. Tudosie, Assistant Chief of the Major Staff of the Fourth Corps, is named Military Commander of Chisinau and its surroundings which he reached on July 19 with a reduced staff of support and security.

The city reflected in its totality the living tragedy. Smoldering ruins and scattered corpses of people and animals everywhere, robbing bands of tramps and ravens of disasters, deserters and armed elements, from the communist army, who ruled the peripheries, as well as a total paralysis of any living activity.

The establishment of order and security was the chief concern, aimed at returning normal living conditions as well as achieving the needed tranquility behind the fighting troops at the front. With all the efforts that were made, the turbulent elements continued their activities by means of signals of light and arms fire during the night and peripheral disorders.<sup>12</sup>

B. The presence of the Jewish element.

Present in significant numbers, they represented the first and most serious obstacle in the work of reconstruction and the establishment of peace and public safety.

This conclusion is drawn from the following facts:

1. The not too distant past of 22 years of Romanian rule in Bessarabia was sufficiently tested by the permanent hostility which they manifested against all Romanian interests. Ignoring completely the goodwill of our rule, which treated them equally with Romanians in all their rights, they continued to think of and



look towards the sickle and hammer in the east, creating on Bessarabian soil the main nest for the recruitment of the majority of lawbreakers against the security of the State and public order.

2. In June of 1940, when Romanian troops were undergoing the painful moments of retreat without fighting, the most bitter humiliation, it was also the Jews who provoked it. Praising loudly the Red happiness which was approaching, they slapped with derision and defiance the tense face of the Romanian soldier, who succumbed unwillingly to an overwhelming humiliation.

3. The same attitudes of persecution and suppression were expressed towards Romanians temporarily left under communist rule. The evidence of priest Vladimir Burjacovski, professor Ilica and lawyer Constantin Stoenescu, presented before our Commission, is sufficient proof of the hate unfolded by these elements against all that was Romanian in the Bessarabia brought to its knees.

4. The Jews which retreated with the Russian Army have also sought to demonstrate their sentiments of enmity towards the Romanian State, which has protected them, by destroying their own buildings, so that they would not fall intact into the hands of the State, while some of those who remained, in the presence of the occupying Romanian forces, have contributed to a large degree to the sabotage of the initial security and order measures undertaken by the Military Command.<sup>13</sup>

**C. The initiative of establishing the Chisinau Ghetto and the special area assigned to it.**

Given the stated facts and following a consultation between the Governor of Bessarabia and Colonel Tudosie, it was decided to establish a Ghetto in Chisinau starting on July 22-23, 1941, i.e. four days after the entrance of Colonel Tudosie in Chisinau.

The area assigned for the Ghetto was the lower part of the city, towards Visterniceni, at the beginning being a larger area and later a reduced one in order to facilitate the possibilities of guarding and security.

**D. The establishment of camps in the rest of Bessarabia.**

As far as the rest of Bessarabia is concerned, where the danger of the Jewish element was the same, it was ordered by the Governor of Bessarabia, order No.61 of July 24, 1941, to the County Prefectures to establish camps in which all the Jews should be gathered.

The collection points were at Rautel, Limbeni, and Rascani, for the Jews of the Balti county; the Forests of Alexandru cel Bun and Rublenita, for those in the county of Soroca; Secureni and Ediniti, for the ones in Hotin and the North of Bucovina. Also at Orhei, Cahul, Ismail, Chilia Noua and Bolgrad.



However, after finding that some camps were providing unacceptable living conditions, steps were taken for their removal as follows: the Jews from the camps of the Forests of Alexandru cel Bun and Rublenita were interned in Vertujeni, and those from Rautel, Limbeni, and Rascani in the camp of Marculesti.

On August 16, 1941, the date on which the settlement in the camps was almost finished, 13,000 Jews were brought by the Germans from Transnistria<sup>14</sup>, without prior formalities, across the bridge at Iampol-Cosauti, under the pretext that they might have been among those who ran away ahead of our troops. These Jews were also directed to and interned in the camp of Vertujeni.<sup>15</sup>

#### E. Initial orders and instructions.

We must note that from the beginning both the Major General Staff and the Government of Bessarabia did not provide instructions to establish the arrangements applicable to the Ghetto and the camps.

Initially only overall directives were given, and detailed orders were taken only as various management difficulties arose. We shall demonstrate below that, for these reasons, many shortcomings developed due to this basic deficiency and partly due to the special regime applied in different camps as a result of the lack of a unifying total concept.

Also, there were no instructions given in reference to nominal statistics of the Jews interned in the camps and in the Ghetto of Chisinau.

#### F. The operation of establishing the Ghetto.

This was done by notices to the homes of Jews in the city, after which they were transported by military patrols, by the police, or by themselves, to the Ghetto, where everyone was free to house himself according to his own ability.

There were no instructions, however, on the allowable quantity of luggage, on the living conditions that waited them, or on means of support. Because of this fact, an evident confusion was observed in the concerns of the internees, and in particular, in their numerous returns to the city in order to satisfy their needs with objects taken from their previous homes. These returns, based on authorizations originating from the Military Commander of the Ghetto, continued until September bringing with them a procession of transactions and uses of valuables by the interned Jews who were already enlightened of their situation and the fate which was being prepared for them. (The statements of Int.Cpt. Roescu and Dr. Voina Potcoava). The latter, in his capacity as Director of the Inventory Service of the Town Hall of Metropolitan Chisinau, made a report to the Mayor on September 6, 1941, indicating that "the



Commander of the local Ghetto allows Jews to come to the city, accompanied by soldiers, to take household objects which used to belong to them. Some of these take objects which were already inventoried while others extract household items from hidden places and take them away", and insisting in conclusion that an intervention be made to stop this behavior.

In conclusion, the Ghetto of Chisinau was established four days after the entry of Romanian troops into the city without having, as its basis, precise orders and instructions which allowed the commission of various abuses and infractions.

## **II      Measures to Preserve the Valuables Remaining as the Property of the State**

In this chapter we refer to the valuables, both buildings and movable goods, which existed in the territory of Bessarabia and were previously owned by Jews or by legal Jewish entities. Their transfer to the property of the State was legalized and established by Law Nr.2507 of September 3, 1941.

Before that date there was no legal basis established for their disposition.

The ongoing military operations, the need to insure the rear of the front, the tactic and often administrative measures taken by the Major General Staff, which partly constrained the administrative authority, have certainly prevented at the beginning the establishment of a well managed operation.

Nevertheless, the Administration of Bessarabia took a series of measures aimed at protecting State property. In particular, on July 29, 1941, order No.146 was given, to the Prefectures and Town Halls, for the inventory of the urban Jewish properties and valuables. On August 2, 1941, it was followed up by another order No.307 for the same purpose. On September 4, 1941, concurrent with the appearance of Law Nr.2507, instructions were given with Nr.386 on the manner of administration and utilization of the real estate legally passing to the property of the State. In addition, an ordinance was promulgated, based on the Legal Decree Nr.161 of July 10, 1941, requiring all inhabitants to surrender, within 48 hours, all objects which did not belong to them or which were stolen.

On the situation of the valuables in Chisinau, and this to the degree that it concerned our ordered mission, we have found the following:

A. The Government gave the orders mentioned above but did decide on the implementation measures. The lack of personnel and resources for this purpose was the main impediment to doing anything.



B. Initially, no measures were taken for stopping the breaking into the residences and the destruction or stealing of furniture.

All these abuses could have been prevented, if the sealing of houses without owners or the intensification of street patrols would have been possible.

C. Lack of uniformity in the administration of the valuables were tolerated, thus: Market Management did the initial distribution of the houses; only in August was this function passed to the Town Hall; also the Recruitment Center obtained and transported many materials.

D. There was no follow up to the judicial suggestions of the executive bodies aimed at creating an inventory and a valuation of the buildings. Thus, the Chief of Town Hall Inventory Service, Voinea Potcova, submitted on September 26, 1941, report Nr.585 to the Director of Romanization of the Government in which a number of concrete proposals were made, aimed at guaranteeing and evaluating the State property and referring to:

1. The need of establishing a card and a special file for each real estate property.
2. The need of evaluating the real estate property and furniture, by a special commission with the right of appeal to a superior body.
3. The need to repair properties to avoid their deterioration and to make them productive.
4. The need of distributing the properties by sectors and the drawing up of regulations which will develop established norms for the administration of the State properties.

E. There were successively established too many commissions of evaluation and inventory. The first was the one appointed by the Town Hall, followed by another appointed by the Government, lead by Int. Cpt. Roescu, and finally, in November, four commissions were established presided by magistrates, facts which gave rise to the situation that today, six months after the occupation of Chisinau, it is not known precisely which are the buildings and other property belonging to the State in this Municipality.

F. Starting from September 4, 1941, when Law Nr.2506 appeared, which left the plenipotentiary administration of Bessarabia in the hands of the Governor, under the sole supervision of the State Leader<sup>16</sup>, this power was not used for the establishment of the needed line of authority.

An example: On October 17, 1941, the Government Directorate of Romanization, asked the Military Commander of Chisinau for approval of the removal from the Ghetto of some furniture to be collected in its stores. The answer by the Commander was a denial, Nr.3354 of October 18, 1941, until all deportations will be completed.



We conclude from this example that the Government, although an organ with full actual authority, nevertheless accepted in this case to be subordinate to the Military Commander of the city of Chisinau.

G. The approximate situation of the real estate within the Municipality of Chisinau which became the property of the State was:

- 1,906 buildings in liveable condition
- 359 " destroyed
- 70 " in a bad condition

In these buildings there were:

- 6,523 liveable apartments
- 323 uninhabitable apartments

The importance which we give to this chapter is justified by the conclusion that the real estate property left by the Jews was from the beginning the object of a whole series of thefts.

As documentation, we refer to the statement by Colonel Tudose, who literally emphasized that:

"In the first eight days, there was in the city no German police unit. Because of this, German military units, organized or not, or isolated in groups, committed acts of force, seizing and transporting all that was the best and most valuable from stores, abandoned or inhabited houses, engaging in conflicts and overcoming the Romanian military guards with the authority and right of a conqueror. These acts were repeatedly brought to the knowledge of the Army, the Governor and the Marshal. The search and appropriation of valuables, which were considered to be hidden in houses, furniture, sofas and floors, were the attraction of all, to which were also associated, by invitation, isolated Romanians. The contents of stores and materials from factories were in the majority of cases appropriated by German units. Wherever a Romanian guard was posted, after a short time German motorized units would appear, would move the Romanian guard away and, during the time that the guard would use for reporting, would load and leave.

Simultaneously with the initial situation of turbulence and lack of security, vagabonds of the periphery, unemployed people and mostly inhabitants of suburbs or nearby villages, roamed the streets, entered houses, committed acts of violence and stole all that they could find."

The witness Voina Potcova, also indicated in his declaration that the slums were full with stolen furniture.



In conclusion: There was, from the very beginning, no precise plan of the procedure which should be followed to insure the wealth that was reverting to the State.

In particular, at the beginning there was interference by the military authorities in this matter, which prevented the work of legitimate organs.

Even now, the operation of statistics and evaluation is not yet clarified.

### III            The Operation of the Chisinau Ghetto and of the Camps

#### A.    The guarding of the Ghetto and its organization.

The Ghetto depended on the Military Command of the city of Chisinau, which was led in succession by: Colonel D. Tudosie, from July 18 to September 1, 1941; General Panaitiu, from 1 to 7 September; and Colonel Eugen Dumitrescu from September 7 to November 15, 1941.

The guarding of the Ghetto was done by different units, which constantly changed because of movements governed by operational necessities. The following units contributed to guarding:

- Company 1 of the Infantry Regiment 50
- A unit of Infantry Regiment 68
- Police Company 10 - Lieutenant Puscasu
- The disinfection Company - Captain Poenaru
- Divisional Battalion 20, Lt. Col. Grigorescu and Lt. Emil Pop during 9-27 October, 1941
- Police Company 23, later changed into Mobile Gendarme Company of Chisinau, from 27 October, under the command of Cpt. Paraschivescu.

It was not possible to conduct the guarding and the security of the Ghetto under good conditions which could guarantee such operations. As first measures, the entrances and exits, corresponding to the streets which crossed the quarter, were barricaded with high wooden walls, but it was not possible to apply this measure also to the streets which bordered the Ghetto.

Because of this fact, through some houses and courtyards which led to these borderline streets, it was possible to enter and leave at will and to transport illegally any objects.<sup>17</sup>

The lack of resources, when compared with the appreciable length of 4 km. of the circumference to be guarded, was one of the main reasons for the situation described above.



The resources for guarding varied between 80-250 persons, the larger number having been reached only on October 27, 1941.

In addition to the problems mentioned above, there were other limitations, resulting from the location of the Ghetto as follows:

1. The presence in the area of approximately 100 Christian families, who lived there. For these it was not possible to make any restrictions of circulation, exit or entrance into the Ghetto.
2. The presence in the same quarter of storage containers of grain and corn, of the Recruitment Center of the County of Lapusna, factories of soap, siphons and rope, for which again, it was not possible to have limitations of circulation.
3. The road to the airport, which was heavily travelled, passed through the length of the Ghetto.

These facts assisted various illicit trade and possibilities of escape.

#### B. The living conditions in the Ghetto.

These were not determined by a precise and judicial regulation. Everyone, rich and poor, lived on their own account. For this purpose, the entry into the Ghetto of peasant carts were allowed, bringing various food products. Colonel Tudose established their own bakery, hospital and pharmacy.

The social composition of the Ghetto was approximately as follows:

- 4,148 men, 4,476 women and 2,901 children; total of 11,525 persons.

Among these, the following were older than 50 years of age:

- 1,502 men and 1,704 women; total 3,206 people.

As far as material conditions were concerned, the majority were poor, among which approximately 3,000 were completely without means of support being helped, even before their introduction into the Ghetto, by the Jewish Community. Better off, with own means of support, were some 2,000 Jews with only 200 among them which that could be considered wealthy.

In view of this situation, except the 3,000 supported by the Community, the majority obtained money for living by selling different objects in their possession.

Until the beginning of the deportations, when there was a categorical order stopping the trade in the Ghetto, these transactions were neither encouraged nor expressly forbidden.



The lack of any indications from the Military Commander, helped the trade and embezzlement operations of valuables to the detriment of the State.

**c. Other institutions existing in the Ghetto.**

1. For the maintenance of order it was established, from the beginning, a police unit under the leadership of Commissioner Virgil Ionescu, who had at his disposal a group of public guardians. This police instrument, aimed at collaborating with the Military Commander, was never known to intervene in order to prevent, discover or describe the abuses taking place.

This situation is partly due to the excessive pressure on the military authorities and also due to the recommendations actually given by the police chiefs to stay as much as possible in the background.

2. The Jewish community in the Ghetto had its own institution of leadership in the form of a committee of 20 persons, under the chairmanship of Guttman Landau. The Committee worked directly with the Military Commander of Chisinau to whom it expressed its complaints; it also managed the execution of orders with respect to taking Jews to public work and to the deportations; finally it provided help to the poor, sick and handicapped.

**D. Mortality**

By natural means, it was not too high. In Chisinau, 441 Jews died of which 20 committed suicide before the deportations.<sup>18</sup> A bigger percentage was in the camp of Vertujeni, namely about 1,800 Jews of which a majority was from among the 13,000 Jews brought into Bessarabia by the Germans and who were in a special state of physical misery. Lt.Col. Pallade, from whose deposition these facts are taken, told us about an incident suggestive of the way that the Germans understood treating them. Namely, when transferring the Jews to us and seeing that the Romanian authorities were distributing bread and tea, they protested saying: "Why are you giving them bread and tea? We shoot them".

**E. The behavior of the guarding authorities in the Ghetto.**

In general, the treatment of the Jews in the Ghetto as a result of the behavior of the soldiers, officers and the organs of the military leadership, was humane and civilized. This was confirmed by many testimonies. (Guttman Landau, Dumitru Sili, Solomon Sur, Ilie Bodoi, Nina Zoltur, Cpt. rez. Balinski, and others)

**F. Entries and exits from the Ghetto until the beginning of the deportations.**

During the leadership of Colonel Tudose, other than the freedom



given to some Jews, who returned to their former residences to recover some of the things left behind, the system of entries and exits from the Ghetto was operated in good order.

The authorizations were given without the Military Command.

At the beginning, when the appetite for robberies had been unleashed and rapes of Jewish women by soldiers became more frequent, particularly by the German army, Colonel Tudose took drastic measures of preventing them by stopping the entry into the Ghetto of soldiers independent of their army. The same applied to vehicles and to any person who did not have any connection with the Ghetto.

He established powerful patrols for the prevention of entrance into the Ghetto indicating that, in case of opposition, firearms should be used.

The issued authorizations were only for Christians living in the Ghetto, for peasants bringing in provisions and for the institutions based there.

The same regime was continued also under the leadership, of a few days, of General Panaitiu, after which, with the arrival of the command of Colonel Eugen Dumitrescu, tolerance and irregularities became the rule.

Tolerance, meaning that the selection of those who entered or left was not executed in the former strict manner but favoritism became prominent.

Irregularities, meaning that persons without any reason, except that they were in the graces of the Military Commander of the city, of the Ghetto, of the Major Chief of State, or of the Commanding office, entered and left whenever they wanted, exercising all manner of transactions and abuses, which we will describe in the chapter on the infractions which occurred.

We cite among them: Nadia Terzi, Maria Licocofski, Zina Flaiser, Gabriela Gherstein, and others.

In addition, a witness (Nina Zoltur) told us that she saw military vehicles which took some of the more beautiful girls from the Ghetto into the city.

#### **G. Guarding and the life in the camps.**

In the other camps of Bessarabia life took the same form and with the same means.

The guard was provided by gendarmes of the respective legions but under better conditions, particularly in Vertujeni and Marculesti,



because the location of the camps was more appropriate for such a purpose.

In conclusion:

1. The organization and the functioning of the Ghetto of Chisinau was characterize by the absence of instructions which would have described precisely the required behavior of the executive organs.
2. The guarding of the Ghetto of Chisinau was executed in a mediocre manner because of the low level of resources with which a serious guarding was not possible.
3. The full functioning of the Ghetto of Chisinau was left in the hands of the military organs, the civil authorities avoiding or evading any action.
4. During the period that the Ghetto was under the command of Colonel Tudose, his concern was evident for the organization of a life as humane as possible for the Jews, as well as for the prevention of abuses.

**IV**

The Deportations

**A. Orders and basic instructions.**

From the memorandum of the Governor of Bessarabia, with respect to the Ghetto of Chisinau, addressed to President of the Council of Ministers, it follows that the decision on the deportation of the Jews of Bucovina and Bessarabia, across the Nistru river, was taken in a Council meeting in Tighina, with the participation of all provincial Governors. On that occasion, precise instructions were given on the manner that the operation should be executed. The Major General Staff was given the responsibility to manage the operations, together with the Major Pretor, General Topor, and the Gendarme Inspector of Bessarabia, Colonel Meculescu, as executive organs.

On behalf of the Major General Staff, Lt.Col. Pallade was assigned with the elaboration of the plans for deportation.

**B. The given instructions, itineraries, the points of passage.**

On September 7, 1941, the Major Pretor, General Topor, provided to the Inspector of Gendarmes in Chisinau, in the form of a "Note", the following instructions:

1. The Jewish deportation operation will start on September 12, 1941, with the camp of Vertujeni towards Casauti and Rezina.
2. Groups of maximum 1,600 including children, but crossing the



Nistru only maximum 800 per day.

3. Approximately 40-50 carts for every group.
4. Groups will leave Vertujeni every two days.
5. At each crossing, approximately one officer of Legionnaire gendarme.
6. The itinerary will be fixed by Lt.Col. Pallade with the commanders of the Legion.
7. The crossing without any formalities.
8. Two supplementary platoons as assistance.
9. The gendarmes of the territorial locations to help with the cleaning of the area and the burial of the dead with the help of the inhabitants.
10. The manner of dealing with those who do not comply? (Alexianu)
11. No custom duties to be levied. Those who rob will be executed.

Following this note, Colonel Meculescu, the Inspector of Gendarmes in Bessarabia, together with Lt.Col. Pallade, gave detailed instructions to the Gendarmes Legionnaires including the established routes.

These established routes, to be followed by the convoys, were as follows:

1. For those from the Northern Bessarabia and Bucovina: from the camp of Vertujeni, through Soroca - point of crossing Cosauti and through Mateuti - point of crossing Rezina; those from Bucovina through point of crossing Atachi.
2. Those from Southern Bessarabia, were directed, from Cahul, Belgrad, Ismail, Chilia Noua, Valcov, through Tarutino, point of crossing Purcari.

From the information given to the Commission by the Inspector of Gendarmes Chisinau, it was shown that, through the points of crossing mentioned above, there were deported from Bessarabia 55,867 Jews and from Bucovina 45,538 Jews.

A total of 101,405 Jews.<sup>19</sup>

Now, in the Ghetto of Chisinau there are: 17 Jews left with a special authorization, 34 sick in the Ghetto hospital; 14 representing the personnel of the hospital (doctors, nurses,



"ciocli"<sup>20</sup>); 15 companions of the sick and 6 children left from an orphanage. Total of 86 Jews.

### C. The execution of the deportation from the Ghetto of Chisinau.

The deportation from this Ghetto started on October 12, 1941, with a column of about 1,500 Jews.<sup>21</sup>

In order to achieve order in the formation of the convoys and their departure, the Ghetto was divided into sectors. Those in question were notified through the Community, by the organs of the Military Command of the Ghetto, one day in advance in order to prepare for departure. There was no precise instruction given of the nature and quantity of the luggage that they were allowed to take with them.

As a norm, each was allowed to take as much as they could carry.

If until this period the life in the Ghetto had acquired somehow an aspect of peace and order, from now on an atmosphere of worry and ferment was unleashed.

The fear of the unknown, the difficulties of the journey and the rumors which disturbed the spirits, forced the Jews, on one hand, to take all available means to evade and escape the departure or to postpone it, and on the other hand, resulted in many abuses and illegalities.

Many of the Jews would ran away the day before departure from the sector to be deported to another one, whose turn was to come later, hiding in attics, cellars, etc., in order not to be found.

The illegal sales in the Ghetto intensified more than ever, also the transactions of precious metals.

The orders of the march were: by foot for those capable, the carts for the old, the sick and the children. The luggage was also loaded on the carts.

The columns marched with great difficulty, disorder and with resulting confusion because:

1. Due to winter, the rains and the cold weather started.
2. In general, the number of vehicles were insufficient, some became defective on the way, some were driven by oxen and some by horses.

For the Ghetto of Chisinau, there were two stages: Chisinau - Orhei<sup>22</sup>; Orhei - Rezina.

Initially, the order of the Major Pretor was that there should be



provided 40-50 carts for a convoy of 1,500 Jews.

Nevertheless, because of the large number of old people and young children, who were unable to work, the Legions had to have more carts.

There were, however, many difficulties because the Government issued order Nr.4029/941, that no requisition take place, so that agricultural work not be impeded, and on October 28, 1941, another No.519, which required only one cart for 70 people.

The Prefectures followed Governmental orders and, as a consequence, refused the demands of the Legions of Gendarmes. This led to cases of direct hinderance of the deportation operation.

Thus, the Mayor of the commune of Vascauti, in the county of Soroca, not only refused to cooperate in the collection of the carts, but urged the inhabitants to run away with the carts in the fields. (Report Nr.3245 of October 2, 1941, by the Inspector of Chisinau Gendarmes, to the prefecture of the county of Soroca).

To all of this is added the appetite for speculation of the cart owning peasants, for whom the requisitioning authorities did not establish a given payment for the imposed service. With the intention of maximizing their profits as a result of the need, they kept very many Jews, and specially those suspected of having resources, in a permanent state of pressure. Threatening to remove them from the carts or simulating the overturning of the carts, they forced to be given money and various objects.

After the passing of a number of convoys, this system became popular and, for purposes of making a profit, carriers could be seen waiting at road intersections and offering their carts and services.

The conveys were led by gendarmes, generally under the leadership of a noncommissioned officer, who allocated a soldier for guarding every five carts. Some of these fraternized through non intervention with the machinations of the carriers, which lacked humanity.

Among those who were walking, many were left behind, not being used to the difficulties of the march and due to physical exhaustion.

For all these reasons, the convoys appeared as interrupted lines; itineraries could not be kept and sometimes convoys would meet at the same point.

The periods of rest were carried out in the field or near woods, to avoid stopping in villages and thus escaping possible attacks and robberies by the peasants. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these precautions, cases were observed when, during the resting period,



peasants would come out of the fields of maize or from the ditches where the convoys were waiting and commit acts of robbery.

During the march, the deported had to obtain food by their own means.

Those who died on the way were buried during the first stages.

In the other camps, the deportation was generally conducted in the same way.

#### D. The crossing of the Nistru

The convoys arriving at Rezina were received by a group of gendarmes, under the command of Lt. rez. Popoiu, who had the responsibility of executing the operation of crossing the Nistru. He would receive them, would transport them in a convoy to Rublenita in Transnistria where he would transfer them to the local gendarmes given this mission. The crossing was done on foot and in carts.

The Jews deported from Bucovina were brought by trains until Atachi. Because of this mode of transportation, they took with them large quantities of luggage. However, from here onward, having to travel by foot or in carts until the crossing of the Nistru and in Transnistria only by foot, they were not allowed to carry with them except luggage strictly necessary and possible to be transported in this new situation.

The remaining luggage which was left, was stored in the care of the gendarmes and the organs of B.N.R. in Atachi and Marculesti.

With respect to the ownership rights of this luggage, discussions arose between the Governor of Bucovina, who claimed that it belonged to him since it came from Jews deported from Bucovina, and the Government of Bessarabia, which claimed ownership since it was on its territory.

This was reported telegraphically to the Major General Staff as early as November 14, 1941, and a Commission is still working today on its inventory and placement.

#### In conclusion:

The deportation was executed under difficult conditions and is characterized by difficulties encountered on the way, due to lack of vehicles and robberies committed by the population of the communities located along the routes of the convoys. The cart drivers exploited the circumstances, trying to extort, by all available means, money and objects from the Jews.

The transportation difficulties and the bad weather helped these



robberies, sometimes committed with the complicity, or at least the tolerance of the escorts.

v. The Operation of Buying Valuables from the Deported Jews by the B.N.R. Commission

Some of the investigations conducted by the Commission indicated that, after the crossing through Rezina of approximately 10 convoys containing some 8,000 Jews, all without being searched, Lt. Popoiu, who was in charge of their transport across the Nistru, informed his superiors through the chain of command that the Germans were searching them in Transnistria removing all valuables and currencies in their possession. This was at the beginning of October 1941.

Having been notified, the Presidency issued an instruction to the Ministry of Finance, No.8507 of October 5, 1941, which in turn sent a memo No.269274 of October 14, 1941, to the Government of Bessarabia in which it established the exchange rates.

On October 8, 1941, the central office of the B.N.R. was made aware by the Presidency and, as a consequence on October 9, 1941, sent to Chisinau by plane a commission under the chairmanship of Mr. Bucur Jugareanu.

Simultaneously the Government also issued the telegraphic order No.9, dated October 9, 1941, to the Prefectures of Balti and Soroca containing exchange rates.

The B.N.R. delegates divided themselves into three Commissions, working as follows: the first chaired by Mr. Bucur Jugareanu at Visterniceni, Orhei and Rezina, the second at Marculesti and the third at Cetatea-Alba.

Each commission was made up of: B.N.R. representatives, a representative of the army and the necessary experts for the valuation of gold and precious stones.

The army representative, specifically requested by the B.N.R. Commission, was needed to prevent, through his presence, suspicions which could have been created as a result of the operations which were performed.

The Commissions worked under very difficult conditions because of the trickling of the convoys from various directions and the subsequent need of its displacement, of the absence of proper premises and the bad weather. They often worked at night, in the rain and without sufficient light.

The criteria of exchange and valuation, provided by the Ministry of Finance, the General Management of Currency Exchange, were as



follows:

- Payment in rubles, at 1 rubble = 40 lei
- Gold paid according to its weight and purity at the official rate.
- Stones and other precious objects paid according to a valuation by an expert and only 20% of valuation, which was equivalent to the ratio of gold at its official price and on the free market.
- Lei were also exchanged for Kassenschein at the rate of one to 60 lei. In any case, they were not allowed to cross the Nistru with Romanian currency.<sup>23</sup>

The operation of control and exchange was carried out thus:

- The exchange of Lei into rubles was initially made with nominal lists. Later, because of the accumulation of work, this system was abandoned, having been considered an unnecessary formality.

- For jewelry, gold coins and valuables, individual receipts were initially generated with the detailed description of the value and the amount paid. These were placed in separate envelopes which were deposited in special boxes. Later, for the same reasons mentioned above and for greater simplicity, the individual receipts system was given up and tables were generated.

After work, the boxes with the envelopes and valuables were deposited in the B.N.R. safe which accompanied the Commission. The safe was locked and the key was given to the President of the Commission. Security was by military guards under orders not to allow to anyone to open the safe except in the presence of the full Commission.

In the cities where the National Banks had safes, for example in Orhei, the boxes with the valuables were deposited there, the safe was locked with one of the keys taken by the President of the Commission and the second by the representative of the Army.

On October 22, 1941, Cpt. Paraschivescu, the Commander of Police Company 23, submitted a report in which he described alleged shortcomings in the procedure followed by the B.N.R. Commission - quoting the lack of a cash register for the exchange of rubles, the lack of a safety box for the deposit of the valuables, in place of the envelopes and the wooden boxes which were used and the need for establishing a controlling register for these valuables.

The Government, informed of this report, verified the observations of Cpt. Paraschivescu and concluded that the procedure followed provided all the guarantees of an honest operation.



In conclusion:

The operations performed by the B.N.R. Commission were normal and did not create any observed deviations from an honest and conscientious line.

**VI.           Infractions Associated with the Ghetto**

**A.   Robberies in the city immediately after the retreat of the Bolsheviks.**

Because of the lack of needed forces for municipal security and the disorder and panic left after the fighting, many robberies took place during this period.

Committing these robberies were the vagabonds of the peripheries, peasants of the suburbs and nearby communities and, in an organized way, German troops. Passing Romanian troops were involved to a smaller degree.

The robberies were directed more towards the abandoned houses, involving furniture and every item of value.

The Germans acquired the contents of stores and factory materials, removing, with the right of the conqueror, the Romanian military guards. From private dwellings they particularly valued peasant items, clothing and pianos.

This situation lasted 8-10 days after the occupation of Chisinau.

From the beginning, because of lack of resources, it was not possible to identify the criminals, so that today this action would be much too late and could not give any results.

**B.   Violations, robberies and arbitrary removals from the Ghetto.**

1. During the first days of segregating the Jews in the Ghetto, 5 to 6 women complained to the Community that they were raped by soldiers, in particular those in passing. This fact was brought to our attention by Leib Rapaport, Dr. Leila Telis and Nuhim Sadagurschi, who stated that he was an eye witness to the rape of a girl by a barber. No specific details were given to us either of the victims or of the perpetrators.

2. Also, from the declarations of the above and without being given other details, the commission was informed that during the same period of establishing the Jews in the Ghetto there were cases of Jews being robbed by passing soldiers.

3. Only the witness Itic Nuhim Buicovschi declared to us that, during one of the days of September 1941, a sergeant major, whose



name he did not know, entered his dwelling in the Ghetto and forcibly removed a blanket, a bed cover and a wooden box.

4. During the process of installing the Jews in the Ghetto, Colonel Tudose told us that the Germans, abusing their power, would initially take out groups or individual Jews and use them to identify dwellings where materials or hidden valuables could be found. This, with all the opposition of the Romanian guarding units.

Because of this situation, Colonel Tudose was obliged to issue orders to shoot anyone who would enter the Ghetto by force or for abuse.

5. A specific case of theft was charged against Cpt. Ioan Paraschivescu, the Commander of the Gendarme Unit in Chisinau, who guarded the Ghetto. Abusing his position and using the orderly soldier Ion Trifan, he took from the Ghetto store items left by the Jews, domestic objects and dishes, and sent them to his wife in Bucharest in baskets and in many transports. This fact was proven by the declarations of the soldier Ion Trifan, the sergeant Dumitrache and front rank Radu Florea, who helped him in execution and in transporting the objects. In addition, by means of a number of house searches in Bucharest and confrontations which took place between the above, most of the stolen objects were identified.

The officer is under arrest and being investigated by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

#### C. Attempts and escapes from the Ghetto.

Less before and more during the deportation period, attempts at escape and actual escapes from the Ghetto took place.

The cases found by the Commission were as follows:

1. Kisel Kremer and Smil Veisencher ran away from the Ghetto and were caught at the railway station in Chisinau where they were trying to leave by train. This took place on October 22, 1941. They were arrested and returned to the Ghetto through the local police. They declare that no one helped them escape and that they left the Ghetto illegally.

2. The Germans helped the escape of the following Jews: Spanermann, Mortcovici Samuel, Kalikman, Allerman, Boserman, the families Ghermann, Cervinschi<sup>24</sup>, lawyer Sudit, Abramovici, and Gherstein. The family Gherstein, made up of father, mother, son and daughter, paid to a German car, driven by a non-commissioned officer and two soldiers, the sum of 150,000 lei, to be taken to Bucharest. We have this information from the agent Galtov and from the admission, in front of the Commission, of all the members of the Gherstein family and the above mentioned Samy Mortcovici.



3. Melich Schwartzberg was brought to Bucharest by train by an alleged agent covered by the police, Petrescu. He paid 20,000 lei and a gold wedding ring. He acknowledges the fact.

The case is being investigated by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

4. Itic Nuhim Buicanschi escaped alone arriving by train to Bucharest. He acknowledges the fact. It is being investigated by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

5. The family Marcu Cohn (husband and wife) and Cervinschi (husband, wife and children) were transported to Bucharest by train by police agents Ion Rohan, Neamtu and Stoenescu, the first being paid 50,000 lei and the last two 100,000. They acknowledge the fact and are under investigation by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.<sup>25</sup>

6. Solomon Spanerman, Saia Perlmutter, Levensohn with wife and one child, Cristal, Weisser with his brother and wife, were brought to Bucharest in a car, between October 10-14, 1941, by Captain Ilie Doicescu of the Aerial Defence Command. This was executed with the help of his concubine Nadejda Sumnevici and of Eugen Dumitru of Chisinau. It is claimed that they took 2,000,000 lei. The first two are under arrest and the affair is under investigation by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

7. Apoteker with his family escaped from the Ghetto to Bucharest during the night of October 15-16, 1941.<sup>26</sup> It is suspected that he was helped by Major rez. Petre Mardare of Bucharest, with whom the above had commercial connections. The case is under investigation by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

8. The family Spanermann, comprising mother and two children, together with Iosif Volovet, agreed with a front ranker airman to be brought to Bucharest for the sum of 6,000 lei. They started in the car and, after they took from them another 2,000 lei on the way, at a distance of 30 km. from Chisinau the driver stopped the car under the excuse that he needed to add water to the radiator. Afterwards, he claimed that the car would not move unless pushed by its occupants. All descended, pushed the car which took off leaving them behind. This information is from the declaration of Iosif Volovet.

#### D. Illicit trade of jewelry and precious metals

1. Initially, many German military would enter the Ghetto to buy gold through a middleman called Lew (The declaration of Commissioner Virgil Ionescu whose constituency included the Ghetto)

Also, the witness Andrei Neago declared that a watchmaker sold some gold to German soldiers who paid him with out of circulation old



marks.

2. The witness Itic Nihim Buicanschi described that someone named Spingeanu, ex-owner of the shop "Casapian-Spingeanu" of Chisinau and now living in Bucharest, would come to the Ghetto in his car buying precious stones and gold objects. Also, he hinted at Nadejda Terzi, former concubine of Colonel Eugen Dumitrescu.

At the completion of the investigations, the judicial authorities will be notified.

The respective authorities have, under preliminary investigation, the following cases of trade in precious metals:

1. Leonida Harbuz, who was caught in the Ghetto with 273 grams of gold bought from Polea Sisma. It is being investigated at the Martial Court.

2. Cpt. rez. Vasile Serbanescu and Major rez. Petre Mardare are under suspicion of helping a Jew, accompanied by two Jewish women, to take valuable objects and precious metals out of hiding places in Nr.10 Eminescu St. and Nr.46 Carol St. The first occurrence was made in the presence of the wife of Dr.Cpt.Popă, who occupies the house at Nr.10 Eminescu St. The fact is under investigation by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

3. The fact that the Jews possessed precious metals and jewelry and were trading them in order to have means for daily living was verified also in a trap, organized by Captain Paraschivescu, the Commander of the Ghetto, with the knowledge of the Commander of the Third Army Corps and the assistance of a military prosecutor.

Namely: on October 29, 1941, using an intermediary agent, the Jew Iosif Sadagurschi pretended to offer the Jews Roza Atatchi, Sico Lipovetchi, Tabia Kelerman and Avram Capitel the possibility of being removed from the Ghetto and left free in Romania in exchange for precious stones and money. For this purpose, five false authorizations were prepared by the Army Corps which, through the above mentioned intermediary Sadagurschi, were handed over to the respective people, bringing in return to the Commander of the Ghetto the following valuables: a lady's ring with two diamonds, a man's gold watch, two ladies gold watches, one pair of gold earrings, a gold hanging chain, one man's gold chain, a gold ring and two gold bracelets, all of which were confiscated and deposited at B.N.R. The false authorizations were retrieved and the Jews were deported.

**E. Illicit trade of authorizations for entering the city, for postponing the deportation and influence trade.**

Such infractions happened exclusively under the command of Col.



Eugen Dumitrescu and through his concubine Nadejda Terzi.

This woman had at all times free entrance into the Ghetto and, with the protection and knowledge of the Military Commander, fully exploited this situation.

She established prices of 1,000-1,500 lei for a permit to exit to the city and 5,000-70,000 lei for the postponement of the deportation from one convoy to another.

Usually, the transactions were made in the house of the Jew Venisencher, which whom she was in close business association. In addition, she had as an accomplice also the Jew Maghidovici, who established for himself a kind of office for these practices.

The following authorizations were given, as discovered by us, for various sums of money:

1. Legally, for the postponement of the departure on October 21, 1941, to: David Mulumud, Mina Nisemboim, Ion Meifet, Zina Fleischer, Raia Maghid, User Zilbrang, Pulina Svalboim, Motel Davidovici, Aron Cogan, Torban Cresea, and Iser Rabinovici. All were found with the above mentioned.

2. She negotiated with the lawyer Rabinovici the selling of seven authorizations, for staying until the last convoy, for 35,000 lei of which she received an advance of 15,000 lei. The above mentioned lawyer, having been advised by his brother-in-law not to give any more money since he will in any case be left for the last convoy because of his wife who was gravely ill, asked Nadia Terzi for the return of the advance. She did return the money but, as retribution for Rabinovici's behavior, intervened with Col. Dumitrescu and he decided for immediate deportation, although the wife was not in a condition for deportation and the medical doctor of the Ghetto was recommending a postponement.

3. The Jew Iaroslavici received 3-4 deportation postponements paying for them with a diamond ring valued at 72,000 lei.

4. Mura Volovet and Ida Spanerman also paid for three authorizations 5,000 lei each and material for a coat with lining and a fur collar. They received them through the intermediary Jew Simha Glukman.

Nadia Terzi acknowledged partly the accusation against her, confirming at the confrontation between her and Col. Dumitrescu that she received for the authorizations 100,000 lei which she handed over to the officer. Colonel Dumitrescu acknowledged that he gave to Nadia a few authorizations but not for money.

However, Colonel Dumitrescu also worked on his own for the above purposes.



5. On October 23, 1941, Colonel Dumitrescu received from Kisell Kremer the sum of 700,000 lei, of which 500,000 were counted within the premises of the Community, and 200,000 lei through the lawyer Sapirin, that he not be send to Balta.

This happened the very next day after Kremer was caught at the railway station in Chisinau trying to run away and after Colonel Dumitrescu subjected him to a rigorous search. After the payment of the above sum, all restrictions on him were removed.

6. He received on a number of occasions, for the same benefits, sums of money from Sapirin, and from Nina Vecselstein 30,000 lei to be allowed to leave with the last convoy.

From the declaration of the Jew Aizic Itco Sebel, it follows that a few hundred of such authorizations were given.

The facts in this chapter are confirmed from the partial confession of those implicated and also from the depositions made to the Commission by: Colonel Meculescu, Andrei Neaga, Kisell Kremer, Guttman Landau, Izidor Bikman, Michel Schwartzberger, Lt. Emil Pop, Ghers Pulferman, Mura Volovetz, Ida Spanerman, Alex. Margulius, and Aizic Itco Sebel.

#### F. Abuses of power and trust. Illegal wear of uniforms.

The authority of the institutions responsible with the supervision and maintenance of order in the activities of the Ghetto and the deportations, was often utilized for directly opposite purposes, namely to assist or commit various abuses.

The Commission found the following cases:

1. Colonel Dumitrescu ordered Cpt. Alexandrescu, his Chief of Major Staff, to send to Bucharest a soldier courier to carry correspondence between the Community of the Ghetto and the Jewish Community of the Capital.

The courier made a number of trips for this purpose and, each time, Col. Dumitrescu was paid for this service 100,000 lei and Cpt. Alexandrescu 50,000 lei. This information was obtained from the Jew Aizic Itco Sebel, however without being corroborated by additional proof.

2. The Jew Sapirin, lawyer, Vice-President of the Community of the Ghetto, was transported by the car of the Military Commander of Chisinau, driven by Captain Alexandrescu, in order to make contact with the Jewish Community of the Capital. He stayed one day in Bucharest and was returned in the same way to Chisinau. The Jew travelled in a military uniform to avoid the problems of controls. Cpt. Alexandrescu claims that this Jew was brought to Bucharest, at the urging of Col. Dumitrescu, in place of the lawyer



Sudit, who was requested by the Presidency and who on that date was not to be found. The fact is acknowledged by Cpt. Alexandrescu and confirmed by many witnesses (Guttman Landau, Sebel, etc.)<sup>27</sup>

3. On November 1-2, 1941, Guttman Landau, the President of the Ghetto Community, asked Cpt. Alexandrescu to take 250,000 lei and to convey them to the Jew Sapirin, who already left with a deportation convoy. - Sapirin was to be found on the way and the money transmitted after Visterniceni, the locality where the B.N.R. Commission was searching the deported Jews. The officer, after persistent denials and in a confrontation with Guttman Landau, finally admitted of taking the money and handing it to Colonel Dumitrescu, who also gave him 100,000 lei. He claims that he spent this money on acts of benevolence and the needs of the Command, which had no funds allocated to it.

The above case was referred to the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

4. On October 23, 1941, the Jews Kisell Kremer and Smil Veinsenker were apprehended at the Chisinau railway station while trying to escape. They were sent under arrest, through the local Police Station, to the Commander of the Ghetto, Lt. Pop, who received them together with the sum of 34,995 lei found in their possession.

Lt. Pop claims that Lt. Col. Grigorescu, the Commander of the Battalion 20 of Artillery, who was guarding the Ghetto and who was present when the Jews and the money were transferred, ordered him to call them next day on the pretense of returning the money (22,995 lei to Kremer and 12,000 lei to Veinsenker), to get them to sign but not to return to them the respective sums. He claims that he executed the order, calling the above. Kisell Kremer's brother, Simcha Kremer, and Veinsenker himself appeared and signed a receipt without being returned any of the money. He claims that the sum of 34,995 was given to Lt. Col. Grigorescu. This denies the allegation.

The matter was transmitted to the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

5. On December 15, 1941, a search was conducted at the house of Lt. Col. Grigorescu of Sebes-Alba; Str. Drumul Sibiului Nr. 21, to determine what he transported from Bessarabia and what was the source of the goods transported. Very many objects, materials and animals were found having been brought by train from Bessarabia, being able to justify only a few of them.

The investigation is due to be completed by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps, where the officer is under arrest.

On January 10, 1942, he was made to retire under Article 58 of the L.I.A.



6. The same above mentioned officer, took together with the unit that he commanded - Battalion 20 of Artillery - his concubine, Maria Licicovschi. He dressed her militarily, thus taking her with him from June 22 to November 25, 1941, when he returned to the Garrison of Sebes-Alba. The fact is established with the acknowledgement of Maria Licicovschi and the declaration of the informer, Lt. Aurel S. Samargiteanu.

The judgement of the case is with the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

7. During the deportations, Sergeant Major Saftenco of the Gendarme Legion of Orhei, among others, was assigned with guard duties of the crossing of the Nistru.

With the fulfillment of this service, he found the occasion to make money speculating on the state of misery of the deported. In particular, he offered rooms for sleeping, to those obliged to spend a night in Rezina, for various sums of money. This was discovered by determining that he took 5,000 lei from Mura Volavet and Erlich, providing one room for five families to take shelter for one night.

The fact was established from the declarations and the subsequent confrontations between the above mentioned non-commissioned officer, Mura Volavet and Ida Spanerman.

It is being investigated by the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

8. One of the systems employed by Colonel Dumitrescu for extorting money from Jews was also to threaten them with various measures or to pretend to execute measures based on superior orders.

A specific case was detailed by the witness Aizic Itco Sebel who declared that this officer announced to the community that, by orders received from superiors, he will send 400 Jews from the Ghetto for work to Tiraspol. The Jews, fearing that the execution of this order will result in the disappearance of those sent away, began negotiations with Colonel Dumitrescu, through the community representatives Bittman and Sapirin, who gave him three, four times 100,000 lei each to postpone the fulfillment of the claimed superior order.

No Jew was sent to Tiraspol.

On December 18, 1941, as a result of a confrontation arranged by the Commission between Colonel Eugen Dumitrescu and his concubine Nadejda Terzi, a confrontation which resulted in the preliminary establishment of the acts of illicit trade that the above mentioned performed with the help of and through this woman, the officer,



probably realizing that the definite proof of his acts was now established, committed suicide by firing a revolver.

9. With the purpose of verifying some rumors related to the escape of Jews from the Ghetto, Lt.Col. Radulescu, the Cabinet Director of the Government, approved that the special agent Constantin Madan simulate helping some Jews to escape, who would be surprised by a military magistrate in the process of bribery.

Agent Madan recruited 13 Jews among the wealthiest, headed by Kisell Kremer, with the help, in the operation to be executed, of four other special intelligence government agents, namely: Manu Gheorghe, Ion Cojocaru, Ion Nedu and Constantin Ionescu. For transportation it was established that he be given the sum of 1,200,000 lei. Simulating the escape and after asking for a deposit of 120,000 lei of the agreed price, the Jews were led to the headquarters of the Special Service in Chisinau where they were arrested.

The Military Magistrate, who accompanied them, made a formal report of the quick search of the Jews and after his departure they were given over to the five agents, who proceeded to perform a second rigorous search in the cellar of the Service.

On this occasion, they found on the Jews approximately 1,200 gold coins, two gold watches and 20,000 lei cash.

From these valuables, they delivered to the Military Tribunal the gold watches and some coins and distributed the rest in a brotherly fashion among themselves.

They are all under arrest and under investigation of the Preliminary Investigatory Office of the Lapusna Tribunal.

#### G. Robberies during the deportations

The deportation convoys represented a most irregular pattern. Because of those who lagged behind, and of the carts which often broke down on the way, there were inevitable breaks in their continuity and in particular they sometimes spread over distances of a few kilometers. Homogeneous guarding was not possible under these conditions, particularly since the resources were limited. The allocation was one gendarme for five carts.

Because of these gaps and the inability of exercising sufficient supervision, for the reasons shown above, there took place during this operation many attempts and many actual robberies against the Jews. Also, during the rest periods, which took place at night, under the conditions of darkness and insufficient security, there were cases of robberies.

In our investigation, we have concluded the following:



1. First of all, the cart drivers were those who, through either threats or explicit robberies, stole from the possessions of the Jews.

Most often, they did not complain for fear of retribution from the robbers.

Information on these facts was supplied by Lt.Col. Radu Lazar, Major Bechi, Gendarme Sergeant Major Ioan Harbagiu, Guttman Landau, and Alexandru Margulius.

2. Peasants and tramps also took active part in active robberies along the deportation routes.

They smuggled themselves among the convoys and, sometimes even by means of direct attacks, stole all that was in their way.

Thus:

On the road to Rezina, some peasants from the village of Biesti, came out in front of a convoy and stole the bundles of the Jews from the carts. The escorts caught them, their papers were taken by the chief of the office of Curleni and they were referred to the Justice system (declaration of Major Bechi).

In Atachi, civilian population penetrated at night through the gendarmes in the Jewish camp and stole. The guard was strengthened and the robberies stopped (declaration of Lt.Col. Pallade).

On the route between Visterniceni and Orhei, peasants and tramps tried to attack the Jewish carts in order to rob them. The escorts intervened, stopped and dispersed them (declaration of Sub.Lt. Pericle Penisoara).

In Orhei, a guard and a civilian stole during the night things belonging to a Jewish woman (declaration of Mura Volavet).

On the road between Orhei and Rezina, a group of peasants tried to rob a convoy. They were caught, their papers taken and they were forwarded to the Tribunal of Orhei (declaration of Major Bechi). Also, on the same road some cart drivers took off the boots of three Jews who died on the way (declaration of Alex. Margulius)

3. A specific case is one related to the Jew Sapirian of which a soldier stole 20,000 lei and 2,000 rubles in the segment from the Ghetto to Visterniceni, and in the segment from Visterniceni to Orhei his luggage was stolen (declaration of Bucur Jugareanu and Kisell Kremer).

4. In Perisecina, two soldiers who were on duty at a mill took from the luggage of Ghers Pulferman all the kitchen utensils, and in Orhei his wife was robbed by two other soldiers and a non-



commissioned officer of her purse, clothing, and toilet items. In the same locality, The Jew Ghers Pulferman offered to a sub-lieutenant to sell his wallet for 600 lei. The officer took the object and, under the excuse that he was going to change money in order to pay him, went away and never returned.

Since the identification of all the perpetrators was not possible, because of the initial lack of diligence on behalf of the organs to whom the various cases were reported, and also because most of the robberies were not reported when they occurred, the Commission delegated to Lt. Mag. Luca Popescu, from the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps, to reconstruct all the infractions mentioned on the deportation route, to identify all the perpetrators and to bring them to justice.

#### H. The complicity of cart drivers in hiding valuables belonging to the deported Jews, in order to remove them from the control of the B.N.R. Commission.

Cart drivers, in addition to carrying out robberies, also served as accomplices of the Jews, to harm the state, by hiding valuable objects owned by the Jews.

The following cases were discovered:

1. Ioan Handarenco, cart driver from Chisinau, Str. Posta Veche, hid for the Jew Bragar and his daughter, 19,000 lei, 4050 rubles and two gold male wrist watches.
2. Gh. Neamtu, cart driver from Chisinau, Str. Visterniceni Nr.25, hid for Jews two pocket watches, a male wrist watch, a silver cigarette box and 10,000 lei.

These two cases were discovered by the President of the B.N.R. Commission Bucur Jugareanu and the Army representative, Lt. Stanculescu. The valuables were confiscated and the infractors sent to the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps.

### VII. Encountered Difficulties and Findings

#### A. Encountered Difficulties

The Commission first took note of the informational material supplied by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers mentioned at the beginning of this report. The indications contained in these notes lacked sufficient details for the mission of the Commission to be able to be fulfilled only on their basis.

In addition, a whole series of difficulties were added due to the existing situation, from the time when the various infractions were committed to the time of receiving the order to investigate, which created great problems in conducting the investigation and



discovering the truth.

These were:

1. The initial lack of reaction on the part of the victims. Almost the majority of Jews, either in the Ghetto or on the roads of deportation, who were the victims of the various illegal acts, did not immediately report them to the legal authorities being afraid of making their situation worse.

All lived in panic, perturbed by the most alarming versions of their fate; thus they adopted the method of silence in order not to arouse the desire for revenge.

Even the Jews that we found in the Ghetto, and who have a more stable situation, and also the few returned from the road of deportation, resisted very much before they began to talk, notwithstanding all the guarantees given by the Commission that nothing will happen to them.

Because of this, the early facts which form the basis of any investigation and which cannot be collected except immediately after a crime is committed, had disappeared.

The Commission was unable to perform, with respect to this subject, except a work of reconstruction, based on factual elements which have disappeared, and this has obviously diminished sometimes the strength of the conclusions.

2. Another impediment was caused by the complexity of the situation and the large number of causal factors. In reality, all the episodes experienced by the Jews, from the installation in the Ghetto, the life in the Ghetto, the procedures of deportation, the travel of the convoys along the route and the crossing of the Nistru, were associated with various infractions of the law, and the perpetrators were recruited from all social and professional levels in the territory of Bessarabia: Romanian officers and soldiers, elements of the German army, public officials, unemployed and marginal people, drivers of carts, etc.

The majority were not initially identified, and now the performance of this work represents one of the most difficult challenges. As much as possible, this is now to be undertaken by the judicial authorities charged with completing the various investigations and judging the discovered infractions.

Notwithstanding all the above difficulties, the Commission nevertheless established many conclusions which indicate: some deficiencies in the administrative organization of the Ghetto, which enabled crimes to be committed; some facts related in part to the accusations indicated in the informational briefs presented to the Presidency; qualified infractions, which are to be resolved



by the relevant authorities.

**B. Findings**

**1. The mental state in Bessarabia. The setting of traps.**

(a) From the investigations we have conducted, we have become convinced that one of the special phenomena which, in an obvious way, hampers the progress of life and the possibility of a rational conduct of public affairs in Bessarabia is the special mental state of this province.

A special inclination can be observed towards libel and suspicion. All social levels contribute to the development of these manifestations.

The courage of being responsible for news or for alleged information is not undertaken by anyone. Almost all work under the mask of anonymity or false identity.

Particularly, this state of affairs is fed by the intellectual class, the discontented who expected to be installed in jobs, and even by the reporting agents of the police and the security service.

If we add to this mental state the fact that the authorities forward without checking innumerable denunciations, on the basis of which investigations and inquiries are started, it is easy to understand the sentiments of those who would want to undertake activities full of initiative and who nevertheless know themselves to be subject to suspicions, investigations and defamations based on unsubstantiated facts. In addition, the fact that these reports are launched before verifying their source or seriousness, encourages the defamers and, at the same time, inhibit to a great measure initiatives and good intentions which, in a province like Bessarabia, are so necessary.

In addition, the Jewish question and the possibility of exploiting them, as people who apparently ceased to benefit from the protection of the law, helped the development of a spirit vicious, corrupted, and inclined to abuse and self indulgence.

Those previously callous found themselves in a most favorable environment for delinquent activity, and some of those who were previously straight let themselves be diverted to the path of the first, thus magnifying the number of lawbreakers.

To all of this is added the defaming propaganda of the legionnaire elements aimed at compromising the constructive work undertaken by the State Leadership.

(b) A system damaging the prestige of the authorities as well as



good procedural standards is the so-called "traps" which we found to be used in Bessarabia.

With the purpose of discovering certain infractions, for which prevention activities failed or were not applied at all, the administrative organs, assisted by judicial authorities, resorted to such procedures.

We recall the trap set for certain Jews of the Ghetto, with the initiative of the Government and with the assistance of five Police agents (Madan, Nedu, etc.), which did not result in any discovery but with the arrest of the agents who in performing their duty robbed the Jews, to the detriment of the State, of a large quantity of gold in their possession.

In addition, also in the Ghetto, another trap against some Jews, suspected of having valuables and large quantities of precious metals, gave quite a mediocre result.

Such procedures, in addition to being directly contrary to legal investigational requirements, have also the disadvantage that, under the cover of their secret execution, create the most favorable opportunity for the agents themselves to become the first infractors.

At the same time, the victims are also subject to the provocation of committing a real and complete infraction, and public opinion has the opportunity of believing that even the authority lends itself through its organs to committing illegal acts from which it benefits.

## 2. Clashes and interference in functions.

We observed that various organs, with responsibility of managing the activities of the province over the Prut river, did not follow a line of understanding and cooperation needed for achieving results.

Some examples:

(a) On November 6, 1941, the General Staff, Section II, ordered the Inspectorate of Gendarmes of Bessarabia, by No.17558, to deport over the Nistru the Jewesses Sara Suruci, married to the Christian Vasile Suruci, and Coca Meier, adding that the deportation will be executed even if the Jewish women are married with Romanians or are baptized.

However, on October 22, 1941, Marshal I. Antonescu, had ordered the Government of Romania, by No.15035, to stop deporting over the Nistru Jewish women married to Christians or Jews baptized earlier.

(b) In accordance with Art.486 C.J.M., in zones of military



activities or behind them, the supreme military authority can codify ordinances specifying crimes and punishments aimed at protecting the safety of the Army, the security of the state and public order.

As a consequence of these legal powers and for the purposes mentioned above, the Commanding General of the Third Army Corps, with the territorial constituency covering almost the whole of Bessarabia, had issued such ordinances.

However, at the same time, the Governor of Bessarabia, without having the legal right in the above matters, had also issued ordinances specifying crimes and punishments.

We refer to ordinance No.24 of November 15, 1941, in which the Governor created infractions and punishments of imprisonment of between one month and two years without specifying the authority.

The overlapping of such illegal prerogatives with legal ones, which belong exclusively to the military authority, diminishes the effectiveness of the imposed measures.

### **3. Findings related to the organization and functioning of the Ghetto.**

The Commission has concluded from the beginning that, because of lack of organization and guidance, with respect to the Ghetto and the life within it, the opportunity was provided for the practice of abuses and illicit trade.

To a large measure, this was contributed by the lack of a responsible management which beginning on September 4, 1941, reverted to the Government.

However, it should be emphasized that this supreme authority, until the occupation of the whole territory of Bessarabia by Romanian troops, was also unable to exercise fully its functions because of the inherent pressure felt in all fields of activity from the Superior Military Command and from the security measures taken behind the fighting forces.

Another consequence of the deficiency mentioned above was the fact that Col. Dumitrescu was not removed in a timely fashion from his command, although his abuses became almost notorious. He did not leave until the Military Command of Chisinau was disestablished.

In addition to the above causes, which were the initial sources of the irregularities, we also note those arising from the lack of any regulations related to the sale and purchase of objects belonging to the Jews.

Due to this fact, the situation was reached that the Jews were



unable to sell their more precious possessions except to persons who received the permission to enter the Ghetto. Thus, advantages were created only for persons who were able to obtain such authorizations and who, because of lack of any competition, benefited of a true monopoly which generated fraud and abuse.

#### 4. Findings related to the deportations

(a) The operation of deportation was carried out under quite difficult conditions as a result of the following:

- The removal of the Jews from the Ghetto was difficult because none accepted voluntarily this measure.

They used all means of avoiding the deportation by postponing their departure by running away to other quarters not due for the current convoys; hiding in cellars and attics, etc.; and purchasing authorizations for postponing the departure, the practice of which created a real market.

- The deportation convoys formed with difficulty and were unable to maintain continuity because the majority were old people, women and children, who where unable to walk and the number of carts was small; the vehicles often broke down and were not driven by uniform animal power; guarding of the convoys was done with very limited resources.

(b) The inhumane exploitation by the cart drivers also contributed to the difficulty of this operation.

Let us mention a few examples:

- The cart drivers in Atachi demanded from the Jews arriving from Bucovina 4,000 lei each to transport their belongings to the point of crossing, a distance of about 4 km.

- Also, those requisitioned for the segment Orhei-Rezina, used threats and various intimidation measures to make the Jews give them the largest possible sums of money or some of their possessions.

Correcting measures were taken whenever such cases were indicated.

#### 5. The selection of the Jews in the Ghetto, for purposes of deportation

The operation of internment in the camp was carried out almost without any rules, because of the lack of initial organization and also the lack of additional instructions from the organs of leadership.

The internment had no criteria. Thrown into the Ghetto were:



former high officials, whose positions deserved consideration; Jewish women married to Christians; Jews married with Christian women; Jewish mothers with baptized children; baptized Jews, etc.

This situation lasted until the beginning of the deportations, when Marshal I. Antonescu, having been made aware by the petition of Lawyer Stepancovshi of Chisinau, issued an order setting out the criteria of preventing the deportation across the Nistru of some categories, namely: Jewish women married to Christians; those baptized some time ago; and those who were indeed good Romanians. The order was transmitted to the Government, by the Presidency, through Nr.15035 of October 22, 1941.

During our investigation, a number of persons appeared before the Commission petitioning the Government to be included in the criteria established by Marshal I. Antonescu and, having been rejected, asked for our intervention for the favorable resolution of their situation.

Having examined the submitted documents, we found that indeed their cases had special merit, with respect to the following:

- (a) When a Christian woman is married to a Jew, the husband should have the same benefit as Jewish women married to Christians.
- (b) If a Jewish woman was married to a Christian, now deceased and has a baptized child from this marriage, she should either benefit or be separated from the child and deported.
- (c) What is the breadth of the concept of a "good Romanian" and what is that of the situation of "baptized some time ago"? We mention the case of the Jewish woman Claudia Bragar who, wanting to marry a Romanian, was baptized in June 1940 in Chisinau under the regime of terror against Christianity undertaken by the Bolsheviks.

The Government, without soliciting additional needed instructions for such cases, took decisions which could have exceeded the substance of the order by the Marshal.

Because we considered the cases presented as meriting a revision, as mentioned above, the Commission intervened to the Governor, with our Nr.9 of December 20, 1941, bringing it to his attention for action.

## 6. Findings related to the administration of property which was due to revert to the State.

In conformity with the order of Marshal I. Antonescu, the Government of Bessarabia gave, on July 22, 1941, a telephonic order to all County Prefectures to compile immediately an inventory of property left from the Russians, the Germans, and the evacuated or



deported Jews so that the general situation be known as soon as the whole territory is occupied.

Because of the lack of an organized procedure in Chisinau, however, this inventory is not finished even today and no evidence has been kept of transactions of these properties.

Consequently, many possibilities were created for removal or changes in disposition of a large part of State property.

However, in this regard we must note the activity of the organs of the Gendarmerie of the Bessarabian Inspectorate, which was remarkable in taking immediate and judicious measures related to the property left by the retreating enemy.

Specifically, the Gendarmerie Posts and related organs assembled this property, made legal inventories and preserved it, making it available to the State.

#### **7. Findings related to the work of the B.N.R. commissions.**

Because of the delayed notification of the B.N.R., the purchasing of valuables and the changing of lei, connected with the deportations, were started after ten convoys had already crossed the Nistru.

From all the collected information, we established that the operation was performed with perfect honesty.

#### **8. Findings related to the behavior of officers and soldiers in the Ghetto and on the evacuation routes.**

From numerous statements to the Commission, we found that, in general, humanity and good treatment were the criteria of behavior towards the Jews by the officers and guarding troops and also by the escorting gendarmes. Soldiers were observed who, during the deportations, helped Jews with the loading of the carts or gave them their bread.

The escorting gendarmes were searched at the end of each convoy.

#### **9. Findings related to some charges contained in the Informational Notes from the Presidency.**

(a) With respect to the removal of furniture and dishes, by the Third Army Corps, from the store located in the Ghetto we established the following:

- On October 23, 1941, the Third Army Corps, having arrived from the front to its residence Garrison of Chisinau and totally lacking the needed necessities of establishing its Headquarters and officers' mess, obtained the approval of the Military Headquarters



of the Municipality and delegated an officer to take from the Ghetto needed furniture and dishes.

An inventory was made of all the objects taken and transferred to the Headquarters. This was also witnessed by the Government, through Int. Cpt. Roescu, thus allowing for the initial lack of proper procedure that the approval had to be obtained from the Government and not from the Military Headquarters.

At the same time, we want to underline the fact that the officers of the Headquarters of the Third Army Corps and the units under their command established in Chisinau, although they came from the front and as such merited special care for their needs, were nevertheless installed in inferior conditions. Junior clerks and privates who came earlier to Chisinau were stationed in good houses, centrally situated and sometimes with all comforts, and these officers, pioneers of heroism and sacrifice for the country, stayed in the periphery under difficult conditions including shortages.

(b) It was not possible to establish that the soldiers guarding the gates of the Ghetto received bribes for allowing entrances and exits. The few isolated cases which were brought to our attention cannot be considered a general rule.

(c) The convoys of Jews, the carts and luggage, were not received by Germans at the Nistru but by units of Romanian gendarmes, who escorted them to the points of destination according to the itinerary established by the Gendarme Inspectorate in Transnistria. Also, we do not confirm the information that later the convoys were overtaken by trucks which loaded the Jews, with the carts and luggage remaining behind to be appropriated.

(d) Major Vasilescu, the former Chestor[?] from Chisinau, was sent for investigation to the Martial Court of the Third Army Corps and, his innocence having been established, the file was closed.

(e) The purchases of valuables and the exchanges were performed in Vesterniceni and not in the Ghetto, because the Military Commander of Chisinau refused the B.N.R. Commission permission to execute these operations in the Ghetto, reasoning that he had no suitable premises and that the Jews, once informed, will hide or dodge the valuables before the control, while if they did not know of the search to which they will be subjected they will leave for the deportation with all their valuables with them.

(f) The Gendarme Inspectorate of Bessarabia punished all gendarmes in its territory who have been proven to have committed irregularities or abuses.



For most of them, arguments were presented at the Gendarmerie Inspectorate of Bessarabia that their punishments be increased, and some of them were sent to appear in front of military authorities.

CHAIRMAN, General Constantin Niculescu (signature)

MEMBERS: Attorney General Stroe Stefan (signature)  
Laurentiu Preotescu, President of the Appeals  
Court (signature)  
Traian Niculescu, Chief Prosecutor (signature)  
Lt. Colonel Alexandru Madarjac, Prosecutor (signature)  
Inspector General Paunescu, B.N.R. (signature)



## SPECIAL REPORT

### REPORT OF INQUIRY NR.2 OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY ORDER OF MARSHAL ION ANTONESCU, THE LEADER OF THE STATE, FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF IRREGULARITIES IN THE GHETTO OF CHISINAU

While the commission conducted its work, certain special facts were established which, not being able to include them in the main report, we considered necessary to present them separately in this report.

The findings are as follows:

#### I. The legal situation of the deported Jews and their real estate.

##### A. The number of interned and deported Jews.

From an overall statistical summary, presented to the commission by Lt. Colonel Pallade, the representative of the Major General Staff for the establishment of the camps and the deportation of the Jews, it is concluded that there were interned: 23,000 Jews in Vertuzeni, 11,000 Jews in Marculesti, 25,000 Jews in Edineti and Secureni and 11,525 Jews in the Ghetto of Chisinau. To these are to be added the Jews of Orhei, Cahul, Ismail, Chilia Noua and Bolgrad, where their number did not exceed 1,000 interned in each locality.

Approximately, there was a total of 75-80,000 Jews.

From the situation presented to the Commission by the Gendarme Inspectorate of Chisinau, responsible for the execution of the deportations, it follows that, through the various established points of crossing, there were 55,867 Jews deported from Bessarabia and 45,538 Jews from Bucovina.

In total: 101,405 Jews

As far as the Jews from Bessarabia, it follows that, between those interned of 75-80,000 and those deported of 55,867, there is a difference of 25,000 Jews, who died a natural death, escaped, or were shot by the methods that we will describe below.

##### B. The systems of identification of the interned and deported Jews.

There was no special instruction, either verbally or in writing, given for their identification in the camps or in the Ghetto of Chisinau.



The only numerical criterion was that which determined the capacity of the camps as well as the formation of the deportation convoys.

Only in the Ghetto of Chisinau, there was an attempt of nominal statistics with respect to the Jews interned there which, however, was never finished.

One first consequence of this situation was the inability of identifying the Jews who escaped from the camps and, implicitly, the impossibility of discovering the escapees as well as those who may have helped them.

In the orders issued on September 7, 1941, related to the deportations, by the Major Pretor General Topor, it was explicitly stated that the crossing of the Nistru by the Jews should be carried out without any formalities.

According to this standard, the Jews were deported in strictly numerical lots, the situation which they followed along the routes and were transferred over the Nistru.

At the crossing points, an order was given by the actual representative of the Major General Staff, Major Tarlef, that all papers in the possession of the Jews be removed (the declarations of Lt.Rez. Popoiu and Lt.Colonel Pallade). In addition, Colonel Emil Brosteanu, the Inspector of Gendarmes in Transnistria, testified that the Jews were deported there without any identification.

### C. The consequences of this situation

#### 1. The establishment of property rights of various real estate in Bessarabia.

In accordance with the Legal Decree Nr.2, of September 3, 1941, related to some legislative measures for Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, the Romanian State becomes, as a result of laws of romanization occurring after June 28, 1941, and of this law, the owner of property in the territory of Bessarabia which belonged to Jews, or to Jewish legal entities, on the date of June 28, 1941, or which Jews or Jewish legal entities acquired after this date.

It follows from this law, that the method of expropriating real estate property belonging to Jews in Bessarabia follows the same criteria as for Jews in the Old Regat<sup>28</sup>, and that, consequently, compensation criteria and needed legal procedures for such an operation will have to be established.

This procedure, however, will not be possible because of lack of identification in which the deported Jews presently find themselves. On the other hand, the forced deportation of the Jews over the Nistru can not represent the situation envisaged by the



law - i.e. finding abandoned goods - because the owners did not abandon, on their free will, the goods which belonged to them, but were forcibly deported.

In these circumstances, the legislator must urgently intervene, solving the problem as it exists determined by actual facts.

## 2. Possible consequences

For some future situations, in which, for the supreme interest of the Country, renewed discussions could arise with respect to settlement of the Jews who lived in Bessarabia and Bucovina at the time of reunification, it would be possible by those interested to exaggerate purposefully the number of these people over the real number and to make substitutions of persons, because of lack of any statistics and identifications.

We mention again that the same serious difficulties, and for the same reasons, will arise for the State in any other legislative or administrative action before the above described problems will be considered.

## II. Executions of Jews

### A. During the internment

#### 1. In the Ghetto of Chisinau

On August 1, 1941, a German Lieutenant came to the President of the Jewish Community of the Ghetto of Chisinau and asked to be supplied in a few hours, for purposes of work, 250 men and 200 women.

The Jews were assembled and, at the appointed hour, the German officer returned accompanied by three soldiers and took away the group of 450 Jews, after inspecting them and selecting specially intellectuals and beautiful women; for this purpose, according to a declaration on file, he used binoculars. In the evening of the same day some of them, namely 39 old Jews, returned with the news that the rest of the 411 Jews were shot near Visterniceni and that they were sent to inform the Ghetto of this event.<sup>29</sup>

The next day, the same German Lieutenant came to the Ghetto and confirmed the fact.

Confirmation was also obtained by the President of the Community who, accompanied by 20 Jews, was sent to the communal grave, where the bodies of the executed were buried, in order to cover it since their burial was quite superficial.

This fact was also confirmed by Colonel Tudose, the Military Commander of Chisinau.



We cite that on this occasion was also killed the Christian Ion Carmen from Ploesti, who was in the Ghetto with his Jewish wife Fenia Carmen, having earlier, in December 1941, returned to Bessarabia to his family which he left under the Russians.<sup>30</sup>

Another case was that of August 7-8, 1941, when an inspector of roads came to the Ghetto and asked for 500 men for work at the building site of Ghidighici. These Jews were supplied together with 25 women for the purpose of preparing their food. After two weeks, 200 Jews of them returned, having become incapable of working, and the rest of 325 have not come back to this day (the testimony of Gutmann Landau and Aizic Itico Sebel).

## **2. In the camp of Tatarasti, county of Cetatea Alba**

On August 9, 1941, the Commander of the camp of Tatarasti received Cpt.Rez. Gh.Ion Vetu and the German Sub.Lt. Heinrich Frohlich, of the Major Staff of the German units in Chisinau, who informed him that, by order of Marshal I. Antonescu, all 451 Jews in this camp must be immediately executed.

Captain Vetu brought this fact to the attention of the Commander of the Legion, who ordered him to carry out the order, as a result of which the Jews were executed.

A written report was prepared by the German officer and the Cpt. of Gendarmes, a copy of which is enclosed to the official papers.

We report that, on the occasion of this execution, Cpt. Vetu took from the executed Jews the following valuables: three watches, a gold ring, four gold wedding rings, a metal chain and the sum of 20,000 lei. The Regional Inspectorate of Gendarmes contacted the General Inspectorate of Gendarmes so that the officer be send in front of the Reform Council.

It needs to be decided:

- (a) If the original report should be kept at the Inspectorate of Gendarmes or deposited in another place.
- (b) If it is appropriate that the officer, guilty of robbing dead bodies, be brought before the Martial Court, where a public trial would take place, or if the reform is sufficient.

## **3. During the deportations**

With respect to the manner that the organs carrying out the deportation were to deal with the Jews which did not comply, the orders of September 7, 1941, of General Topor contained the following instructions: "The manner of dealing with those who do not comply? (Alexeanu)".



The statement of Lieutenant Augustin Rosca, of the Gendarmes Legion of Roman, who was responsible for the deportation of the Jews from Secureni and Edineti, is enlightening in the understanding of the above order. Indeed, the officer in essence states the following:

Having been summoned by Lt. Colonel Pallade, the representative of the Major General Staff, for receiving instructions on the manner of deportation, he was told on this occasion that he will also receive a special communication either from the Gendarmes or from Capt. Popescu, the communication officer from Atache.

This special communication was made by the Commander of the Hotin Legion, Major Dragulescu, who told him that, according to the order of the Major General Staff, the Jews who will not be able to keep up with the convoys, for reasons of either lack of strength or illness, are to be executed. For this purpose he was ordered to send, two days ahead of the leaving of each convoy, a responsible for the route who, with the help of the posts of gendarmes in the localities through which the Jews were to pass, will prepare each 10 kilometers a grave for about 100 persons where those lagging the convoys will be gathered, shot and buried. The pre-military from the villages along the route of deportation are to help in the preparation of the graves and in the burial of those executed.

Lieutenant Rosca followed his orders exactly which resulted the execution of about 500 Jews among those deported on the route Secureni-Cosauti.

The same system was used also for the convoys along the route Edinet-Casauti, where the execution of the deportation was the responsibility of Lieutenant Popovici, from the same unit and under the orders of Lieutenant Augustin Rosca.

Because of the procedure used for the preparation of the graves and the burials, the peasants from the villages along the route became aware of the expected events and waited along the sides of the roads, in corn field and various hiding places, for the executions to take place so that they could throw themselves on the bodies in order to rob them.

From the verbal statement of Lieutenant Augustin Rosca, it follows that the preparations and particularly the execution of the given orders created such dramatic moments that those who took part will carry with them for a very long time the memories of these events.

CHAIRMAN, General Constantin Niculescu (signature)

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Lt. Colonel Alexandru Madarjac, Prosecutor (signature)  
Inspector General Paunescu, B.N.R. (signature)



TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Chisinau is the Romanian name. In Russian, and also internationally, it is known as Kishinev or Kishinew.

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2. These two reports are undated, at least in the available form without any cover letter of transmittal. When were they written? The Commission arrived in Kishinev on December 6, 1941. In Part II, section E, mention is made of "... today, six months after the liberation of Chisinau,...", which would make it mid-January 1942, and in Part IV, section F.5., the date of January 10, 1942, is mentioned, the latest date in the report. The best guess of the date of the reports is the middle or end of January, 1942. Copies of these original Romanian reports are presented in Appendix 1.

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3. Lapusna is the name of the county in which the city of Chisinau is located.

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4. B.N.R. stands for "Banca Nationala Romana", the National Romanian Bank.

\*\*\*\*\*

5. The river Nistru, or Dnestr, separates the province of Bessarabia from the Ukraine, or its southern part denoted as Transnistria. For some 22 years, between about 1918 to June 28, 1940, it was the frontier between Romania and the Soviet Union.

\*\*\*\*\*

6. This refers to the geographic province of Bessarabia, located between the river Prut, on the west, and the river Nistru (Dnestr) on the east, which was returned to the Soviet Union on June 28, 1940. It has been under Romanian jurisdiction since the collapse of Czarist Russia after the October Revolution of 1917. The river Prut was crossed by the Romanian and German armies on June 22, 1941, when they launched Operation Barbarossa, their invasion of the Soviet Union.

\*\*\*\*\*

7. During the month of November 1941, the fascist dictator of Romania, Marshal Ion Antonescu, held a national plebescite on his leadership. People were asked to vote YES or NO. Next day, the Romanian papers published the names of the 14 people nationally who voted NO! I remember these days vividly; at the time we were in



hiding in an apartment that my uncle Monia Apotecher rented for us on the fifth floor at No.3 Mantuleasa Street in Bucharest.

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8. Craiova is a city in the province of Oltenia, part of the old Romania.

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9. Mihai Viteazu No.23 was our home! My father bought this property from Mr. Ghers Sehter in January 1931. At the time, its street number was No.21; it was later changed to No.23. I visited it during my recent return visit to Kishinev after 53 years. It is now Mihai Eminescu No.23, the big house has been divided into two parts and is inhabited by two different families. We were driven out of our home to the Ghetto on Thursday morning, July 24, 1941. Although I am not sure, I have a vague recollection that my father knew Int. Captain Roescu and left him the keys to the house.

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10. The "legionnaire movement" was the fascist Iron Guard organization, founded in Romania in 1927 which, despite the execution of its leaders by King Carol II in 1938, became a powerful force in Romania in the late 1930s. In 1940 the Iron Guard helped bring Ion Antonescu to power. While he was a fascist ally of Nazi Germany, Antonescu suppressed the organization in 1941 and thousands of Iron Guard members were killed.

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11. Odessa was occupied by the Germans and the Romanians on September 16, 1941. The deportations from the Ghetto have already started some days earlier. We escaped the day before and arrived by train in Bucharest early morning on September 16, 1941, when the headlines in the local papers were announcing the fall of Odessa.

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12. From personal experiences and observations, I can add some comments on this initial period. The city burned for some days before its fall, with severe battles in its vicinity. Many Jews who tried to escape the fires were caught and killed by the advancing fascist armies. The first soldiers who came into the courtyard of our home were German officers. They swore at us as "dirty Jews" but, in every case, they behaved individually in a disciplined manner. On our tortured way into the Ghetto, I witnessed robberies of homes by local Christian inhabitants, for example the sacking of my uncle's home, Dr. Vladimir Cervinschi, located one short block from our house. Also, and including the first days in the Ghetto, it was individual and small groups of Romanian soldiers who killed, robbed and raped Jewish people.

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13. Self serving explanations and rationalizations of fascist antisemitism are not new and do not deserve refuting arguments. A few relevant things, however, might be of interest based on personal knowledge.

Until that time, Kishinev had been a "Jewish city" for almost a century, with a Jewish population of approximately sixty percent. As such, the community covered a large spectrum of views, including young communist elements as well as middle and upper class people who lived through the 1930s in constant fear of a Soviet occupation of Bessarabia.

When it finally happened, peacefully in June 1940, some of these left for Romania with the retreating troops. However, during the first half of 1940, Romania began to turn fascist and this caused about 10,000 Romanian Jews to move to Kishinev to live under the Soviet regime, within the three days after June 28, 1940, which were available for such moves. The majority of the Jewish population, as well as others, suffered during the Stalinist period. Many, regarded by the Soviets as "potential enemies of the people", were arrested and forcibly moved east, in a major operation during the night of June 13, 1941, only two weeks before the German invasion.

When the war started and the Russians began to withdraw, many Jews also succeeded in evacuating eastward. The Russians started to burn the city systematically a couple of days before its occupation, the beginning of their "scorched earth policy" which was followed in all areas which they evacuated throughout the war. The above antisemitic "reasons" against the Jews of Bessarabia, did not prevent the fascist Antonescu regime to carry out, starting on June 29, 1941, an organized murder of about 12,000 Romanian Jews, at the very beginning of the war, just west of Bessarabia in the Romanian city of Iasi.

Quoting from the Memoirs of Rabbi Alexandre Safran, the Chief Rabbi of Romania during 1940-1947:

*"When the Romanian troops entered Bessarabia in July 1941, they massacred the Jewish population with unbelievable ferocity. The cruelty with which the Bessarabian Jewish population had been treated by the Romanians surpassed even the cruel treatment to which Bucovinean Jewry had been subjected by the same Romanians. The antipathy, hostility and prejudices of the Romanians toward the Jews of Bessarabia had erupted in the immediate post-World War I years and were sustained by the government, press and public opinion, which considered Bessarabian Jews, especially the intelligentsia and students, Communists and Russian sympathizers. It therefore did not take much for the Romanians to work up a rage against the Jews." (Safran, 1987, p.78)*

Jewish victims seem to be always given multiple and contradictory reasons for their murder and persecution. I clearly remember two German soldiers coming into our crowded courtyard in the Ghetto one day. Impressed by the poor living conditions, one told me that "you are suffering because you are rich Jews; back in Germany, working Jews are treated very well"!



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14. One may wonder where exactly is Transnistria. Searching a world atlas will not help. A better source is Julius S. Fisher's book. The introduction to the book is succinct and illuminating:

*"Transnistria was a geographic freak. A short-lived province carved out of the Ukraine, it was decreed into existence by the Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu at the beginning of the German-Russian war in the summer of 1941. It comprised the territory between the Dniester (Nistru) and the Bug in the southernmost corner of the Ukraine. The province's total life span encompassed two years and seven months - from August 19, 1941, after the Russians had evacuated it until March 20, 1944, when the Red Army reconquered it.*

*Today it is an historic shadow, having vanished without a trace. But in Jewish history it is inscribed in blood and tears; it will never be forgotten. Transnistria spells horror - horror that defies description; scenes of cannibalism in which one group of men torture, rob and destroy their helpless victims in cold blood. Transnistria symbolizes genocide.*

*The extermination of a race or group of men, was the mission of the Germans under Hitler and the Nazi movement. They pre-planned their procedure, blueprinted the strategy, set up edifices and facilities for mass murder. Their large chemical plants prepared, after careful tests, the fastest-killing poisons; their extermination experts (Adolf Eichmann, Dieter Wisliceny, Kurt Becher, etc.) were sent from country to country to handle the "job". In their infernal work the Nazis remained true to themselves - thorough, systematic, diabolical.*

*The Rumanian genocide was of a different character. Ion Antonescu, the dictator, was "a lunatic, like Mussolini and Hitler, but without the leadership qualities of the first and the iron will of the second." In vain he sought the support of the Rumanian political parties. He stood alone. Behind his grandiloquent statements and declarations there was no real power or organization. He issued the decrees for the deportation of the Jews without establishing any plan for the conduct of the mass departure. In the ensuing confusion and chaos all the demons of the netherworld were set loose. Every governor, prefect, clerk, every military and municipal officer could act according to his will or whim. And they did - with unimaginable cruelty, greed and sadism.*

*In grotesque imitation of their German counterparts they beat and clubbed their victims, caused them to suffocate in locked cattle wagons, and starved or worked them to death. But the Rumanians added some brutalities of their own: the marching in severest winter of men who were stripped naked or wrapped in paper; the mass rape of daughters and wives of their victims; and as a grim climax, the burning alive of 20,000 Jews in Odessa.*

*Transnistria became the cemetery for more than 200,000 Jews. Their story is little known, even to students of this period of history. This book attempts to present some details of this immense tragedy - some of the details; others are lost forever. The entire story will never be known." (Fisher, 1969, pp.9-10)*

After escaping from the Ghetto and after our arrest in Bucharest (see note #25), my parents were deported to Transnistria in April 1942 to the camp of Dumanovca in the department of Golta in eastern Transnistria. They were very lucky to miss not only the death march to Transnistria, which all my family missed by escaping from the Ghetto in October 1941, but also the terrible murders committed in Golta a very short time earlier. Although killings, hard labor and starvation continued, they were less massive than in December 1941. Let me quote again from Julius S. Fisher's book:



"The department of Golta was assigned as the site for their concentration. [Fisher discusses here the fate of the local Russian Jews of the Ukraine; they were joined in Golta by the Jews of Bessarabia and Bucovina who survived the death march.] In Bogdanovca, there were concentrated 48,000 Ukrainian Jews; in Dumanovca, 18,000; and in Acmecetca, 4,000.

The prefect of this department was Col. Modest Isopescu [in the war crime trials in 1945 he was "credited" with the destruction of about 70,000 Jews in a most horrible manner, see (Fisher, 1969, p.153)], a sadistic monster, whose aide, Aristide Padure, was worthy of him. These beasts with human faces, as their indictment calls them, decided to exterminate all the internees.

"In Bogdanovca, 48,000 men were massacred in the days preceding Christmas [1941].

On December 21, early in the morning, they took out of the lager the invalid, the sick, and those of the women who, after weeks of starvation, were unable to march. They were herded into stables which were flooded with kerosene and set afire.

In these buildings, 4,500-5,000 people were burned alive. The remaining 43,000 persons were sent to a nearby woods and while the buildings and the victims were still burning, the vast majority of men realized that this was their death-march ... The scenes that developed were terrible - mothers lifted their children heavenward, beseeching God for mercy; other parents, on the contrary encouraged their children to face death with firmness and calm ...

Arriving in the desert first they were robbed of all. Then they were ordered to undress, whereafter groups of 300-400 were formed and murdered with grenades. Thus it went on until Christmas. On December 24th the massacre was suspended; that same day Isopescu came and took pictures of the scene. On December 28-29, the bloody work was continued and finished.

Two hundred robust men were left alive to burn the corpses. This job took two months; at the end of it, 150 of them were executed." (---, The Trial..., 1946, pp. 298+)

In destroying 48,000 men in four days, Isopescu set a record unrivalled not only by Ohlendorf, Kube and other S.S. leaders, but even by the German death factories of Maidanek or Auschwitz.

This monster cannot be accused of lack of ingenuity. In the extermination of the other lagers he used different methods.

"At Dumanovca, there were 18,000 Jews concentrated. In order to prolong their sufferings he ordered that at the interval of 3-4 days groups of 300-400 should be killed. Thus the process of extermination was dragged through the months of January and February.

... at Acmecetca the 4,000 people were exterminated by hunger. This lager was located in a kolhoz far away from any human settlement. Isopescu isolated it perfectly and prohibited the shipping there of any food. After days of starvation the entirely exhausted inmates were given raw potatoes. Whereafter raw maize-flour was distributed among them. The hunger-crazed inmates devoured whatever they were given, with the result that their bellies puffed up and they died amidst terrible pains. (---, The Trial..., 1946, pp. 298+)

This lager with its starving and desperate population was often visited by Isopescu. This sadist and drunkard would watch his victims; he enjoyed their agony, took pictures of their tortured writhing and sent them to the Bucharest papers. (---, The Trial..., 1946, pp. 298+)"



(Fisher, 1969, pp.122-123)

While interned in the camp of Dumanovca, my father was able to visit Acmecetca at the beginning of August 1942. He wrote about his experience in 1944 (see Appendix 4).

A recent excellent book on "The Ghettos of Transnistria" is by Dr. Avigdor Shachan (Shachan, 1988).

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15. While it is not the intention of these notes to document additionally, in any detail, the suffering of the Jews in those tragic days, it seems instructive to contrast the "simple" story of this paragraph with the more complete description from Julius S. Fisher's book of what happened just after the entrance of the Germans and Romanians into Bessarabia:

*"On July 8 [1941] the [Romanian] Gendarmerie Inspector of Bessarabia ordered all rural Jews of that province segregated. [As Fisher's note points out, this was in "Circular order No.1. The first order (No.1) issued after the occupation of Bessarabia! In the turmoil of the newly-launched war, this was their great problem!"] Sixteen days later 25,000 Jews from North Bessarabia were transferred at the town of Coslar into Transnistria."* (Fisher, 1969, p.45)

*"In these early days of the war Transnistria was occupied by the Germans, so that the Attachi side of the bridge [this is a bridge over the Nistru; in the Report the city is spelled "Atachi"] was guarded by the Rumanians and the other side by the Germans. After the Germans had permitted the entry of 25,000 exiles at the town of Coslar on July 24 they abruptly changed their policies. They decided to halt the influx of Jews and to eject those already admitted - a decision that spelled untold suffering for these 25,000 exiles. For four days after their entry they drifted aimlessly around. The only food they received was some kind of maize unsuitable for human nourishment. Then the Germans transferred them, in groups of 400-500 to former collective farms. On August 2, they were brought back to the city of Moghilev. Within these few days 4,000 of them perished of hunger, exposure and the bullets of their guards. From Moghilev they were marched to the town of Scazinetz. There in good Nazi fashion the Germans selected about 1,000 old or infirm Jews, promising to send them to sanatoria and thereupon murdered the lot of them. On August 5, the remaining contingent was driven to Attachi from whence 3,000 of them were to be marched back to Bessarabia. On August 7, an addition 4,500 were to return to Bessarabia. But the Rumanians had closed their side of the bridge.*

*Now a cruel game started between the Germans and Rumanians. The Germans marched the exhausted Jews to another bridge at the town of Jampol [spelled Iampol in the Report]. The Rumanians rushed troops there to block the re-entry of the Jews. The real sufferers in this game, of course, were the miserable Jews who, forced for weeks without food to wander from place to place, perished by the thousands.*

*Finally the Rumanians yielded. On August 11, the Head Pretor's Office decreed that the Jews would have to be readmitted to Bessarabia. In behavior that typified the lack of discipline and order in Rumania, the police refused to obey the decree, the Head Pretor had to repeat his instructions with the recrimination that "it is deplorable that the Commander of the police does not understand his mission (duty)."*

*Thus after weeks of enforced marching, inhuman exertions, privation and degradation, 13,500 of the unfortunates returned to Bessarabia and were interned in the lager of the town of Vertujeni, Soroca Department. The missing 11,500 Jews had died in Transnistria."* (Fisher, 1969, pp.46-47)



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16. "Conducatorul Statului", i.e. the "State Leader", or "Führer" was the title used for Romania's fascist war dictator, Marshal Ion Antonescu.

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17. It was indeed through one such courtyard and fence that my family and I were able to escape from the Ghetto early morning on Wednesday, October 15, 1941.

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18. This is an annual mortality rate of 15.3%, excluding those who were murdered in the special actions taken during the existence of the Ghetto.

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19. Very, very few of these survived Transnistria!

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20. The Romanian word used in the manuscript, "ciocli" is defined in the dictionary as "grave diggers, sextons".

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21. I remember clearly seeing this convoy leave the Ghetto. It was the seventh day of Sukot! We escaped three days later, on October 15, 1941.

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22. A personal note: Remaining in the Ghetto, after our escape, was my paternal grandfather, Aaron-Iosef Cervinschi, with his second wife and her sister (my grandmother had died in 1933). At the time he was 69 years old, a religious Jew and a hasid of the Skvere Rabbi who was also in the Ghetto. My grandfather would not consider shaving his beard or leaving the Rabbi. As Cohanim, he blessed us the morning that we escaped and the only thing that we know of his subsequent fate was a postcard that he wrote on the way to my aunt, his daughter, living in Romania in the city of Iasi. The postcard was written in Romanian, obviously by someone else since my grandfather did not know Romanian (the original postcard has been deposited some years ago at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, Israel; a copy is presented in Appendix 2). It is addressed to "Mrs. Ghenea Fisman, Str. Anastasiu Panu No.5, Iasi", with the return address indicated as "Cervinski, Orhei"; it even bears a rubber stamp proclaiming "Censorship Orhei". Here is its translated text:



"Orhei, 29 October, 1941

Dear Ghenea, We arrived here yesterday. From here I will travel further, where I do not yet know. We are all healthy. From David [my father] I have not received anything for 12 days since he moved. To you and to your family I write that you should move as soon as you can into a new house. Yours is humid and you should move where Nuta lives [Nuta was my grandfather's brother who, before WWI, immigrated to Haifa, Palestine]. Not withstanding the fact that this will be expansive, you should move. With money (alone) one cannot live. I do not like your house; it is humid and cold and can damage you with rheumatism. God should help us and we should see each other again at my brother Nuta. Kiss all, Your Father."

In memory of my grandfather, who was murdered and perished somewhere on the roads to Transnistria with thousands of our brethren, my father changed his surname to Aharoni and I changed it to Aroni!

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23. "In addition to the confiscation of four-fifths of the valuables, the fixing of the rate of the ruble at 40 lei was another measure of robbery. It marked the third compulsory exchange of currency within a year-and-a-half time span - in July, 1940; July, 1941; October, 1941. As a result, a man who had 1,000,000 lei on July 1, 1940 - a fortune at that time - would receive for them 40,000 rubles from the Russians who had taken over. On July 1, 1941, after the Romanians re-occupied this area, that amount would be exchanged for 25,000 lei. In October, 1941, this amount was exchanged for 600 rubles, for which the deportee later received 10 German Marks - the price of one loaf of bread!" (Fisher, 1969, p.61)

Deportations, in and out of the Ukraine, and official robbery are, unfortunately, not new for the Jews. Here is but one example from history:

"... in 1727 an order was promulgated to the effect that "All Jews found to be residing in the Ukraine and in Russian towns shall be immediately expelled beyond the frontier, and not allowed under any circumstances to enter Russia."

Prince Demidoff San Donato, in quoting this expert in his excellent book, says that a proviso to this ukase stipulated that before leaving Russia all the Jews were to be made to exchange their gold and silver for copper money!" (Davitt, 1903, pp.8-9)

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24. In our case, contrary to this report, the Germans had absolutely nothing to do with our escape from the Ghetto.

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25. These facts are mixed up. We never travelled with the Cohns and I do not know who they are. Our escape is mentioned in two of the official Ghetto reports presented in Appendix 3. The three agents mentioned did indeed help us board the train in Chisinau and travel to Bucharest, after first escaping the Ghetto alone through a fence and meeting them at the railway station on the morning of Wednesday, October 15, 1941. I was 14 at the time and my brother Shraga (or Pava as he was then called) was 6 years old and in the middle of scarlet fever. In addition to the two of us, and our



parents, we had with us my uncle and aunt, Misha and Ida Apotecher (nee Kanterman), and my aunt's sister Mania Kanterman. The train was full of soldiers, many injured, returning from the front. We heard a comment that "there are jidani (a derogatory term for Jews) in the train!". At the beginning we would change carriages almost every stop not to draw too much attention. The most dangerous stop was close to Iasi, at the old border with Romania, where papers were usually checked. My recollection is that the agents had false papers indicating that we were prisoners on the way to Bucharest.

The trip lasted some 19 hours, arriving in Bucharest about 5:00 am. We had to keep my brother from sleeping since he spoke only Russian and we did not want him to wake up talking this language. On arrival the agents took us to my uncle Monia Apotecher's flat, who sent them in the first place, and he paid them the remainder of the money. We were immediately dispersed to various friends for hiding. These friends were literally risking their lives harboring us. A bit later, we were reunited with my grandmother Sarah Apotecher who escaped separately one day before us. Later still, we were installed in an apartment rented by Monia.

It was there, in the evening of November 24, 1941, that the police arrived over one month later, dragging along my uncle Monia. The agents who helped us escape had returned back to take another group (who exactly I am not sure but I believe it to be Kisell Kremer) and were caught at the railway station. They brought the police to my uncle's place and forced him to take them to where we were. Initially the atmosphere was "relaxed" since the policemen made my uncle believe that they were ready to be paid off; when he produced the money, they also arrested him for attempted bribery.

My parents, uncle and grandmother were all arrested and taken away; my father told me to take my brother and run away through the rear door. We went to friends of my uncle, the Saperstein family, and were still there on the day of the Pearl Harbor attack, December 7, 1941. I remember how the entry of the United States in the war helped raise our lagging spirits! Mania Kanterman, who was in the apartment when the police arrived, was left to be; I believe that somehow they did not realize that she had also escaped from the Ghetto. Misha and Ida, luckily, were away at some friends place; they were never arrested and spent the rest of the war in hiding in one room of an apartment of a Romanian officer in Bucharest.

My brother and I were alone in Bucharest, helped by friends, until January 1942, when my uncle Iosif Landau came illegally to Bucharest from Galati (dressed as a Romanian officer, since Jews were not allowed to travel by train) and took us to their place. I was in Galati until 1943 when I returned to my uncle Monia in Bucharest (another long story!). My brother was in Galati until April 1944 when, before the end of the war, we were reunited with our parents who were able to escape ahead of the advancing Russian troops from Transnistria, where they were deported by train from Bucharest in April 1942. On July 9, 1944, we joined 731 other refugees and were able to leave Constanta to Palestine, via Turkey, on the "illegal" ship Kazbek.



A final note on the twists of fate. While we were hiding in Bucharest, before the arrest in November 1941, my father, who was a well known Zionist in Kishinev, was told by the Jewish organizers that we will be given a place on Struma, a ship in preparation for departure to Palestine. It finally left on December 12, 1941, eighteen days after our arrest; because of the arrest we did not sail on it. Those who remember history will recollect that Struma was kept by the British in Istanbul for two months, refused permission to sail or disembark, was made to sail back out into the Black Sea and was sunk there, apparently by a Russian submarine. Of the 769 people on board, only one remained alive! (Wyman, 1984, p.158)

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26. These facts are also somewhat wrong. It was only my grandmother, Sarah Apotecher, who was brought out by Major Mardare during the night of October 14-15, 1941. It should be noted that in Bessarabia, because of the different alphabets of the Russian and Romanian languages, many names get somewhat "changed" when translated back and forth between the two languages. Thus, my maternal grandfather's surname was "Apotecher" or "Apoteker" in Romanian and "Aptekar" in Russian.

The escape is mentioned in the official Ghetto reports presented in Appendix 3. This Appendix also contains a declaration that my uncle made in the Ghetto describing how we were robbed and our lives threatened by Romanian soldiers in July 1941.

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27. This "abuse of power" and additional accusations against Colonel Dumitrescu, touch upon the tremendous efforts that were made on one hand by the leaders of the Jewish Community of the Ghetto to inform their brethren in the Romanian capital of Bucharest of the impending deportations, and what was felt will be their inevitable result, and, on the other hand, by the brave but unfortunately unsuccessful efforts of the Jewish leaders in Bucharest to save the Jews of the Ghetto and of the other camps in Bucovina and Bessarabia. The center of Romanian power was in Bucharest and the Ghetto inhabitants desperately looked towards the Jewish leaders close to that power to save them.

It seems relevant to quote at length from the memoirs of Rabbi Alexandre Safran, the young Chief Rabbi of Romania from 1940 to 1947:

*"... when the Romanian troops entered Bessarabia and took control of the region, all hatred for the Jews there erupted in general massacres. In Kishinev, where only about 11,000 Jews were left, the inhabitants were enclosed in a ghetto.*

*The Federation [i.e. the Union of the Jewish Communities of Romania, presided in Bucharest by Dr. Wilhelm Filderman] sent a Christian Romanian lawyer, Musat, to Kishinev. This Christian lawyer had been hired and well paid by the Federation to carry*



*out important missions in places where only a Christian could enter and thus bring help to the wretched Jews. Only someone like him could bribe Romanian civilian and military clerks in order to obtain at least some temporary "easing" of the situation. This was in the hope that meanwhile in Bucharest we could secure some postponement of the anti-Jewish decisions. Musat, a grim and severe Romanian, had been sent to examine the situation in various places where Jews were in particular danger and to report back to us. He had been sent not only to inspect the situation in Kishinev, but also, if possible, to see what was happening throughout the region. It was known that the massacres in Hotin, Balti and other Bessarabean towns had also been horrendous. While Musat was in Kishinev, I received countless telegrams from there: some arriving the same day, one after another. They were signed by a rabbi named Twerski (a reputed family of rabbis) and by other rabbis and lay leaders. [Rabbi Twerski was the famous Skvere Rabbi of Kishinev one of whose devoted hasidim was my grandfather Aron Iosef Cervinschi; they would all perish during the death march to Transnistria] Each telegram was written in an impressive style, containing allusions to the worsening situation. The senders employed all sorts of codes to deceive the censor - they spoke about interventions with professors, requests for medicine, desperate appeals to hasten in order to save the "patient". One telegram said that "the patient's fever is high", another that "the fever is rising", others that the "state of the patient is aggravated", "the patient's state is very serious" or that "the patient is in great pain" and, finally, "the patient is close to death". This was the alarming style of the telegrams; a pleading, touching, weak and desperate voice that suddenly faded...*

*One day a man dressed like a Romanian officer came to the house on Burghlea Street in Bucharest. He was a Jew, the lawyer Shapira who had escaped from the Kishinev ghetto to alert the leading Jewish bodies in Bucharest about the catastrophic situation that the last Jews of Kishinev were facing." (Safran, 1987, pp.78-79)*

This is the same man described as the Jew Sapirin in the Report. A more dramatic description is reported in the book by Julius S. Fisher:

*"In glaring contrast to their persecutor's depravity stands the heroism of the Jewish victims. A lawyer, Shapiro. (his first name unmentioned) had the amazing ingenuity to obtain and wear an army officer's uniform. He flew in a military airplane to Bucharest in an effort to save his brethren from deportation. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful. By remaining in the capital he could have saved his own life. Instead, he returned to Kishinev to perish along with thousands of his people." (Fisher, 1969, p.54-55.)*

He deserves full identification: the lawyer was Dr. Abraham Shapiro (Shapira, Sapirin) (Doron, 1977, p.100). Julius S. Fisher mentions that, during the deportations, on the way to the city of Moghilev the roads became transformed into a quagmire by the autumnal rains. Twenty eight people became hopelessly trapped in the mud and the gendarmes did not permit anyone to help them. "When a lawyer, Dr. Abraham Shapiro of Suceava, protested he was shot dead. All 28 victims perished" (Fisher, 1969, p.101)

Was this the same courageous Abraham Shapiro of Kishinev?

Rabbi Safran continues:

*"Shapira, one of the main leaders of the Kishinev ghetto, had dressed as a Romanian officer and thus made his way to Bucharest. When he arrived, he was immediately brought up to my apartment. The people from the Federation were staggered: if Shapira had been discovered in that dress on his way to Bucharest he could have been shot. And the same fate could wait not only him, but also myself and all those who gave him shelter. But none of us even thought of this. All our thoughts were centered on what could be done to help, to save the remaining Jews of the Kishinev ghetto, to prevent their "evacuation", that is, their deportation to Transnistria, and their massacre on the way. This was our sole concern.*



*After a few moments, Filderman also came in, and we both listened to Shapira's description of the desperate situation in the Kishinev ghetto. We listened to him for hours - long, terrifying hours. Difficult hours. We tried to conceal our emotions from Shapira, but it was impossible.*

*I had previously given copies of the telegrams signed by Twerski and the others to the Queen Mother, Cassuto [Monseigneur Andrea Cassuto was the Apostolic Nuncio, the representative of the Vatican, with whom Rabbi Safran had a good relationship], [the delegates of] the International Red Cross Committee and the Swedish, Swiss and Turkish ambassadors. While Shapira was still with us, I contacted the royal palace in order to inform the Queen Mother of the latest developments. The same day, I also contacted Cassuto. Filderman and I kept our daily contacts with the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, with the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, the military authorities and all those officials accessible to us. We also met with the opposition leaders - Maniu, Bratianu, Dr. Nicolae Lupu - the president of the Red Cross, the president of the Court of Appeals, and others. But we did not obtain any concrete results, only promises and sympathy. The ghetto evacuations continued. The deportations and "liquidations" went on.*

*The autumn of 1941 was grey and damp; a cold, sad autumn as the backdrop to the deportations. This was the time of the Tabernacles festival, Succot, when the Jew leaves his house and lives in a Succah, a temporary dwelling, for one week in commemoration of the Israelites' journey through the desert to the Promised Land. [Succot began the week of Monday, October 6, 1941; the deportations started the last day of Succot, Sunday, October 12, 1941. The Ghetto was a mass of desperate people, "mice caught in a mousetrap". Nevertheless, my grandfather build himself a "succah", a minimum cover over an old bed in the courtyard, and slept for the whole week there as required by law! His strong faith did not save him, but I am sure that it did provide a tower of psychological strength till the very end.] In 1941, the Jews of Romania began wondering through the cold, marshy desert of eastern Romania and the western Ukraine. A new and sinister word was on the lips of Romanian Jewry: Transnistria. These Jews who had survived the massacres in Bessarabia, as well as Bucovinian Jewry and the Jews of Dorohoi, were chastened by the government by a wave of deportations to Transnistria under inhuman conditions.*

*Both Filderman and I were overwhelmed by pain and grief. After having discussed with Filderman all the hideous aspects of the situation, I wrote an appeal to Marshall Antonescu." (Safran, 1987, pp.78-80)*

Rabbi Safran's appeal to Antonescu was written on October 11, 1941. Dr. William Filderman, the President of the Federation of the Jewish Congregations in Romania, also wrote a letter on the same day (Fisher, 1969, p.71). The deportations began one day later! Safran tried unsuccessfully to see Antonescu's wife, Maria, and also the Marshal himself.

*"When we finally met, emotion filled my words, my tone, my insistence. I begged him to take pity on those wretched, dislocated, hunted people and not to send them to their death. At a certain moment it seemed that he was touched, but soon after he started to rant and rave. I tried to calm him, to point out that, with but one word, he could stop the catastrophe, prevent the destruction of so many homes and return those people from that painful trek that could lead to the death of so many. But he merely stared at me severely with his sometimes burning, sometimes icy eyes, and maintained that the Jews deserved their fate. His face grew alternately bright red and pale white, and he appeared like a wild beast ready to tear me to shreds. I had summoned up all my spiritual strength to guide me through this audience, but at this point I already started murmuring Shema Israel. My feelings during this trying experience, which remains etched in my soul, cannot be translated in words." (Safran, 1987, pp.81-82)*



Rabbi Safran's efforts continued with meetings with Maria Antonescu and the Patriarch of Romania and contacts with King Michael and Queen Elena, the Queen Mother. The Queen Mother even tried to convince the German ambassador, Baron von Killinger, to "show mercy to the innocent victims"! Unfortunately, nothing helped; Dr. Filderman's appeal to Marshall Antonescu and his rejection of it, in a demagogic letter accusing Bessarabian Jews of atrocities committed against the retreating Romanians in 1940, were made public in front page news on October 19, 1941. Later, in 1943, in a fit of anger Antonescu deported Dr. Filderman to Transnistria.

It is unfortunate that in our time history is being forgotten and attempts are even being made to rewrite it. Last month, in a memo to its members, Mr. Edgar Bronfman, the President of the World Jewish Congress, highlighted the following recent news item:

*"In a small Romanian city outside Bucharest, an enthusiastic crowd that includes members of Parliament and other governmental officials cheers as a statue of General Ion Antonescu - a mass murderer responsible for the deaths of 250,000 Jews - goes up in the a public square."*

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28. These are the old and original provinces of Romania.

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29. August 1, 1941, was a Friday. At the time, we had been in the Ghetto one week, frightened and hungry with very little food. We "lived" in one small room of an old one-story house, in a large courtyard typical of the old part of the city where the Ghetto was located. Conditions were very crowded averaging one or more families per room.

That Friday morning, rumors spread quickly through the Ghetto that young men and women will be taken to work where they will also be fed. The assembly was taking place in the small public square of the Ghetto, around the corner from where we were located. Before the war, during my previous 14 years, my mother used to complain constantly that I was a poor eater. At that time, however, food became a great incentive and I went to the square willing, hungry and eager to "go to work".

I remember that summer day vividly. The small square was full of people surrounded by some soldiers; certainly more than the "three soldiers" mentioned in the Report. We stood in a long crowded queue before a table where lists were being made of the selected people. Although this was a German operation, Romanian officers were also present. After a while, torn between hunger and fears of the frightening possibilities of "the work", I decided to retreat. It was not easy but not impossible either. I moved to the periphery of the square and convinced a soldier standing guard that I was almost blind in one eye and potentially not a good worker (this excuse came to mind since almost two years earlier I



have been sick in an eye and lost one year of regular schooling because of it). He let me go.

About 5 p.m. that day, I watched the group of 450 being led away, surrounded by some soldiers and carrying tool boxes; we later found out that these contained ammunition for their execution. The fighting at the front was still close to the city and there were frequent Russian air raids without much prior warning. Such a raid occurred that evening; as usual, in our courtyard, we took shelter in the large wine cellar that was available.

Suddenly, a man appeared at the entrance to the cellar. He was one of the "39 old Jews", a resident of our courtyard at Alexandru Vlahutza No.19, and was in a state of hysterics. A few men took him aside, my father among them, and tried to understand his story. An attempt was later made to keep the truth quite, so as to avoid undue panic in the Ghetto, but this was not very successful. Our neighbor, whose name unfortunately I do not remember, and the other men in the Ghetto of his small group of 39 related their experience. The 450 were marched to the neighboring village of Visterniceni where there were apparently large anti-tank ditches prepared by the Russians. The young men and women, except the 39 older men, were executed in these ditches. The 39 were made to bury them. They were then lectured by a German officer and told to return to the Ghetto, tell the people what they saw and warn them that this will be their fate if "they did not stop signaling with lights to the incoming Russian planes".

In addition to their aim of killing Jews, the Germans obviously wanted to terrorize the Ghetto population. What I observed in those days, and on this occasion in particular, was how the normal human mind apparently switches off certain unbearable facts in order to protect its sanity. What happened after the murders of August 1, 1941, was that many in the Ghetto refused to believe the truth. This was manifested a number of times in a type of mass hysteria. At its few "gates", the Ghetto had tall wooden walls with posted guards. We knew them by their street names. What happened after August 1, and also later with respect to the people missing from Ghidighici, was that suddenly a rumor would spread in the Ghetto that "they are all coming back at gate X!". Hundreds would run to that gate to welcome them. Unfortunately, no one returned from the dead!

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30. Ploesti is a city near Bucharest in the old part of Romania. The date of "December 1941" in the Report is an obvious typo; it should be "December 1940".

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## **APPENDICES**

- 1. Reports of Inquiry (Original Copies)**
- 2. Postcard From Orhei**
- 3. Ghetto Reports**
- 4. Acmecetca**



## **APPENDIX 1**

**Reports of Inquiry (Original Copies)**



RAPORT DE ANCHETA

AL COMISIUNEI INSTITUITA CONFORM CRIMINULUI DOARULUI  
MARESIL ION ANTONESCU, CONDUCATORUL STATULUI, PENTRU  
CERCETAREA HERAGULELOR DE LA GHETTOUL  
DIN CHISINAU.

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RAPORT DE ANCHETA

AL COMISIUNEI INSTITUITA CONFORM ORDINULUI DOMNULUI HARESAL  
ION ANTONESCU, CONDUCATORUL STATULUI, PENTRU CERCETAREA NE-  
REGULELOR DE LA GHETTO-UL DIN CHISINAU.

Comisiunea, formată din Domnii: General de Divizie Niculescu Constantin, Comandantul Militar al Capitalei, ca Președinte și General Magistrat Stroe Stefan, Inspectorul Justiției Militare, Laurențiu Preoțescu, Președintele Curții de Apel Chișinău, Traian Niculescu, Procurorul General al Curții de Apel Chișinău, Lt. Colonel Alexandru Nădărjac, Procuror Instructor la Curtea Martială a Capitalei și Inspector General Păunescu, de la Banca Națională ca membrii, toți numiți din ordinul Domnului Mareșal Ion Antonescu, transmis cu Nr. 217 din 4 Decembrie 1941, de către Secretariatul General al Președinției Consiliului de Miniștri, și-a început lucrările, privitoare la anchetarea neregulelor din ghetto-ul Chișinău, în ziua de 4 Decembrie 1941.

Ni s'a încredințat, drept material documentar de bază, din partea Președinției Consiliului de Miniștri: o notă informativă, raportul Nr. 741/941 al Parchetului Lapușna, raportul din 1 Decembrie 1941 al Secretariatului General al Președinției către Domnul Mareșal, copie de pe raportul de anchetă al Comisiunei instituită pentru cercetarea dispariției unei cantități de aur, provenită dela KISEL KREMER și alții, din ghettou și o notă rezumativă intitulată "Ghettou", prin care sub denumirea de "Jaf organizat", se trasează direcțiile neregulelor săvârșite, determinând astfel obiectivele cercetării și anume: lipsa de organizare a ghettou-lui, înlesnirea comiterii de infracțiuni, prin amestecul creștinilor cu evreii din ghettou și neînarea unei situații a celor internați, evadări din ghettou, intrarea în ghettou a diferite persoane suspecte și fără control, datorită căror s-au înlesnit și săvârșit transacțiuni în dauna Statului, lipsa de organizare în strângerea aurului de către B.N.R., jafuri și crime săvârșite cu ocazia evacuărilor și trecerilor peste Nistru.



Deasemenea, Domnul Ministrul al Justiției, ne-a mai încredințat și raportul Nr. 512 din 3 Decembrie 1941 al Domnului Procuror General al Curții de Apel Chișinău și câteva anexe, referitor la unele nereguli și infracțiuni săvârșite, tot în legătură cu lagările evreilor din Basarabia.

In scopul executării misiunii date, Comisiunea s'a transportat în ziua de 6 Decembrie 1941, la Chișinău, după ce în prealabil s'a determinat programul de lucru. S'a hotărât anume, să se parcurgă pe etape, fazele generatoare de infracțiuni și nereguli în legătură cu înființarea, organizarea și evacuarea ghettou-lui, precum și verificarea în linii generale a tuturor consecințelor decurgând din activitățile de mai sus, cum ar fi:

- Opera de proteguire și conservare a bunurilor mobile și imobile ce intră în partimoniu Statului, exercitată de organele administrative ale Basarabiei;
- Condițiunile juridice ce nasc pentru evacuați și averile rămase de pe urma lor, pe baza actelor de Guvernământ și legiuirilor edicate;
- Înixtiunile în atribuții, drept rezultat al suprapunerii anumitor împăterniciri isvorâte din legi, atât pentru Guvernământul Basarabiei, cât și pentru Inaltele Comandamente Militare.

In activitatea sa urmată, Comisiunea s'a deplasat în Ghettou și la Orhei, a ascultat 137 informatori, cu parte din ei procedând și la confruntări și a procurat tot materialul documentar oficial, în legătură cu lagările și ghettourile din Basarabia.

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Inainte de a păsi la expunerea constatărilor și concluziunilor noastre, drept rezultat al cercetărilor efectuate, socotim necesar a prezenta, unele fenomene care punctează în chip deosebit, atmosfera generală și activitatea provinciei de peste Prut.

Sunt indicații care vor servi în cumpănirea hotărârilor ce se vor lua și care se referă la:

**1. Psihoza specială, inclinată către delatiune și exagerare.**

Prămantările sociale din ultimul timp, motivate în parte de unele greutăți initiale în organizarea administrativă, sentimentele de răzbunare, lipsa de scrupulozitate și



și ue conținuă a constiținței multora, nu uescunțuit în Basarabia o adeverată avalanșă de pretinși informatori, care prin: note informative, denunțuri sau şoapte, au creiat o atmosferă de permanentă suspiciune, ce contribue, pe deosebit la îngreutarea operei de reconstrucție și aşezare normală a vieții de acolo, iar pe de altă, la necompletețe și uneori la nereala încunoștiințare a Conducerii Statului, asupra stărilor de fapt din Basarabia.

La crearea atmosferei menționată mai sus, a contribuit în bună măsură și ambițiile nesatisfăcute a unora din localnici, care se așteptau la aşezarea lor în diferite funcții publice.

Factorii dela care provin asemenea manifestări sunt:

1. Elemente din massa cetățenilor, care sub masca anonimatului, sau a falselor identități, comunică în scris, reprezentanților apăraturei administrative sau Comandamentelor Militare, diferite informații, auzite sau inventate, expunându-le prin prizma exagerării, sau adessori prin aceea a sentimentului de răzbunare și invidie.

Asemenea denunțuri nu au ocolit nici pe exponenții cei mai neîntinăți ai vieții publice, cum spre exemplu: Generalul Zwiedineck, fost Subsecretar de Stat al Româniai, și Generalul Athanasiu, Comandantul Corpului 3 Armată.

Consilierul Dardan de la Curtea de Apel Chișinău, ne-a mărturisit că a fost informat că, însăși N.A.V.D.-ul comunist, s'a speriat de multimea denunțurilor din Basarabia. Primise peste 50.000.

2. Unii intelectuali, care se pretind bine informați, simțindu-se obligați a se aseza astfel pe o linie de interes sau pentru a-și satisface sentimentele de răzbunare.

Dăm două exemple edificate:

a. avocatul Cernăuțianu Ilie, din Chișinău, comunică Căpitanului de rezervă Cepescu, de la Guvernamentul Basarabiei că știe multe lucruri cu privire la traficurile ce se fac în ghettou.

Comisiunea, ținând socoteală de poziționarea informatorului propus și a garanției de seriozitate ce prezintă, a dispus chemarea lui.

La interrogatoriul luat, ne-a declarat că "a auzit vorbindu-se de pe la gresierii de la Curtea de Apel, că se putea obține o amânare a plecării evreilor evacuați, contra 10.000 lei. Nu dă nici o preciziune, nu face nici un control și lansează știrea.



Deasemenea, ne-a mai declarat, că guvernatorul Adascăliți dela Curtea de Apel, i-a spus că în ziua plebiscitului, Avocatul Hogaș dela Primărie, vorbind cu Dl. Sălceanu, i-a comunicat că evreul Schur și ține un milion la dispoziție, ca să-i înlesnească rămnarea în Chișinău.

Si aci, transmite o informație din auzite și aceasta comunicată prin a treia persoană, informație care se plasează cu totul în domeniul neseriozității.

b. Locotenentul de rezervă Constantin Bădescu, funcționar la Ministerul de Interne și actualmente domiciliat în Craiova, se prezintă Primarul Municipiului Chișinău și îi cere să facă imediat o descindere la imobilul din str. Nihai Viteazul Nr. 23, locuința Int.Cpt. Roescu, dela Guvernământ, unde s-ar găsi multe obiecte prețioase și mari cantități de aur. S'a executat descinderea și nu s'a găsit nimic, fapt care a determinat suspiciunea colportată că valoările au existat, însă au fost sustrase.

Intrebat de Comisiune, ce l-a determinat să facă acest denunț verbal, ne-a răspuns prin declarație scrisă că, pur și simplu, a vrut să se răzbune pe Căpitanul Roescu cu care avusese un incident, încheind depozitac cu următoarea frază, care-i caracterizează în întregime mentalitatea: "... considerându-mă complect satisfăcut, servindu-i de lecție și în viitor și să țină minte că i-am făcut și eu boala".

3. Agentii informatori de Stat. Din lipsa unui control serios în recrutarea lor și a insuficienței pregătirii profesionale, dau note informative lipsite de seriozitate și obiectivitate. Adesea ori traficau cu însăși funcțiunea lor. Dăm câteva exemple:

a. În ziua de 9 Decembrie 1941, parvîne Comisiunei, o notă informativă cu mențiunea expressă că provine din "Constatare personală", prin care se afirmează că, la data de mai sus, a văzut eșind din Chișinău, prin bariera Hâncești, două camioane încărcate cu mobilă și covoare și că în unul din ele se afla lângă șofer, Colonelul ștefan Dumitrescu.

Ori, este știut că încă dela 5 Decembrie, Colonelul Dumitrescu, era arestat la Parchetul Militar C.E.C., iar camioanele urmărite prin toate Legiunile de Jandarmi, în traseul lor probabil, n'au fost găsite.

a. Agentii speciali de informație: Hadan Constantin, Căjocaru Ion, Nedu Ion, Marin Gheorghe și Const. Ionescu,



atașați Guvernământului, pentru opera informativă, înscenată, cu asentimentul superiorilor lor, înlesnirea evadării unor evrei, sub pretextul de a descoperi pe acei care se ocupau cu asemenea practici și cu acest prilej și însușesc o importantă cantitate de aur dela evreii, obiect al încercării. Toți se află arestați și în cercetarea Cabinetului de Instrucție al Tribunalului Lăpușna.

#### 4. Acțiunea subversivă întreținută de mișcarea legionară.

Lt. Colonelul Pallade ne prezintă nota informativă cu Nr. 2505 din 10 Noembrie 1941, prin care se menționează că, mișcarea legionară din Moldova, Basarabia și Bucovina, a trimis instrucțiuni tuturor centrelor județene, pentru a creia și întreține o atmosferă defavorabilă actualului regim, în care scop:

a. Acolo unde există evrei să se formuncele reclamațiuni, prin care să se arate că cei bogăți, au cumpărat funcționarii și Comisiunile militare, pentru a-i scuti de munca obștească.

b. Să se formuleze reclamațiuni, pe tema averilor rămase de pe urma evreilor evacuați, indicându-se fapte din care să iasă în relief favoritismul interesat.

In acțiunea aceasta, se recomandă să activeze numai legionarii cari au luptat pe front și sunt în prezent demobilizați, iar insinuările să fie difuzate în pătura de jos și în special printre femeile celor mobilizați, pentru a-și creia astfel o masă de nemulțumiți, în scopul unor viitoare demonstrații.

Deasemenea, ni s'a mai prezentat, o altă notă informativă cu Nr. 2748 din 27 Noembrie 1941, precum și raportul Nr. 2770 din 2 Decembrie 1941, al Biroului Statistic Militar Iași, către ștarele Stat Major, Secția II-a, prin care se arată că, tot din rândurile legionare pornește o acțiune de defăimare a armatei. Se menționează câteva cazuri concrete, care conduc la convingerea subliniată mai sus.

#### B. Ambianța prielnică de alunecare în domeniul incorrectitudinei.

Până la ocuparea Odessei, a dăinuit pe întreg teritoriul Basarabiei, atmosfera de răsboiu, drept rezultat normal a mișcărilor de trupe, trenuri de răniți și măsuri de siguranță pentru asigurarea spatiului trupelor de operații, etc.



In aceste condițiuni, instrumentul de ordine din cadrul aparatului administrativ și exercită mai greu atribuțiunile.

Pe de altă parte, situația evreilor supuși restricțiunilor impuse de imperitive superioare, excită în bună măsură înclinarea către abuz. Aceasta s'a accentuat pe măsura ce nevoile de trai ale evreilor și constrângereau mai mult și dorința de libertate, și făcea să recurgă la toate combinațiile posibile, dând astfel frâu liber tentației celor de cărți depindea înlesnirea oricărui avantaj, ce li se putea face.

Deasemenea sentimentul unanim, că ei erau deja scoși de sub ocrotirea legilor, făcea ca orice particică de autoritate, să-și amplifice puterea și să încurajeze samavolnicia.

In special, cu ocazia evacuărilor, atât înainte de pornire, cât și pe traseele următe, când convoaiele acestor evrei, se reduceau la simple turme anonime, fără personalitate și fără identitate, când viața lor nu mai reprezenta o noțiune demnă de protejat, atmosfera abuzivă a crescut în intensitate, contaminând ca o molimă, aproape toate conștiințele, cu rosturi sau fără rosturi, în asemenea operații.

Predomina ideea nerăspunderei, care inflăcăra și trezea instințele primare. La adăpostul ei, chiar unele proeminențe ale cinstei și probităței, au sărit de pe linia conduitei lor și s-au învălmășit în ambianța încălcărilor de legi. Casul Căpitanului Alexandrescu, pe care-l vom expune în cuprinsul raportului de față.

La toate acestea de mai sus, a ajutat fără îndoială, agitația și fuga naturală către salvare, din partea evreilor, care cu pus în slujba disperării lor, toate moravurile ctavice ce-i caracterizează.

Deși, în bună măsură, materialul informativ asupra activităților delictoase din Basarabia, în legătură cu evreii, a fost viciat din lipsă de seriozitate și adeseori copleșit de sentimente de răzbunare, totuși Comisiunea a putut culege din complexitatea lui, unele indicații prețioase, care ne-a putut conduce pe făgașul îndeplinirei misiunei date.

Sprijiniți pe aceste informații și parcurgând întreg sistemul de investigații engăduit unei cercetări, am reușit să prezintăm în raportul de față, date, în majoritate precise, asupra: înființării ghetoului din Chișindu și lagărelor din Basarabia, a vieții în ghettou și lagăre,



a evacuărilor, neregulelor și infracțiunilor săvârșite, în legătură cu aceste situații, după cum urmează:

I. Înființarea ghettou-lui din Chișinău și a lagărelor din Basarabia.

A. Situatia generală din Chisinau, în primele zile după ocupare.

In ziua de 18 Iulie 1941, trupele Românești depășiseră în înaintarea lor desrobitoare, Capitala Basarabiei, care se mistuia prin foc și-și zguduia temeliile dinamitate de către armata roșie, care se retrăgea.

Colonelul D.Tudosie, Subșeful Statului Major al Armatei 4, este numit Comandant Militar al Chișinăului și împrejurimilor sale, unde intră în ziua de 19 Iulie, cu un personal redus, de însoțire și siguranță.

Orașul prezinta în întregimea lui, aspectul tragic-trăite. Ruine fumegânde la fiecare pas, cadavre de oameni și animale, presărate în tot locul, bande de derbedei și corbi ai nenorocirilor, care jefuiau, dezertori și elemente înarmate, din arma comunistă, care stăpâneau periferiile, precum și paralizia totală a oricărei activități de trai.

Stabilirea ordinei și siguranței era preocuparea de căpetenie, atât în scopul reluării unui ritm normal de viață în oraș, cât și pentru acela de a asigura liniștea necesară în spatele trupelor de operații. Cu toate eforturile depuse, elementele de turburare își continuau activitatea, prin semnalizări luminoase, focuri de armă în timpul nopții și dezordini periferice.

B. Prezența elementului evreesc.

Rămași în număr destul de însemnat, marcau prima și cea mai serioasă piedică în opera de reconstrucție și stabilizare a liniștei și siguranței publice.

Această constatare se deduce din următoarele stări de fapt:

1. Trecutul nu prea îndepărtat a celor 22 ani de stăpânire Românească în Basarabia, era destul de încercat, de permanentă ostilitate pe care ei o manifestaseră contra tuturor intereselor Românești. Ignorând cu totul bunavoința stăpânirei noastre, care-i egalașe cu Români în făgășurile tuturor drepturilor, ei nu-și luau totuși ochii și gândurile de la răsăritul secerei și ciocunului, formând din



pădăntul Basarabiei, pe primul principiu de recrutare a majorității infractorilor contra siguranței Statului și ordinei publice.

2. În Iunie 1940, când trupele Românești, au trădit durerioasele clipe ale retragerii fără luptă, amarul tuturor ușilor înțelor, tot evreii l-au provocat. Slăvind zgromotos fericirea roșie care se aprobia, pălmuiau prin batjocură și sfidare, obrazul crispăt al ostașului Român, care se supunea fără voe, unei rușini copleșitoare.

3. Aceiași atitudine de persecuție și apăsare și-au imprimat-o față de români vremelnic rămași sub stăpânirea comunistă. Mărturiile preotului Burjacovski Vladimir, profesor Ilie și Avocat Constantin Stoinescu, date în fața Comisiei, evidențiază din plin ura desfășurată de aceste elemente, contra a tot ce era românesc în Basarabia îngunchiată.

4. Evreii care au însoțit trupele rusești în retragere, au căutat deasemeni să-și manifeste sentimentul de dușmanie, față de Tara Românească, care-i ocrotise, prin distrugerea proprietăților lor imobile, pentru a nu rămâne intacte în patrimoniul Statului, iar parte din acei rămași, în prezența trupelor române de ocupație, au contribuit în largă măsură la sabotarea dispozițiunilor de ordine și siguranță, luate inițial de Comandamentul Militar.

C. Initiativa înființării ghettoului din Chișinău, și sectorul destinat pentru aceasta.

Față de starea de fapt arătate și drept urmare a unei consfătuiri între Guvernatorul Basarabiei și Colonelul Tudosie, s'a hotărât înființarea unui ghetou în Chișinău, începând dela 22-23 Iulie 1941, adică după 4 zile de la intrarea Colonelului Tudosie în Chișinău.

S'a destinat pentru ghetou, partea de jos a orașului, spre Visterniceni, la început într'o cuprindere mai mare și ulterior restrânsă, pentru a se ușura posibilitățile de pază și siguranță.

D. Înființarea lagărelor în restul Basarabiei.

În ce privește restul Provinciei, unde pericolozitatea elementului evreesc era aceiași, s'a dispus prin ordinul nr. 61 din 24 Iulie 1941, al Guvernatorului Basarabiei, către Prefecturile de județ, de a se face lagăre în care să se strângă toți evreii.



Centrele de strângere, au fost la: Rautel, Limbeni și Rășcani, pentru evreii din județul Bălți; Padurea Alexandru cel Bun și Rublenița, pentru cei din județul Soroca; Securenii și Edinești, pentru cei din Hotin și Nordul Bucovinei.

Deasemenea, la Orhei, Cahul, Ismail, Chilia Nouă și Bolgrad.

Constatându-se însă că, unele lagăre, nu corespundeau unor condiții acceptabile de viață, s'au luat măsuri de mutarea lor, după cum urmează: evreii din lagările dela Pădurile Alexandru cel Bun și Rublenița, au fost cazați la Vestujeni, iar cei dela Rautel, Limbeni și Rășcani, la lagărul dela Mărculești.

In ziua de 16 August 1941, dată când cazăreacă în lagăr era aproape terminată, au fost aduși din Transnistria în Basarabia, fără preclabilă formalitate, de către Germani, pe podul dela Iampil-Coșăuți, un număr de 15.000 evrei, sub pretextul că ar fi fost dintre aceia fugiți din fața trupelor noastre.

Acești evrei, au fost dirigați și cazați tot în lagărul dela Vestujeni.

#### E. Ordine, instrucțiuni initiale.

De la început, trebuie să remarcăm că, atât Marele Cartier General, cât și Guvernământul Basarabiei și Comandamentul Militar al Chișinăului, nu au dat instrucțiuni prin care să se stabilească reglementarea regimului de aplicat lagărelor și ghettoului.

S'au dat inițial numai directivele în mare, iar dispozițiunile de detaliu, cu fost aplicate în măsura întâmpinării diferitelor greutăți în conducere. Pentru aceste motive, vom arăta mai jos, desfășurarea numeroaselor defecțiuni, deduse din această lipsă de bază și în parte regimul deosebit, aplicat la diferite lagăre, datorită lipsei unei concepții unitare de ansamblu.

Deasemenea, nu s'au dat instrucțiuni nici cu privire la ținerea statisticei nominale a evreilor instalată în lagăr și ghettoul din Chișinău.

#### F. Operațiunea instalării în ghettou.

S'a făcut prin avertisment la locuințele evreilor din oraș, după care s'au transportat însoțiti de patrule militare, de poliție, sau singuri în ghettou, unde fiecare a fost liber să se cauzeze după puterile sale.



Nu s'a dat nici o dispoziție însă, cșupra canti-  
tății de bagaje îngăduită fiecărui a lua, cșupra condițiunilor de trai ce-i aştepta, ori cșupra resurselor de întreținere. Datorită acestui fapt, s'a remarcat o evidentă zăpăceală în grijile puse de internați pentru cazare, și în special, numeroase reveniri în oraș pentru a-și complecta lipsurile, cu obiecte ce le ridicau din fostele locuințe. Aceste reveniri, pe baza autorizației emanate dela Comandamentul Militar al ghettou-lui, au dăinuit până în Septembrie, antrenând cu ele, un întreg cortegiu de tranzacțuni și subtilizări de valori, din partea evreilor internați, cari erau deja edificați cu situația și soarta ce li se destinase. (Declarația Int.Cpt.Roescu și Dr.Potcovă Voina). Acesta din urmă, în calitatea să de șef ai Serviciului de Inventariere de pe lângă primăria Municipiului Chișinău, face, la 6 Septembrie 1941, un raport către Primar, în care arată textual că: "Comandamentul ghettou-lui din localitate, încuviințează evreilor să vină în oraș, însorită de soldați, ca să ridice din obiectele lor casnice, care le-au apartinut. Unii din aceștia duc obiectele, deja inventariate, iar alții scot lucrurile casnice din locuri ascunse și le transportă", insistând în concluzii, pentru a se interveni ca să înceze această stare de fapt.

In rezumat, ghettoul din Chișinău, a fost înființat la 4 zile după intrarea trupelor românești în localitate, fără însă a avea la baza lui, ordine sau instrucțiuni precise, ceace a îngăduit comiterea diferitelor abuzuri și infracțiuni.

## II. Măsurile conservatorii pentru bunurile rămase în patrimoniul Statului.

In cadrul acestui capitol, ne referim la bunurile mobile și imobile, aflate pe teritoriul Basarabiei și foste proprietăți a evreilor sau persoanelor juridice evrești. Trecerea lor în patrimoniul Statului, s'a reglementat și definitivat prin legea Nr.2507 din 3 Septembrie 1941.

Până la această dată, nu se stabilise un regim legal cu privire la destinația ce urmă să li se dea.

Operațiile, încă în curs, necesitatea de asigurarea spatiului frontului, dispozițiunile de ordin tactic și adeseori administrativ, luate de Marele Cartier General, care constrângeau în parte autoritatea administrativă, au



împiedecat desigur, la început, desvârșirea unei opere de bună gospodărie.

Administrația Basarabiei a luat totuși o serie de măsuri, cu scopul de a pune la adăpost cverec Statului. Anume, la 29 Iulie 1941, se da ordinul Nr.146, către Prefecți și Primării, pentru inventarierea proprietăților și bunurilor urbane evreiești. La 2 August 1941, se da, ca urmare, alt ordin cu Nr.307, în același scop. La 4 Septembrie 1941, odată cu apariția Legei Nr.2507, se dau instrucțiuniile cu Nr.336, asupra modului de administrație și de folosința imobilelor intrate legal în patrimoniul Statului. Deasemenea, s'a edictat și oordonanță, pe baza Decretului Lege Nr.161 din 10 Iulie 1941, obligând pe toți locuitorii să depună, în termen de 48 ore, obiectele ce nu le aparțin sau care au fost furate.

Asupra situației bunurilor din Chișinău și aceasta, în măsura în care chestiunea venea în atingere cu obiectul misiunei ordonate, am constatat următoarele:

A. Guvernământul a dat ordinele menționate mai sus, dar n'a hotărît și mijloacele de execuție. Lipsa de personal și de fonduri afectate scopului urmărit, a fost ceea mai principală piedică pentru a se realiza ceva.

B. Inițial, nu s'au luat măsuri, pentru oprirea violării domiciliilor și a devastărilor ori furtului de mobilier.

S'ar fi putut preveni toate aceste abuzuri, dacă ar fi fost posibilă sigilarea locuințelor fără stăpân și intensificarea pazei pe străzi.

C. S'au tolerat imixtiuni în administrarea bunurilor, astfel: Comenduirea Pieței, repartizată la început locuințele; numai în August acest atribut a fost trecut Primăriei; deasemenea Cercul de Recrutare a ridicat și transportat multe materiale.

D. Nu s'a dat urmăre, la întâmpinările judicioase, ale organelor de execuție, destinate inventarierei și valorificării imobilelor. Astfel, Sesul Serviciului de Inventariere dela Primărie, Voinea Potcoavă, înaintează la 26 Septembrie 1941, raportul Nr.585, către Directoratul Româniazării din Guvernământ, în care face o serie de propuneri concrete, în scopul garantării și valorificării bunurilor Statului și anume referitoare la:

1. Necesitatea înființării fișei de imobil și a dosarului special pentru fiecare imobil.

2. Necesitatea evaluării imobilelor și mobilierului, de comisiuni special cu drept de contestație la un for su-



D. Necessitatea reparării imobilelor, pentru a evita degradările și a le face capabile de productivitate.

E. Necessitatea repartizării imobilelor pe sectoare și c înțocmirei unui regulament, prin care să se dezvolte normele stabilitate, pentru administrarea bunurilor Statului.

F. S'au format succesiv prea multe Comisiuni, de evaluare și inventariere. Prima, a fost aceea numită de primărie, urmată de alta cu Guvernământului, condusă de Int. Cpt. Roescu, și însfârșit în Moldova, se înființează patru comisiuni, prezidate de magistrați, fapte care au condus la situația ca, nici astăzi, după 6 luni dela ocuparea Chișinăului, să nu se știe precis care-i averea mobilă și imobilă a Statului, în acel Municipiu.

G. Începând dela 4 Septembrie 1941, când apare legea Nr. 2506, care institue plenipotența administrării Basarabiei în măiniile Guvernatorului, cu controlul singur al Conducătorului Statului, nu s'a făcut integral uz de acest atribut, pentru a imprima linia de autoritate necesară.

Un exemplu: La 17 Octombrie 1941, Direcția Română din Guvernământ, cere Comandamentului Militar al Chișinăului, să i se aprobe ridicarea din ghettou a unor mobile, spre a fi colectate în depozitele sale.

I se răspunde de către Comandament cu Nr. 3354 din 18 Octombrie 1941, că nu se aproba până nu se vor termina toate lucrările de evacuare.

Din acest exemplu, deducem că Guvernământul, deși ca un organ cu deplină autoritate în materie, totuși s'a lăsat în acest caz, subordonat Comandamentului Militar al orașului Chișinău.

H. Situația aproximativă a imobilelor de pe raza Municipiului Chișinău, care au intrat în patrimoniul Statului:

- 1906 imobile în stare locuibilă
- 359 " distruse
- 70 " în stare rea

In aceste imobile, se găsesc:

- 6523 apartamente locuibile
- 323 " nelocuibile.

Importanța ce dăm acestui capitol, este justificată de constatarea că averea mobilă rumănească dela evrei, inițial a făcut obiectul unei serii întregi de jafuri.

Pentru documentare, ne referim la declarația lui Colonelului Tudose, care subliniază textual că:



"In primele șări, nu exista în oraș nici o unitate de poliție germană. Din această cauză, informațiunile militare germane, organizate sau nu, sau izolate în grupuri, au săvârșit acte de forță, ridicând și transportând tot ce era mai bun și mai de valoare din depozite, case părăsite sau nepărăsite, intrând în conflict și trecând peste pazele militare române, cu autoritatea și dreptul de cuceritor. Aceste acte, au fost, în repetate rânduri, aduse la cunoștința Armatei, Domnului Guvernator și Domnului Mareșal. Căutarea și însușirea de valori, pe care le socoteau ascunse prin case, mobilier, canapele, dușumele, era atracțiunea tuturor, la care se asociau, prin inițiatie, și militarii izolați români. Conținutul depozitelor și materialelor din fabrici, au fost în bună parte însușite de informațiunile germane. Ori unde se instala o sentinelă română, după puțin timp, apăreau informațiuni auto-germane, dădeau la o parte sentinelă și în timpul folosit de aceasta pentru raport, încărcau și plecau.

Concomitent cu starea inițială de turburare și nesiguranță, haimanalele periferiilor, oameni fără căpătăi și într'o bună măsură locuitorii suburbanelor sau satelor apropiate, cutreerau străzile, intrau prin case și dedându-se la nevoie și la acte de violență, furau tot ce le eșea în cale.

Hartorul Voina Potcoavă, arată și el în declarație că mahalalele erau pline de mobilier furat.

In rezumat: Nu a existat delă. Început un plan precis asupra proceuriei ce trebuia urmată, pentru a se asigura avereia ce revinea Statului.

Hai ales, la început a existat imixtiunea autorităților militare în această chestiune, care au împiedecat lucrările organelor îndreptățite.

Nici acum, operațiunea de statistică și evaluare, nu este încă clarificată.

### III. Funcționarea ghettou-lui din Chișinău și a lagărelor.

#### A. Paza ghettou-lui și organizarea ei.

Ghettoul depindea de Comandamentul Militar al orașului Chișinău, condus succesiv de: Colonel D. Tudosie, dela 18 Iulie - 1 Septembrie 1941; General Panaitiu, dela 1-7 Septembrie; Colonel Dumitrescu Eugen, dela 7 Septembrie - 15 Noembrie 1941.



Paza ghettou-lui s'a jăcut cu dijerite unități, care din cauza deplasării lor, în raport cu necesitățile operative, se schimbau mereu.

Dintre unitățile care au concurat la pază, cităm:

- Compania 1-a din Reg. 50 Infanterie
- O unitate din Reg. 68 Infanterie
- Compania 10 Poliție - Locot. Pușcașu.
- Compania de fumizare - Cpt. Poenaru
- Batal. 20 mitr. Div. Lt. Col. Grigorescu și Locot. Pop Emil delc 9 - 27 Octombrie 1941.
- Compania 23 Poliție, transformată ulterior în Comp. Jand. mobilă Chișinău, dela 27 Octombrie 1941, sub comanda Cpt. Paraschivescu.

Paza și siguranța în ghettou nu s'a putut face în condițiuni bune care să garanteze o asemenea operație. Ca prime măsuri, intrările și eșirile corespunzătoare străzilor care străbăteau cartierul, s'au baricadat prin garduri finale de scânduri, însă această măsură nu s'a putut extinde și pe străzile care mărgineau ghettoul.

Datorită acestui fapt, prin unele case și curți căre dădeau în aceste străzi de limită, se putea intra și eșii în voie și se puteau transporta clandestin orice obiecte.

Lipsa de efective, față de lungimea apreciabilă a cercului de pază cca. 4 km., a fost una din cauzele principale a situației expuse mai sus.

Efectivele de pază au variat între 80-250 oameni, acest din urmă număr fiind atins abea la 27 Octombrie 1941.

In afara de insuficiențele remarcate, menționăm și alte piedici, rezultate din însăși aşezarea ghettoului și anume:

1. Existența în cartierul respectiv a circa 100 familiilor de creștini, care locuiau acolo. Pentru acestă nu se putea face vreo restricție cu privire la circulaarea, eșirea și intrarea în ghettou.

2. Existența în același cartier a manutanței, depozitului de grâu și cereale, a Cercului de Recrutare Lăpușna, fabricelor de săpun, sifoane și frânghii, pentru care erau și opreliștile în circulație, nu se puteau îngădui ușa mult.

3. Drumul către aeroport care era foarte circulat, străbătea ghettoul în lungul lui.

Datorită acestor stări de fapt, înlesnind tuturor traficurilor era aproape naturală, deosebita și posibilitățile de evadare.

#### B. Condițiunile de viață în ghettou.

Acestea nu au fost determinate de o reglementare judicioasă și precisă. Fiecare bogat și sărac, trăia pe cont propriu.



In acest scop, se căuta să fie în gheto și căruțelor fărănești care aduceau diferite produse alimentare. Colonelul Tudose le-a făcut o brutărie proprie, spital și farmacie.

Componența socială a ghettou-lui era aproximativ următoarea:

- 4.148 bărbați, 4.476 femei și 2.901 copii. Total 11.525 suflete.

Dintre aceștia, erau trecuți peste 50 ani:

- 1.502 bărbați, și 1.704 femei. Total 3.206 suflete.

Ca stare materială, majoritatea erau săraci, din tre care cca. 3.000 lipsiți complet de mijloace, fiind ajutați, chiar înainte de a fi introdusi în ghettou, de Comunitatea evreiească. Cu mijloace proprii de trai, fiind mai avuți, erau cam 2000 evrei și numai 200 dintre ei puteau fi socotiti bogăți.

Fuță de această situație, exceptând pe acei 5000 ajutați de Comunitate, cei mai mulți și procuru bani pentru existență, din vânzarea diferitelor obiecte ce aveau.

Până la începerea evacuărilor când s'a dat o dispoziție categorică de oprire a vânzărilor în ghettou, transacțiile nici nu au fost îngăduite nici nu au fost oprite express.

Lipsa oricărei indicațiuni din partea Comandamentului Militar, a înlesnit traficuri și operațiuni de înstrăinare, a valorilor, în dauna Statului.

#### C. Alte organe existente în ghettou.

1. Pentru menținerea ordinei s'a înființat, chiar dela început o circumscriptiune polițienească sub conducerea Comisarului Virgil Ionescu, care avea la dispoziția sa un grup de gardieni publici. Acestui instrument polițiesc destinat colaborării cu Comandamentul Militar, nu i s'a remarcat nicăieri intervențiunea, pentru împiedicarea, descoperirea și relatarea abaterilor săvârșite.

Această stare se datorează în parte și prea ucrei presiuni a autorităței militare, precum și recomandările date chiar de șefii polițienești, de a sta cât mai mult în expectativă.

2. Conglomeratul evreesc din ghettou avea și el un organism propriu de conducere sub forma unui comitet compus din 20 persoane, sub președinția lui Guttmann Landau. Comitetul lucra direct cu Comandamentul Militar al Chișinăului, unde și expunea doleanțele; deasemenea dirija executarea dispozițiunilor ordonate, cu privire la scu-



terea evreilor pentru născut obștească și a celor ce urmău să fie evacuați și, în fine, exercita opera de ajutorare a săracilor și de asistență bolnavilor și neputincioșilor.

#### D. Mortalitatea.

Pe cale naturală, n'a dat un procent prea mare. La Chișinău au murit 441 evrei, din care vreo 20 s'au sinucis în preajma evacuării. Procentul mai mare, a fost în lagărul de la Vertujeni, cca. 1800 evrei și anume majoritatea dintre cei 15.000 trecuți în Basarabia de către germani și care se găseau într'o deosebită stare de mizerie fizologică. Lt.Col.Pallade, din declarația căruia reținem toate aceste date, ne reproduce un incident sugestiv cu privire la modul cum înțelegeau germanii să-i trateze. Anume, cu ocazia trecerii evreilor la noi, văzând că autoritățile române le distribuia pâine și ceai, au protestat textual: "dece le mai dați pâine și ceai? Noi îi împușcăm".

#### E. Comportarea organelor de pază în ghettou.

Sub aspectul general, tratamentul evreilor din ghettou, rezultat din felul de comportare a soldaților, gradăților, organelor militare de conducere, a fost omenesc și civilizat. Mărturii numeroase confirmă aceasta. (Guttmann Landau, Dumitru Sili, Solomon Sur, Ilie Bodoi, Nina Zoltur, Cpt.rez. Balinski, s.a.)

#### F. Intrările și eșirile din ghettou până la începerea evacuărilor.

In timpul conducerii Colonelului Tudose, exceptând oarecare larghețe ce s'a dat, unora din evrei, care reveneau la fostele lor locuințe, pentru a-și mai ridica din lucrurile lăsate, regimul intrărilor și eșirilor în ghettou a fost întărit de bună ordine.

Autorizațiile se eliberau exclusiv de Comandamentul Militar.

La început, când poftele de jaf se deslănțuiseră și răpirile de femei evreice deveniseră mai frecvente din partea soldaților, în special din armata germană, Colonelul Tudose, a luat măsuri drastice de a le împiedeca, prin oprirea intrării în ghettou, a oricărui ostaș, indiferent de armata căreia aparține. Deasemenea și pentru vehicule, precum și pentru orice persoană care nu avea nici o legătură cu ghettoul.

A înființat patrule puternice de control pentru interzicerea intrărilor în ghettou, cu consecnul ca în caz de opoziție să se facă uz de armă.



locuitorii ai ghettoului, făranii care aduceau provizii și organele stabilimentelor aflate acolo.

Acelaș regim s'a continuat și sub conducerea, de câteva zile, a Generalului Panaitiu, după care odată cu venirea la comandă a Colonelului Eugen Dumitrescu, s'a întronat toleranța și neregula.

Toleranța, în sensul că trierile celor ce intrau sau ieșeau, nu se mai executau cu strictețea dincinte, iar favoritismul își făcuse drum lagăr.

Nereguli, în sensul că, persoane sără nici o indicație, decât acea că se găseau în grădiniile Comandamentului Militar al orașului, al ghettou-lui, al sefului de Stat Major, al Comenduiri, intrau și ieșeau când voiau, practicând tot felul de tranzacții și abuzuri, pe care le vom semnala la capitolul infracțiunilor săvârșite.

Citău dintre aceștia pe: Nadia Terzi, Maria Licicofski, Zina Flaiser, Gabriela Gherstein, și alții.

Deasemenea, o martoră (Nina Zoltur) ne-a declarat că a văzut mașini militare, care scoateau în oraș pe unele fete mai frumoase, din ghettou.

#### G. Paza și viața în lagăre.

In celelalte lagăre din Basarabia, viața se desfășura în aceiași formă și cu aceleași mijloace.

Paza se făcea de către jandarmii legiunilor respective, însă în condiții mai bune, în special la Vertejeni și Mărculești, pentru că și plasamentul lagărelor era mai propriu unei asemenea destinații.

#### In rezumat:

1. Organizarea și funcționarea ghettou-lui din Chișinău și a lagărelor, s'a manifestat prin lipsă de instrucțiuni, care să precizeze modul de comportare al organelor de execuție.

2. Paza ghettou-lui din Chișinău a fost făcută în condiții mediocre din cauza lipsei de efective cu totul reduse, față de care nu se poate asigura o pază seriousă.

3. Intreaga funcționare a ghettou-lui din Chișinău era lăsată în măna organelor militare, autoritățile civile evitând, sau eschivându-se dela orice acțiune.

4. În timpul în care ghettoul era sub comandă Colonelului Tudose, se remarcă grija acestuia pentru a organiza o viață cât mai omenească evreilor, cât și pentru a împiedeca orice abuz.



Odată cu venirea la comandă a Colonelului Dumitrescu, începe seria abuzurilor și infracțiunilor menționate în raport.

#### IV. Evacuaările.

##### 1. Ordine și dispozițiuni de bază.

Din memoriul Guvernatorului Basarabiei, cu privire la situația ghettoului din Chișinău, adresat Președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri, reiese că hotărîrea asupra operațiunii de evacuare a evreilor din Bucovina și Basarabia, vîste Nistrului, a fost luată într'un Consiliu la Tighina, la care au participat toți Guvernatorii de provincii. S'au dat, cu acel prilej, indicațiuni precise asupra felului cum urma să se execute operațiunea. Marele Cartier General a fost însărcinat cu dirijarea operațiunii, împreună cu Marele Pretor, General Topor și Inspectorul de Jandarmi al Basarabiei, Colonel Neculescu, ca organe de execuție.

Din partea Marelui Cartier General, a fost însărcinat Lt.Col.Pallade, cu întocmirea planului de evacuare.

##### B. Instrucțiunile date, itinerarii, puncte de trecere.

La 7 Septembrie 1941, Marele Pretor, Generalul Topor, dă Inspectoratului Jandarmi Chișinău, sub formă de "Notă", următoarele instrucțiuni:

1. Operațiunea de evacuare a evreilor, începe la 12 Septembrie 1941, cu lagărul Vertujeni spre Căsăuți și Rezina.

2. Grupe de maximum 1600 inclusiv copii, trec însă peste Nistrul maximum 800 pe zi.

3. Câte 40 - 50 căruțe de fiecare grup.

4. Grupele pleacă din Vertujeni din două în două zile.

5. La fiecare trecere, câte un ofițer de jandarmi de la Legiune.

6. Itinerariile se fixează de către Lt.Col.Pallade cu comandanții Legiunii.

7. Trecerea fără nici o formalitate.

8. Două plutoane suplimentare ca ajutor.

9. Jandarpii posturilor teritoriale, să dea concurs la curățirea terenului și îngroparea morților cu ajutorul locuitorilor.



10. Modul de comportare față de cei ce nu se supun? (ilexianu).

11. Să nu fie vămuși. Vor fi impușcați cei ce jefuesc.

Urmare acestei note, Colonelul Neculescu, Inspectorul Jandarmeriei din Basarabia, dă instrucțiuni de detaliu, Legiunilor de Jandarmi, comunicându-le totodată și itinerariile fixate, împreună cu Lt.Col.Pallade.

Traseele stabilite și următe de coloane, au fost următoarele:

1. Pentru acei din Nordul Basarabiei și Bucovina: dela lagărul Vertujeni, prin Soroca - punct de trecere Cosăuți și prin Mateuți - punct de trecere Șezina; cei din Bucovina prin punctul de trecere Atachi.

2. Acei din Sudul Basarabiei, au fost dirijați, de la Cahul, Bolgrad, Ismail, Chilia Nouă, Vâlcov, prin Tărtuino, punct de trecere Purcari.

Din situația prezentată Comisiunei, de către Inspectoratul de Jandarmi Chișinău, rezultă că, prin punctele de trecere, mai sus menționate, au fost evacuați din Basarabia 55.867 evrei, iar din Bucovina 45.533 evrei.

Total 101.405 evrei.

Actualmente, în ghettoul din Chișinău se mai găsesc: 17 evrei rămași cu autorizație specială; 34 bolnavi în spitalul ghettou-lui; 14 care formează personalul spitalului (doctori, infirmiere, ciocli); 15 însoțitori ai bolnavilor și 6 copii rămași de la un orfelinat. Total 86 evrei.

#### C. Executarea evacuărilor din ghettoul Chisinau.

Evacuarea din acest ghettou a început la 12 Octombrie 1941, pe coloane de câte 1500 evrei.

Pentru ordinea plecării și formarea convoaielor, s'a împărțit cartierul pe sectoare. Cei în cauză, erau anunțați prin Comunitate, de organele Comandamentului Militar al ghettoului, cu o zi înainte, pentru a se pregăti de plecare. Nu s'a dat o dispoziție precisă, asupra cantității și naturei bagajelor ce aveau dreptul să ia cu ei.

Ca normă, se admite să ia fiecare cât poate să ducă în brațe.

Dacă până la această epocă viața în ghettou lucește oarecum aspectul de ordine și liniste, de aci înainte pornind, s'a deslănguit o atmosferă de frământare și îngrijorare.



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Prin urmărire, prevedea că lupta să se desfășoare pe război și pe război, pe calea războiului spiritual, în cadrul împărătești, și pe război, pe calea războiului material, pentru a suporta să evadarea și a scăpa de plecare sau a o întârzia, iar pe de altă, cu dat ocazie la eludarea multor abuzuri și neglegții.

Mulți din evrei, făgădui în prezina plăcării, din sectorul destinat evacuării, în astul, căruia îl denumeau mai târziu, ascunzându-se prin paguri, planșe, etc., pentru a nu fi găsiți.

Vânzările clandestine în ghettou, începuse să se intensifice mai mult ca oricând; tranzacțiile cu metale prețioase deasemenea.

Executarea marșului se făcea: pe jos cei valizi; în căruțe pentru bătrâni, bolnavi și copii. Tot în căruțe se încărcau și bagajele.

Colonelii mărgăluiau foarte greu, desordonat și cu producere de încurcături, pentru că:

1. Datorită sezonului de toamnă, începuse viloile și frigul.

2. In general, numărul vehiculelor era insuficient, unele se stricau pe drum, parte trase de boi, parte de cai.

Pentru ghettoul din Chișinău, se făceau două etape: Chișinău - Orhei; Orhei - Rezina.

Initial, dispozițiunea Mareiui Pretor, a fost ca să se dea 40-50 căruțe, la un convoi de 1500 evrei.

Totuși, față de numărul mare al bătrânilor, bolnavilor și copiilor, care nu puteau merge pe jos, Legionile au fost nevoie să scoată mai multe căruțe.

Au întâmpinat însă multe greutăți, din cauză că Guvernământul dăduse ordinul Nr. 4029/941, de a nu se mai face nici o rechiziție, pentru a nu se împiedeca muncile agricole, iar la 28 Octombrie 1941, un altul cu Nr. 519, prin care aproba a se scoate numai o căruță la 70 oameni.

Prefecturile executau dispozițiunile Guvernământului și, în consecință, refuzau să satisfacă cererile Legionilor de Jandarmi. Cu acest prilej, au fost cazuri de directă împiedecare, a operațiunii de evacuare.

Astfel, primarul comunei Văscăuți din jud. Soroca, nu numai că a refuzat să dea concurs la strângerea căruțelor, dar a indemnizat locuitorii să iugă cu căruțele pe câmp. (Raportul Nr. 3245 din 2 Octombrie 1941, al Inspectoratului Jandarmi Chișinău, către Prefectura județului Soroca.)

La toate acestea, se mai adaugă și poftă de speculă a țăranilor căruțași, cărora nu li se fixase de autoritatea proprie rechiziționa, un quantum determinat ven-



mult de pe urma pribegilor, și ținea pe foarte mulți, și în special pe cei bănuși a fi avuți, într-o permanentă presiune. Sub amenințarea că îl dă jos din căruțe, sau simulând răsturnarea vehiculelor, și forțau să le dea diferite obiecte și bani.

După scurgerea câtorva coloane, acest sistem popularizându-se, se vedea căruțași, care în scopuri de câștig, așteptau la răscruci de drumuri, pentru a-și oferi serviciile, cu căruțele lor.

Eșaloanele erau conduse de jandarmi, în mod obișnuit, sub comanda unui subofițer, care repartiza un ostaș pentru paza a cinci căruțe. Unii din ei fraternizau prin neintervenție, cu manevrele lipsite de omenie ale căruțașilor.

Dintre acei, cari mergeau pe jos, mulți rămâneau în urmă, din cauza neobișnuinței, a greutății drumului și epuizării fizice.

Toate aceste cauze, dădeau coloanelor aspectul unor linii întrerupte; itinerariile nu se puteau respecta și uneori eșaloanele se întâlneau în acelaș punct.

Etapele de odihnă se făceau în câmp sau pe lângă păduri, pentru a se evita staționarea prin sate, și prin aceasta eventualele atacuri, jafuri sau vexăriuni, din partea țăranilor. Si aşa, cu aceste precauții luate, s'au semnalat cazuri când în timpul odihnei, țăranii au eşit de prin porumburi sau şanțuri, unde așteptau coloanele și se dădeau la acte de jaf.

Pe timpul parcursului, hrana evacuațiilor se procură prin mijloace proprii.

Cei morți pe drum, se îngropau la primele etape.

In celealte lagăre, executarea evacuărilor, s'a făcut în genere după același sistem.

#### D. Trecerea peste Nistru.

Coloanele sosite la Rezina, erau luate în primire de o formătire de jandarmi, sub comanda Locot. rez. Popoiu, care avea însărcinarea să execute operația de trecere peste Nistru. Îi primea, și trecea în colonați până la Rublenița în Transnistria, unde și dădea în primire jandarmilor de acolo, însărcinați cu această misiune. Trecerea se făcea pe jos și în căruțe.

Ebreii evacuați din Bucovina, au fost aduși în trenuri până la Atachi. Datorită acestui fel de transport, și-au luat cu ei, mari cantități de bagaje. De aci însă, urmând a face drumul pe jos sau în căruțe, până la trecerea Nistrului, iar în Transnistria numai pe jos, nu



le-a fost îngăduit să-i luă cu supra lor de către numai bagajele strict necesare și posibile de transportat în această situație nouă.

Restul bagajelor rămase, au fost depozitate prin grija jandarmilor și organelor B.N.R. la Atachi și Nărculești.

Cu privire la dreptul de proprietate asupra lor, s'au născut discuțiuni între Guvernatorul Bucovinei, care pretindea că-i aparțin, fiind provenite dela evrei evacuați de acolo și între Guvernământul Basarabiei, care pretindea că-i aparțin ca unele ce se găsesc pe teritoriul său.

Aceasta s'a raportat telegrafic încă de la 14 Octombrie 1941, Harelui Cartier General, iar astăzi încă lucează o Comisiune pentru inventarierea și plasarea lor.

#### In rezumat:

Evacuarea s'a executat în condițiuni grele și se caracterizează prin dificultăți întâmpinate în parcurs, datorită lipsei de vehicule și jafuri comise de populația comunelor situate pe traseele convoacelor. Cărujașii au exploatat împrejurarea, căutând să stoarcă, prin toate mijloacele, sume de bani și lucruri dela evrei.

Dificultățile de transport și vremea rea, au înlesnit aceste jafuri, practicate uneori cu complicitatea, sau cel puțin cu toleranța escortelor.

#### V, Operația cumpărării valorilor dela evrei evacuați, prin Comisiunile B.N.R.

Din piesele cercetării urmate de Comisiune, se arată că după trecerea prin punctul Rezina, a aproximativ 10 convoaie, cu un efectiv de circa 8000 evrei, toți necontrolați, Locot. Popoiu, însărcinat cu transportul lor peste Nistru, a făcut cunoscut erarhic șefilor săi, că germanii și controla în Transnistria, ridicându-le toate valorile și devizele aflate asupra lor. Era pe la începutul lunii Octombrie 1941.

Președinția sesizată, dă o notă Ministerului de Finanțe, cu Nr. 8507 din 5 Octombrie 1941, care la rândul său, trimite adresa Nr. 269274 din 14 Octombrie 1941,

Guvernământului Basarabiei, prin care fixează normele de schimb.

În ziua de 8. Octombrie 1941, centrala B.N.R., a fost înconsoțită de către Președinție și drept urmare trimisă la Chișinău, în ziua de 9 Octombrie 1941, cu



Concomitent se dă și de către Guvernământ, ordinul telegrafic Nr.9 din 9 Octombrie 1941, către Prefectura Bălți și Soroca, cu norme în vederea schimbului.

Delegații B.N.R. s-au împărțit în 3 Comisiuni, lăsând astfel: una prezidată de dl. Bucur Jugăreanu la Vîsterniceni, Orhei și Rezina; a doua la Nărculești și a treia la Cetatea-Albă.

Din fiecare comisiune făceau parte: Delegații B.N.R., un delegat al armatei și experții necesari pentru valorificarea curului și a pietrelor prețioase.

Delegatul armatei, cerut chiar de către Comisiunea B.N.R., a avut rostul de a înflătura, prin prezența lui, suspiciunile care ar fi putut naște de pe urma operațiunilor ce se executa.

Comisiunile au lucrat în condiții foarte grele, din cauza scurgerei convoaielor pe diferite direcții și deci a nevoei de a se deplasa, și lipsei de localuri proprii și a timpului defavorabil. Au lucrat adeseori nocturn, în ploae și fără lumină suficientă.

Criteriile de schimb și evaluare, date de Ministerul de Finanțe, Direcția Generală a Mișcării Fondurilor, au fost următoarele:

- Plata în ruble, la paritatea 1 rublă = 40 lei.
- Aur plătit în greutatea și finețea lui, cursul oficial.
- Pietrele și alte obiecte prețioase, plătite pe baza unei evaluări făcută de un expert specialist și numai pe o cotă de 20% din evaluare, care ar fi echivalentă cu proporția dintre aurul la cursul oficial și aurul la cursul liber.
- Li se puteau schimba și Lei, contra Kassenschein la paritatea de una contra 60 lei. Cu moneda românească nu puteau, nici într'un caz, trece peste Nistru.

Operația de control și schimb se făcea astfel:

- Schimbul de Lei în ruble, se făcea la început, pe bază de liste nominale. Ulterior, din cauza aglomerăției lucrărilor, s'a renunțat la acest sistem, fiind totodată socotit ca o formalitate inutilă.

- Pentru bijuterii, monezi de aur și valute, s'au întocmit la început chitanțe individuale, cu specificarea detaliată a valorii și sumei plătite. Această se punea în plicuri separate, care se depuneau în casete speciale. Ulterior, din aceleși motive crătate mai sus, și spre mai multă simplificare, s'a renunțat la sistemul chitanțelor individuale și s'au făcut pe tabele.



După terminarea lucrului, casetele cu plicuri și valori, se depuneau în autoduba B.N.R., care însoțea Comisiunea. Duba se închisă, iar cheia o lua Președintele Comisiunei. Paza se făcea cu santinele militare, care aveau consemnul de a nu permite nimănui descuarea, decât în prezența întregei Comisiuni.

În orașele unde Băncile Naționale aveau tezaur, cum a fost cazul la Orhei, casetele cu valori se depuneau acolo, tezaurul se închidea, luându-se: una din chei de Președintele Comisiunei, iar a doua de către delegatul Armatei.

La data de 22 Octombrie 1941, Cpt. Paraschivescu, Comandantul Comp. 23 Poliție, înaintează un report, în care semnalează unele pretinse lipsuri în procedura urmată de Comisia B.N.R. - Evidenția lipsă unui registru de cassă pentru schimbul rublelor, lipsa unei casse de fier pentru depunerea valorilor, în locul plicurilor și cutiilor de lemn care se întrebunțau și necesitatea înființării unui registru de control, pentru aceste valori.

Guvernământul sesizat de acest raport a verificat observațiile făcute de Cpt. Paraschivescu și a constatat că procedura ce se urma, prezenta toate garanțiile unei cinstite operații.

#### In rezumat:

Operațiunile făcute de Comisiunile B.N.R., au fost regulate și nu au dat prilejul să se constate vreo abatere dela linia cinstei și conștiinciozităței.

#### VI. Infracțiunile săvârșite în legătură cu ghettoul.

##### A. Jafuri în oraș, imediat după retragerea bolșevicilor.

Din cauza lipsei de forțe necesare pazei municipiului, a dezordinei și panicei rămase de pe urma luptelor, opera de jaf s'a deslănguit în stil mare, în această perioadă de timp.

Au cooperat la comiterea acestor nelegiuri, haimanalele periferiilor, sătenii suburbanelor și a comunelor apropiate și într'o formă organizată, trupele germane. Mai puțin trupele Române ajlate în trecere.

Jafurile se exercitau, mai mult asupra locuințelor săvârșite, ridicându-se mobilier și orice lucru de valoare.

Germanii și-au însușit conținutul depozitelor și materialelor din fabrici, înălțând, cu drept de cuceritori, pazele militare române. Din locuințele particulare,



prețuire în special scurjusele judecăști, articolele ne  
îmbrăcăminte și pianele.

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Această stare a durat 8-10 zile dela ocuparea Chișinăului.

Dela început, din lipsă de mijloace nu s'a putut exercita o cercetare pentru identificarea infractorilor, aşa că astăzi această operațiune ar fi mult prea tardivă și nu ar mai putea da vreun rezultat.

B: Violuri, jafuri și scoateri samavolnice din ghettou.

1. In primele zile dela instalarea evreilor în ghettou 5-6 femei s'au plâns Comunității că ar fi fost violate de către soldați și anume dintre acei aflați în trecere. Faptul ne-a fost declarat de către: Leib Rapaport, Dr. Leia Telis și Sadagurschi Nuhim, care a precizat că a fost chiar martor ocular, la violarea unei fete, de către un frizer. Nu ni s'a putut da vreo preciziune, nici asupra victimelor, nici asupra autorilor.

2. Tot din declarațiile celor de mai sus, și fără să se da alte precizuni, comisiunea a fost informată că, în aceeași epocă de stabilire a evreilor în ghettou, s'au întâmplat cazuri de jaf în dauna evreilor, de către soldații aflați în trecere.

3. Singur informatorul Buicovschi Ițic Nuhim, ne declară că, în una din zilele lunei Septembrie 1941, un sergent major al cărui nume nu-l știe, a intrat în locuința sa din ghettou și i-a luat cu forță o plapomă, o cuvertură și o casetă de lemn.

4. In legătură cu operațiunea de instalare a evreilor din ghettou, Colonelul Tudose, ne-a declarat că, germanii, prin abuz de putere, scoțeau la început, grupuri sau numai câte un evreu, pe care îi întrebuiuțau la identificarea locuințelor unde să ar fi putut descoperi, materiale sau valori ascunse. Aceasta, cu toată opoziția unității române de pază.

Față de această situație, Colonelul Tudose a fost nevoit să dea dispoziții, ca să fie impuscat, orișicine va mai intra, prin abuz, sau cu forță înghettou.

5. Un caz concret de însușire de bunuri, l-am stabilit în sarcina Cpt. Paraschivescu Ioan, Comandantul Legiunei de Jandarmi, mobilă Chișinău, care făcea paza ghettoului. Acesta abuzând de calitatea sa și prin mijlocirea



soldatului de ordonanță Trifan Ion, a luat din depozitul de lucruri a ghettoului, rămase de pe urma evacuării, obiecte casnice și veselă, pe care le-a trimis soției sale la București, în coșuri și în mai multe transporturi. Faptul este dovedit, cu declarațiile: soldatului Trifan Ion, sergentului Dumitrache și fruntașului Radu Florea, care l-au ajutat la săvârșirea faptei și la transportarea obiectelor în sușite. De asemenea, cu ocazia mai multor percheziții domiciliare, efectuate în București și a confruntărilor ce au avut loc între cei de mai sus, s'au identificat majoritatea obiectelor sustrase.

Ofițerul se află arestat, în cercetarea Curții Militiale a Corpului 3 Armată.

#### C. Incercări și evadări din ghettou.

Până la evacuare, mai puțin, și în timpul evacuării mai mult, s'au săvârșit incercări de evadare și evadări din ghettou.

Cazurile constatate de Comisiune, sunt următoarele:

1. Kisel Kremer și Veinšencher Smil, au fugit din ghettou și au fost prinși în gara Chișinău, când încercau să plece cu trenul. Faptul s'a petrecut în ziua de 22 Octombrie 1941. Susnumiții au fost arestați și trimiși în ghettou prin Chestura locală. Declara că nu le-a înlesnit nimici încercarea de fugă și că au eșit clandestin din ghettou.

2. Germanii au înlesnit fuga următorilor evrei: Spänermann, Mortcovici Samuel, Kalikman, Allermann, Boșerman, familiile Ghermann, Cervinschi, avocat Sudit, Abramovici și Gherstein. Familia Gherstein, compusă din tată, mama, fiu și fiică, a plătit unei nașini germane, condusă de un subofițer și doi soldați, suma de 150.000 lei, până la București. Informațiile le au cucerit agentul Galiov și recunoașterile în fața Comisiunei, a tuturor membrilor familiei Gherstein și a numitului Mortcovici Samy.

3. Schwartzberg Melich, a fost adus la București cu trenul, de un pretins agent acoperit de poliție, Petrescu. A plătit 20.000 lei și o verighetă de aur. Recunoaște faptul.

Cazul se află în cercetarea Curții Militiale C.3 A.

4. Bulcanschi Ițic Nuhim, a plecat singur, venind cu trenul la București. Recunoaște faptul. Se cercetează de Curtea Militială C.3 A.



5. Familia Ţarcu Cohn (soț și soție) și Cervinschi (soț, soție și copii), au fost transportate la București cu trenul de către agenții polițienești Rohan Ion, Șcamțu și Stoeneșcu, plătind primii 50.000 lei și ultimii 100.000 lei. Recunosc faptul și se află în cercetarea Curții Martiale C. 3 Armată.

6. Solomon Spanerman, Perlmutter řaia, Levensohn cu soția și un copil, Cristal, Weisser și fratrele și soția, au fost aduși la București, cu o mașină, între 10-14 Octombrie 1941, de către Căpitanul Doicescu Ilie din Comandamentul Apărării Antiaeriene. Faptul a fost săvârșit cu ajutorul concubinei sale, Nadejda Sumnevici și a lui Eugen Dumitriu din Chișinău. Se pretinde a fi luat 2.000.000 lei. Primii doi sunt arestați, iar întreaga cauză se află în cercetarea Curții Martiale a Corpului 3 Armată.

7. Apoteker cu familia, a evadat din ghettou și s-a refugiat în București, în noaptea de 15-16 Octombrie 1941. Se bănuiește a fi fost ajutat în această acțiune, de maiorul rez. Hardare Petre din București și cu care susnumitul, avea legături comerciale. Cazul se cercetează la Curtea Martială C. 3 A.

8. Familia ſpanerman, compusă din mamă și doi copii, împreună cu Iosif Volovet, au convenit cu un fruntaș de la aviație, ca să-i aducă la București, pentru suma de 6.000 lei. S'au imbarcat în mașină și după ce în parcurs le-au mai luat încă 2000 lei, la o distanță de 30 km. de Chișinău, ſoferul a oprit vehiculul, sub pretext că trebuie să pună apă la radiator.. După această operație, a simulat că mașina nu poate fi pusă în mișcare, decât fiind împinsă de ocupanți. S'au dat toți jos, au împins mașina care a plecat, lăsându-i în drum. Informațiile din declarația lui Volovet Iosif.

#### D. Trajicuri cu bijuterii și metale prețioase.

1. La început intrau în ghettou, foarte mulți militari germani, care cumpărau aur, prin mijlocirea unui săsesc, numit Lew. (Declarația comisarului Virgil Ionescu, care avea circumscriptiunea în ghettou).

Deasmenea, martorul Neagu Andrei, ne-a declarat că un ceasornicar a vândut niște aur unor soldați germani, cari i-au plătit prețul în mărci scoase din uz.

2. Informatorul Bucanschi Ițic Șihim, ne precizează că, un oarecare Spineanu, fost proprietar al magazinului "Cuseanian-Spineanu" din Chișinău și actualmente



domiciliul în București, venea cu mașina în ghetou și cumpăra pietre prețioase și obiecte de aur. Deasemenea, vizează și pe Hadejia Terzi, fostă concubină a Colonelului Eugen Dumitrescu.

Se vor sesiza instanțele judiciare, cu desăvârșirea cercetărilor.

In curs de instrucție, la instanțele repressive, sunt următoarele cazuri, pentru fapte de trafic de metale prețioase:

1. Harbuz Leonida, care a fost prins în ghettou cu 273 gr. aur, cumpărate dela Sîșma Polea. Se cercetează la Curtea Martială.

2. Cpt. rez. Serbănescu Vasile și maior rez. Nardare Petre, sunt bănuiți că fi înlesnit unui evreu, însotit de două evreice, ca să-și scoată din ascunzișurile cflate în str. Eminescu Nr.10 și str. Carol Nr.46, obiecte valoroase și metale prețioase. Prima operație s'a făcut chiar în prezența soției Hedic Cpt. Popa, locatarul imobilului din str. Eminescu Nr.10. Faptul se află în cercetarea Curții Martiale C.3 A.

3. Faptul că evreii aveau metale prețioase și bijuterii asupra lor și că tranzacționau cu ele, pentru a-și creia mijloace de trai, s'a verificat și cu ocazia unei curse, întinsă de Căpitanul Paraschivescu, Comandantul ghettoului, cu știința D-lui Comandant al C.3 A. și asistența unui procuror militar.

Anume: în ziua de 29 Octombrie 1941, servindu-se de un agent interpus, evreul Sadagurschi Iosif, a simulat că oferă evreilor: Roza Atașchi, Sico Lipovețchi, Kelerman Tabia și Capitel Avram, posibilitatea de a fi scoși din ghettou și lăsați liberi în țară, în schimbul unor pietre prețioase și bani. În acest scop, s'au confeționat cinci autorizații false din partea Corpului de Armată, care prin intermediul numitului Sadagurschi, au fost înămătate celor în drept, aducând în schimb la Comandamentul ghettoului, următoarele valori: un inel de damă cu două briliante, un ceas bărbătesc de aur, două ceasuri de aur pentru damă, una pereche cercei de aur, un lanț agățător de aur, un lanț bărbătesc de aur, un inel de aur și două brățări de aur, care toate au fost confiscate și depuse B.H.R. Autorizațiile false s'au retrас, iar evreii au fost evacuați.



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E. Traficuri cu autorizațiile pentru ieșire în oraș, pentru amânarea plecărilor în evacuare și traficuri de influență.

Îsemenea infracțiuni s'au întâmplat exclusiv sub conducerea Col. Eugen Dumitrescu și prin mijlocirea concubinei sale Nadejda Terzi.

Această femeie avea oricând intrarea liberă în ghetto și sub protecția și cu știința Comandantului Militar, a exploatat din plin această situație.

Fixase prețuri și anume 1000 - 1500 lei, o autorizație pentru ieșirea în oraș și dela 5000 - 70.000 lei, pentru amânarea plecării dela un convoi la altul.

In mod obișnuit, tranzacțiunile le exercita în casa evreului Venigencher, cu care era în strânse legături de afaceri. Deasemenea, mai avea în complicitate și pe evreul Maghidovici, care-și instalase chiar un fel de birou, pentru asemenea practici.

A dat următoarele autorizații, descoperite de noi, contra diferite sume de bani.

1. În alb, pentru amânarea plecării la 21 Octombrie 1941, lui: Maramud David, Nisemboim Mina, Weifeț Ion, Zina Fleischer, Maghid Raia, Zilbrang Ușer, Svalboim Paulina, Davidovici Motel, Cogan Aron, Torban Cresea și Rabinovici Ișer. Toate au fost găsite asupra susnumitilor.

2. A tranzactionat cu avocatul Rabinovici, vinderea a 7 autorizații, pentru rămânerea până la ultimul convoi, contra sumei de 35.000 lei, din care primise acont 15.000 lei. Susnumitul avocat fiind sfătuit de către cununatul său Kisel Kremer, să nu mai dea bani, pentru că tot va rămâne să plece cu ultimul convoi, din cauza soției sale, care era grav bolnavă, a cerut restituirea acontului, dela Nadia Terzi. Aceasta a dat banii înapoi, însă drept repreșalii pentru fapta lui Rabinovici, a intervenit la Col. Dumitrescu și acesta a hotărât ca să fie expediat imediat, deși soția lui era netransportabilă și avizul medicului ghettoului, recomanda amânarea plecării.

3. Evreul Iaroslavici, a primit 3-4 autorizații de amânare, plătind pentru ele un inel cu briliante, în valoare de 72.000 lei.

4. Mura Voloveț și Ida Spanerman, au plătit pentru 3 autorizații la fel, câte 5000 lei și stofă pentru un palton, cu căptușeală și blană de guler. Le-au obținut prin intermediul evreului Simha Glukman.



i se aduc, confirmând cu ocazia confruntării dintre ea și Colonelul Dumitrescu că, a luat pentru autorizații lei 100.000, pe care i-a înmânat ofițerului. Colonelul Dumitrescu a recunoscut și el că i-a dat Nadiei Terzi câteva autorizații, dar nu interesat.

Dealtfel, Colonelul Dumitrescu, a lucrat și pe cont propriu, în scopurile de mai sus.

#### Colonelul Dumitrescu

5. În ziua de 23 Octombrie 1941, l-a primit dela Kisell Kremer suma de 700.000 lei, dintre care 500.000 lei numărăți chiar în localul Comunității, iar 200.000 lei, trimiși prin avocatul Sapirin, pentru a nu-l trimite la Balta.

Aceasta s'a întâmplat chiar a doua zi, după ce Kremer fusese prins în gara Chișinău, încercând să fugă și după ce Colonelul Dumitrescu îl supusese la un control riguros. După plătirea sumei menționată mai sus, i-au fost ridicate toate restricțiunile.

6. A primit pentru satisfacerea acelorași înlesniri, în mai multe rânduri, sume de bani dela Sapirin, iar de la Nina Vecselstein 30.000 lei, ca să o îngăduie să plecă cu ultimul convoi.

Din declarația evreului Sebel Ițco Aizic, reiese că s'au eliberat câteva sute de săsemenea autorizații.

Faptele de sub acest capitol se verifică prin recunoașterea parțială a celor implicați, precum și prin declarațiile date în fața Comisiunei, de către: Colonel Neculescu, Neaga Andrei, Kisell Kremer, Guttman Landau, Izidor Bikman, Schwartzberger Kichel, Lt. Pop Emil, Pulferman Gherș, Murc Volovetz, Ida Spanerman, Alex. Margulius și Sebel Ițco Aizic.

#### F. Abuzuri de putere și de încredere.

##### Port ilegal de uniformă:

Autoritatea organelor însărcinate cu supravegherea și prevenirea ordinei în activitatea ghettoului și a evacuărilor, a fost adeseori întrebuintată în scopuri direct contrare și anume, pentru a înlesni, sau săvârși, diferite abuzuri.

Comisiunea a constatat următoarele cazuri:

1. Colonelul Dumitrescu a ordonat Cpt. Alexandrescu, Seful său de Stat Major, ca să trimită la București, un soldat curier, pentru a transporta corespondență între Comunitatea ghettoului și comunitatea evreilor din Capitală.



Curierul a făcut mai multe curse în acest scop, și de fiecare dată, s'ar fi plătit pentru acest serviciu Col. Dumitrescu câte 100.000 lei, iar Cpt. Alexandrescu câte 50.000 lei.- Această informație o deținem dela evreul Sebel Ițco Aizic, fără însă a mai fi coroborată cu altu dovedă.

2. Evreul Sapirin, avocat, vice-președintele comunității din ghettou, a fost transportat cu mașina Comandamentului Militar al Chișinăului, de către Căpitunul Alexandrescu, pentru a lua contact cu comunitatea din Capitală. A stat o zi în București și a fost înapoiat la Chișinău în același mod. Evreul a călătorit în uniformă militară, pentru a evita neplăcerile unui control pe drum. Se pretinde de Cpt. Alexandrescu că acest evreu a jost adus la București, după indemnul Col. Dumitrescu, în locul avocatului Sudit, care fusese cerut de Președinție și care la acea dată era dispărut. Faptul este recunoscut de Cpt. Alexandrescu și confirmat de numeroși informatori (Guttmann Landau, Sebel, §.a.).

3. În ziua de 1-2 Noembrie 1941, Guttmann Landau, Președintele comunității din ghettou, roagă pe Cpt. Alexandrescu ca să ia suma de 250.000 lei și să o predece evreului Sapirin, care plecase cu un convoi în evacuare.- Sapirin trebuia găsit pe traseu și suma remisă după Visterniceni, localitatea unde se făcea de către Comisiunea B.N.R. controlul evreilor evacuați. Ofițerul, după o persistentă negație și pus în situația de a fi confruntat cu Guttmann Landau, a sfârșit prin a recunoaște că a luat banii și că i-a înmânat Colonelului Dumitrescu, care i-a dat și lui 100.000 lei. Pretinde că acești bani, i-a cheltuit pentru acte de binefacere și nevoile Comandamentului, care nu avea nici un fond alocat.

Cazul de mai sus, s'a deferit Curții Militare a Corpului 3 Armată.

4. În ziua de 25 Octombrie 1941, sunt prinși în gară Chișinău, evreii Kisel Kremer și Sulil Weingesker, care voiau să fugă. Se trimite prin Chestura locală, sub stare de arest, Comandamentului ghettoului, Lt. Pop, care-i primește, împreună cu suma de 34.995 lei, găsită asupra lor.

Locot. Pop pretinde că Lt. Col. Grigorescu, Comandantul Batal. 20 Mitraliere, care jacea paza ghettoului și care a fost față la predarea curzilor și bunilor, i-a ordonat că a doua zi să-i cheamă sub pretextul restituirii



benilor (lui Kremer 22.995 lei și lui Veinschencher 12.000 lei) și să-i pună să semneze, însă să nu le predice sumele respective: Susține că a executat dispoziția dată, chemându-i pe cei de mai sus, chemare la care s'a prezentat Simcha Kremer, fratele lui Kisel Kremer și Veinschencher în persoană, care semnează de primire, fără însă a li se restituvi vreun ban. Suma de 34.995 lei, pretinde că a fost predată Lt.Col.Grigorescu. Acesta neagă imputațiunea de mai sus.

Faptul a fost deferit Curții Martiale a C.3 A.

5. În ziua de 15 Decembrie 1941, se execută la locuința Lt.Col.Grigorescu din Sebeș-Alba, str.Drumul Sibiului Nr.21, o percheziție domiciliară, pentru a se constata ce a transportat susnumitul din Basarabia și care este proveniența celor transportate. Se găsesc foarte multe obiecte, materiale și animale aduse cu trenul din Basarabia, fără a putea justifica, decât fourte puține din ele.

Cercetarea urmează a fi complectată de Curtea Martială C.3 A., unde ofițerul se află arestat.

Pe data de 10 Ianuarie 1942, a fost pus în retragere, prin aplicarea art.58 din L.I.A.

6. Tot susnumitul ofițer, a luat în campanie cu unitatea ce comanda -Bat.2o Mitr.Div.- pe concubina sa, Maria Licicovschi. A îmbrăcat-o militarește, purtând-o după el în această situație, dela 22 Iunie -- 25 Noembrie 1941, dată când s'a întors în Garnizoana Sebeș-Alba. Faptul este stabilit cu recunoașterea Mariei Licicovschi și declarația informatorului, Lt.Sămărgițeanu S.Aurel.

Cu judecarea cauzei, s'a sesizat Curtea Martială a Corpului 3 Armată.

7. Cu ocazia evacuărilor, a fost însărcinat printre alții și Serg.Major Saftenco din Legiunea Jandarmi Orhei, ca să facă pază trecerei peste Nistru.

A găsit din executarea acestui serviciu, prilej de a-și procura bani, speculând starea de nenorocire a evacuaților. Anume, oferea cameră de dormit, acelora care erau obligați să rămână o noapte în Rezina, contra diferitelor sume de bani. S'a descoperit una din aceste jupți prin constatărea că, a luat dela Mura Volavăț și Erlich, suma de 5.000 lei, dând o cameră la 5 familii ca să se adăpostească o noapte.

Faptul este stabilit din declarațiile date și confruntările următe, între susnumitul subofițer, Mura Volavăț și Ida Spanerman.



8. Unul din sistemele întrebuințate de Colonelul Dumitrescu, pentru a scoate sume de bani dela evrei, era și acela de a-i amenința cu diferite măsuri, sau a pretexta executarea anumitor ordine superioare.

Un caz concret ni-l expune informatorul Sebel Ițco Aizic, care ne-a declarat că, acest ofițer a anunțat comunitatea, că din ordin superior, urma să trimită 400 evrei din ghettou, pentru lucru la Tiraspol. Evreii văzând în executarea acestui ordin, posibilitatea disparației celor ce vor fi trimiși, au început tratativele cu Col. Dumitrescu, prin reprezentanții comunităței, Bittman și Sapirin, care i-au dat acestuia de trei, patru ori, câte 100.000 lei, pentru a temporiza îndeplinirea pretestatei dispozițiuni superioare.

Nu s'a trimis nici un evreu la Tiraspol.

În ziua de 18 Decembrie 1941, în urma unei confruntări execute de Comisiunea, între Colonelul Dumitrescu Eugen și concubina sa Nadejda Terzi, confruntare care a avut drept rezultat, constatarea peremtorie a actelor de trafic pe care susnumitul le practica prin mijlocirea și cu ajutorul acestei femei, ofițerul dându-și seama probabil, că se deschise definitiv calea dovedirei faptelor ce săvârșise, s'a sinucis cu un foc de revolver.

9. În scopul de a se verifica anumite sunouri relative la evadarea evreilor din ghettou, Lt. Colonelul Rădulescu, Directorul de Cabinet al Guvernământului, încurajează agentului special Const. Madan, să simuleze înlesnirea plecării cătorva evrei, care urmău să fie surprinși de un magistrat militar, în flagrant delict de dare de mită.

Agentul Madan recrutează vreo 13 evrei dintre cei mai bogăți, în frunte cu Kisell Kremer, fiind ajutat în operația ce urma să execute de către alți patru agenți speciali dela serviciul de informații, afectați Guvernământului și anume: Gheorghe Manu, Ion Cojocaru, Ion Nedea și Constantin Ionescu. Pentru transport a stabilit să i se dea suma de 1.200.000 lei. Simulând plecarea și după solicitarea unui acont din suma convenită de 120.000 lei, evreii sunt duși la sediul centralei Serviciului Special din Chișinău, unde sunt arestați.

Magistratul Militar care-i însoțea a dresat un proces-verbal asupra perchezitiei sumare ce s'a făcut evreilor, după care plecând au fost luați în primire de către cei cinci agenți speciali, care au procedat în



beciul Serviciului, la o c-două și riguroasă percheziție.

Cu acest prilej, au găsit asupra evreilor circa 1200 monezi de aur, 2 ceasuri de aur și 20.000 lei în bancnote.

Din aceste valori, au predat Parchetului Militar ceasurile de aur și câteva monezi, iar restul le-au lăsat să părăsească între ei.

Toți se află arătați, în cercetarea Cabinetului de Instrucție, de pe lângă Tribunalul Lăpușna.

#### G. Jefuiiri în parcursul evacuării.

Coloanele de evacuați se prezintau sub un aspect cu totul neregulat. Din cauza celor rămași în urmă și a cărujeelor care adeseori se stricau pe drum, se formau inevitabile întreruperi în continuarea lor și în special se lungeau uneori pe distanțe de câțiva kilometri. Paza nu putea fi omogenă în asemenea condiții, cu atât mai mult cu cât și efectivele erau reduse. Repartiția era făcută de un jandarm la cinci căruje.

Datorită acestor goluri și a neputinței de a se exercita o supraveghere suficientă, din cauza motivelor arătate mai sus, s'au constatat cu ocazia acestei operațiuni, numeroase încercări și săvârșiri de jafuri, în dăuna evreilor. Deasemenea și în timpul popasurilor, care aveau loc noaptea, sub ocrotirea întunecului și a puzei insuficiente, s'au remarcat cazuri de jaf.

Din cercetarea urmată, am constatat:

1. În primul rând cărujașii au fost aceia care, fie sub imperiul amenințărilor exercitate, fie prin acte de rapt expresse și-au însoțit din lucrurile pe care evrei le aveau asupra lor.

De cele mai multe ori, nu reclamau din frica răsunării jefuitorilor.

Informațiuni asupra acestor fapte, ne-au fost date de către Lt.Col.Lazăr Radu, Major Bechi, Jandarm Serg. Major Harbagiu Ioan, Guttman Landau, Alexandru Hargulius.

2. Tânărul și derbedeii au luat deasemeni parte activă la opera de jaf, pe traseele de evacuare.

Se strecurau printre coloane și uneori chiar, prin atacuri directe și furau ce le eșea în cale.

Astfel:

În drumul spre Rezina, câțiva tânărî din comuna Biești, au eşit înaintea unui convoiu și au furat pachetele evreilor din căruje. Escortele i-au prins, li s'au



dresat actele de șeful postului Căleni și au fost dejetiți justiției (declarația Maiorului Bechi).

La Atachi, populația civilă se strecura printre jandarmi, în lagărele evreilor, în timpul nopții și furau. S'a întărit paza și au încetat jafurile (declarația Lt.Col.Pal-lade).

In traseul dela Visterniceni la Orhei, țărani și derbedei au încercat să atace căruțele evreilor, pentru a jefui. Au intervenit escortele, care i-au oprit și împrăștiat. (declarația Sublt.Penișoară Pericle).

La Orhei, un gardian și un civil, au jurat în timpul nopții, lucrurile unei evreice (declarația Mira Volavet).

In drum dela Orhei spre Rezina, un grup de țărani au încercat să jefuiască un convoi. Au fost prinși, li s'au dresat acte și înaintați Tribunalului Orhei (declarația Maiorului Bechi). Deasemenea, tot pe acest traseu, niște căruțași, au luat bocancii din picioare dela trei evrei, care muriseră pe drum (declarația Alex. Mărgulius).

3. Un caz concret, este acela privitor pe evreul Sapirian, căruia i s'a furat pe traseul ghettou-Visterniceni, de către un soldat, suma de 20.000 lei și 2.000 rouble, iar pe traseul Visterniceni-Orhei, i s'a furat bugajul (declarația Bucur Jugăreanu și Kisel Kremar).

4. La Perisecina, doi soldați care făceau serviciul la o moară, au luat din bagajele lui Pulferman Ghers, toate obiectele de bucătărie, iar la Orhei, soției acestuia i s'a furat, de către alți doi soldați și un subofițer, voșeta, mai multe obiecte de toaletă și îmbrăcăminte. Tot în această localitate, evreul Pulferman Ghers, a oferit unui Sublocotenent vânzarea port-feiului său, pentru suma de 600 lei. Ofițerul a luat obiectul și sub pretextul că se duce să schimbe banii pentru a-i înmâna suma, a plecat și nu s'a mai întors.

Deoarece identificarea tuturor făptuitorilor, nu s'a putut face, din cauza lipsei inițiale de diligență, din partea organelor cărora li s'au reclamat diferitele cenzuri, precum și din acela că cele mai multe acțiuni de jaf nu au fost reclamate atunci când s'au săvârșit, comisiunea c'insărcinată pe Lt.Nag.Luca Popescu, dela Curtea Militară C.3 Armată, să execute reconstituirea tuturor neglijuirilor semnalate pe traseul de evacuare, să identifice pe toți infractorii și să-i defere justiției.



H. Complicitatea cărujașilor pentru a ascunde obiectele de valoare avariată și evreilor evacuați, în scopul de a se sustrage controlului Comisiunei B.N.R.

Cărujașii, în afară de faptul că se dedau la acte de jaf, au servit totuși și de complici ai evreilor, pentru a păgubi Statul, prin ascunderea obiectelor de valoare pe care aceștia le posedau.

Au fost descoperite următoarele cazuri:

1. Hândarenco Ioan, cărujaș din Chișinău, str. Poșta Veche, a ascuns pentru evreul Brager și fiica lui, 19.000 lei, 4050 ruble și două ceasuri de mână, bărbătești.

2. Neamțu Gh., cărujaș din Chișinău, str. Visterniceni nr. 25, a ascuns dela evrei, două ceasuri de buzunar, un ceas de mână bărbătesc, o tabachere de argint și 10.000 lei.

Faptele ambilor, au fost descoperite de către Președintele comisiei B.N.R. Bucur Jugăreanu și delegatul Armatei, Lt. Stănculescu. Valorile au fost confiscate, iar infractorii trimiși Curții Militare C.3 Armată.

VII: Greutăți întâmpinate și constatări.

a. Greutăți întâmpinate.

Comisiunea a ținut seamă în primul rând de materialul informativ dat de Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri și menționat la începutul raportului de față. Indicațiunile cuprinse în aceste note, conțin prea puține precizii, pentru ca misiunea comisiunii să poată fi executată numai pe baza lor.

La aceasta, s-au mai adăugat, o serie întreagă de dificultăți, drept rezultat al stărilor de fapt existente, dela săvârșirea diferitelor infracțiuni și până la primirea ordinului de anchetă, datorită cărora posibilitatea de administrare a probelor și descoperirea adevărului a întâmpinat mari greutăți.

Acestea sunt:

1. Lipsa inițială de reacție din partea victimelor. Aproape majoritatea evreilor, fie în ghettou, fie în traseele de evacuare, care au fost victimele diferitelor încălcări de legi, nu au reclamat imediat, organelor în drept, din frica de a nu-și înrăutăți situația.

Toți trăiau în panică; versiunile cele mai alarmante cu privire la soarta lor și turburau, așa că au adoptat metoda tăcerii, ca să nu ațâțe pofta de răspunare.



... care și eureii pe cari i-am gasit în ghettou și care au o situație mai precizată, precum și acel cățiva întorși din drumul spre evacuare, au rezistat foarte mult până ce au început să vorbească, cu toate garanțiile date de Comisiune, că nu li se va întâmpla nimic.

Datorită acestui fapt, probele prime, care formează baza oricărei cercetări și care nu se pot culege decât imediat după săvârșirea unei infracțiuni, au dispărut.

Comisiunea n'a putut să facă, cu privire la acest capitol, decât o operă de reconstituire, bazată pe elemente de fapt disparate, care uneori, diminueză desigur forța probantă a concluziilor.

2. O altă piedecă a fost aceea constituită de complexitatea situațiunilor delictuoase și a marelui număr de factori răspunzători. Într'adevăr, toate episoadele prin care au trecut evreii, dela instalarea lor în ghettou, viața în ghettou, procedura evacuării, parcursul traseelor de către coloane și trecerea peste Nistru, au fost însoțite de variațe abateri dela căile legale, iar autorii s'au recrutat din toate straturile sociale și profesionale, aslate pe teritoriul Basarabiei: ofițeri și soldați români, elemente din armata germană, funcționari publici, particulari, oameni fără căpătăiu și de periferie, cărujași, etc.

Majoritatea nu au fost dela început identificate, iar acum realizarea acestei opere, constituie una dintre cele mai grele probleme. În limita posibilului, urmează să o facă, organele judiciare sesizate cu desăvârșirea diferitelor cercetări și judecarea infracțiunilor descoperite.

Cu toate aceste împiedecări expuse mai sus, totuși Comisiunea a stabilit foarte multe constatări, din care rezultă: unele defecțiuni în organizarea administrativă a ghettoului, făcând posibilă comiterea de infracțiuni; unele stări de fapt care înălătură parte din acuzațiunile aduse prin notele informative date Președinției; infracțiunile calificate, ce urmează să fie rezolvate de instanțele repressive.

#### B. Constatări.

##### 1. Starea de spirit din Basarabia. Atragerile în curs.

a. Din cercetările executate, ne-am convins că unul din fenomenele speciale, care îngreuiază în mod vădit progresul de viață și posibilitatea de ratională îndrumare a treburilor publice în Basarabia, este starea de spirit specifică acestei provincii.



*Se remarcă o înclinare decesebită către defăimare și suspiciune. Toate straturile sociale contribue la desfășurarea acestor sisteme de manifestare.*

*Curajul răspunderii unei știri, sau pretinse informațiuni, nu și-l ia nimeni. Aproape toți lucrează sub masca anonimatului, sau falselor identități.*

*Alimentează în special, această stare, pătura intelectuală, nemulțumitii cari se așteptau să fie însăcunăți în slujbe și chiar agenții informativi ai poliției și siguranței.*

*Dacă la această stare de spirit se adaugă faptul că autoritățile trimet fără să controleze nenumărate denunțuri, pe baza cărora deschid anchete și cercetări, se poate deduce ușor, sentimentul acelora care ar fi avut dorința să se manifeste printr-o activitate plină de inițiativă și care totuși se știu supuși la suspiciuni, anchete și defăimări, bazate pe fapte cu totul neîntemeiate. Pe lângă aceasta, faptul că se dau curs acestor informațiuni înainte de a li se verifică sursa sau temeinicia, încurajând pe defăimători, anihilând totdeodată în largă măsură inițiativele și bunele intenționi, care într-o provincie ca Basarabia sunt așa de necesare.*

*Deosemenea, tema evreească și posibilitatea lor de exploatare, ca unii care nu se mai bucurau, în avărență, de proteguirea legilor, a înlesnit dezvoltarea unui suflu viciat și înclinat către abuz și bun plac.*

*Cei de mai înainte înrăuți s-au găsit în mediul cel mai prielnic de expansiune delictuoasă, iar parte din acei ce fuseseră neintinăți și nepătați, s-au lăsat alungați pe făgeșurile primilor, îngroșind astfel numărul infractorilor.*

*La toate acestea se mai adaugă și propaganda defăimătoare a elementelor legionare, în scop de compromitere a operei constructive, ce se realizează de către Conducerea Statului.*

*b. Un sistem dăunător prestigiului autorității și bunelor reguli procedurale, sunt așa zisele curse, ce am constatat că se utilizează în Basarabia.*

*In scopuri de a se descoperi unele infracțiuni, față de care activitatea de preventire eșuase, sau nu se aplicase deloc, organele administrative, ajutate de acele judecătoreschi, recurg la asemenea procedee.*

*Reamintim, cursa întinsă unor evrei din ghettou, din inspirația Guvernământului și cu ajutorul a cinci agenții de Poliție (Hadă, Nedu și alții), care s'a soldat fără*



nici o descoperire, dar cu arestarea agenților care în îndeplinirea datoriei, jefuiseră pe evrei, în dauna Statului, de o mare cantitate de aur ce aveau asupra lor.

Deasemenea, tot în ghettou, altă cursă contra unor evrei bănuiți a avea mari cantități de metale prețioase și valori, al cărei rezultat a fost cu totul mediocru.

Asemenea procedee, pe lângă că sunt direct contrare prescripțiunilor legale în materie de cercetare, dar mai prezintă și desavantajul că, sub masca manifestărilor lor acoperite, se dă cel mai favorabil prilej executanților, să cadă ei întâi, în rândul infractorilor.

Totodată și victimele sunt puse în postura de a fi provocați la comiterea reală și completă a infracțiunii iar opiniei publice i se oferă prilejul de a crede că însăși și autoritatea se pretează prin organele ei, la săvârșirea de fapte ilegale, de pe urma cărora și creiază beneficii.

## 2. Îmixtiuni în atribuții și fricțiuni.

Am constatat că diferențele organisme, cu atribuții de dirijarea activităților din provincia de peste Prut, nu au mers pe o linie de înțelegere și colaborare, necesară realizărilor.

Câteva exemple:

a. La 6 Noembrie 1941, Marele Cartier General Secția II-a, ordonă cu Nr.17558, Inspectoratului de Jandarmi din Basarabia, să trimită peste Nistru, pe evreicele Sara Surruci, căsătorită cu creștinul Vasile Surruci și pe Mărier Coca, adăugând că trecerea se va executa, chiar dacă evreicele sunt căsătorite cu români, sau botezate.

Ori, încă dela 22 Octombrie 1941, Domnul Mareșal I.Antonescu, a ordonat cu Nr.15035, către Guvernământul Basarabiei, ca să se opreasă trecerea peste Nistru, a evreicelor căsătorite cu creștini, sau a evreilor creștinăți mai de mult.

b. În conformitate cu art.486 C.J.E., în zona de operații sau interioară, autoritatea militară superioară, poate edicta ordonanțe cu fapte și pedepse, menite a garanta siguranța Armatei, apărarea țării și ordinea publică.

Drept urmare a acestor dispoziții legule și învederea scopurilor de mai sus, Generalul Comandant al Corpului 3 Armată, cu circumscriptie teritorială corespunzătoare aproape în întregime Tinutului Basarabiei, a emis ordonanțele necesare.



în acest timp însă și Guvernatorul Basarabiei, fără a avea un drept, în sensul de mai sus, isvorât din lege, a emis ordonanțe, cu infracțiuni și pedepse.

Cităm, ordonanța Nr.24 din 15 Noembrie 1941, prin care Guvernatorul creiază infracțiuni și prevede pedepse dela 1 lună până la doi ani închisoare, fără a determina însă și competența.

Suprapunerea unor asemenea atribute nelegale, peste acele legale și care revin exclusiv autorității militare, diminuează efectul măsurilor represive.

3. Constatări în ceace privește organizarea și funcționarea ghettoului.

Comisiunea a constatat încă dela început că, din cauza lipsei de organizare și îndrumare, cu privire la ghettou și viața care se desfășura în el, s'a dat prilej pentru practicarea tuturor abuzurilor și truficurilor.

A contribuit în largă măsură la aceasta și neereditarea unei directive etarhice, care, începând dela 4 Septembrie 1941, revenea Guvernământului.

Trebue însă subliniat că și această autoritate superioară s'a găsit, până la ocuparea întregului teritoriu al Basarabiei de către trupele Române, în situația de a nu-și putea exercita atributile în mod complet, din cauza presiunii inerente care se resimțea, asupra tuturor ramurilor de activitate, din partea Harilor Comandanente Militare și a nevoilor de siguranță ce se luau, în spatele trupelor operative.

O consecință în plus, a deficienței menționate mai sus, este faptul că nici Col. Dumitrescu n'a fost îndepărtat la timp din comandă, deși deveniseră aproape notorii, abuzurile sale. N'a plecat decât odată cu desființarea Comandanțatului Militar al Chișinăului.

*In afară de cauzele de mai sus, care au format sursa inițială a neregulelor, mai reținem și pe acelea isvorâte din lipsa oricărei reglementări a regimului de vânzări și cumpărări, a obiectelor ce aparțineau evreilor.*

Datorită acestui fapt, s'a ajuns la situația că evreii să nu-și poată vinde obiectele mai de preț, decât persoanelor care căpătau autorizație de intrare în ghettou. În modul acesta se creiau avantajii numai persoanelor care puteau obține aceste autorizațiuni și care din lipsa oricărui concurență, beneficiau de un adevarat monopol generător de fraude și abuzuri.



#### 4. Constatări în ce privește evacuările.

a. Operația evacuării s'a executat în condițiuni destul de grele, datorită următorelor cauze:

- Scoaterea evreilor din ghetto se făcea anevoieos pentru că nimeni din ei, nu acceptau cu voie bună aplicarea acestei măsuri.

Intrebuințau toate mijloacele de a se sustrage, sau amâna plecarea prin: fugă în alte cartiere nedestinate eșaloanelor ce urmău să plece; ascunderea prin pivniți, poduri, etc.; cumpărarea de autorizații pentru amânarea plecării, practică din care se creiase un adevărat negoț.

- Coloanele de evacuați se formau greu și nu își puteau menține continuitatea, pentru că majoritatea o formau bătrâni, femeile și copii, care nu rezistau călătoriei pe jos, iar căruțele erau puține; vehiculele se stricau foarte des și nici nu erau acționate de o tracțiune animală omogenă; paza convoaielor se făcea cu efective foarte reduse.

b. Mai contribuia la îngreuierea acestei operații și exploatarea neomenoasă de către căruțași.

Menționăm câteva exemple:

- Căruțașii din Atachi, pretindeau evreilor veniți din Bucovina, câte 4.000 lei ca să le transporte bagajele până la punctul de trecere, deși distanța era de cca. 4 km.

- Deosebit de deosebit, uniti dintre acei rechizitionați pentru traseul Orhei-Rezina, întrebuințau amenințări și diferite sisteme de intimidare, pentru a să determine pe evrei, să le da cât mai mari sume de bani, sau din lucrurile ce aveau.

S'au luat măsuri de îndreptare, de câte ori, s'au semnalat asemenea cazuri.

#### 5. Trierea evreilor din ghetto, în vederea evacuării.

Din cauza lipsei de organizare inițială, precum și din aceea a neluării de relații suplimentare, dela jorul conducător, cu privire la executarea operațiunii de internare în lagăr, s'a procedat la punerea în aplicare a acestei măsuri, aproape fără nici o regulă.

Internarea n'a avut nici un criteriu. Au fost vărați în ghetto: foști demnitari a căror situație merită să fie apreciată; evreice măritate cu creștini; evrei insu-rați cu creștini; mame evreice cu copii creștinați; evrei botezăți, etc.



Această situație a dăinuit, până după începerea evacuărilor, când Domnul Mareșal I. Antonescu, fiind sesizat de cererea Avocatului Stepancovschi din Chișinău, a formulat pe cale rezolutivă, normele de triere, pentru oprirea trecerii peste Nistru, a unor categorii dintre ei și anume: a evreicelor căsătorite cu creștini; a celor creștinăți mai de mult; acei cari au fost cu adevărat buni români. Ordinul s'a transmis Guvernământului, de către Președinție, cu Nr. 15035 din 22 Octombrie 1941.

In timpul anchetei s'au prezentat Comisiunei, mai multe persoane, care solicitase Guvernământului să fie cuprinse în cadrul normelor stabilite de Domnul Mareșal I. Antonescu și care fiind respinse, ne-au cerut să intervenim, pentru soluționarea favorabilă a situației lor.

Studiind documentele care ne-au fost depuse, am constatat că, într'adevăr cazurile lor, meritau o atenție specială, ele referindu-se la:

a. Faptul dacă o creștină este măritată cu un evreu, soțul se bucură de aceeaș dispozițiune luată, pentru evreicele măritate cu creștini.

b. Dacă o evreică este măritată cu un creștin, astăzi mort și are un copil creștinat din această căsătorie, urmează condițiunea de favoare dispusă, sau trebuie să fie izolată de copil și evacuată.

c. Care este întinderea noțiunii de "bun Român" și care aceea a situației de "a fi creșinat mai de mult". Menționăm cazul evreicei Claudia Bragar, care în dorința de a se căsători cu un român, s'a botezat în Iulie 1940 la Chișinău, sub regimul de teroare contra creștinății, exercitată de bolșevici.

Guvernământul, fără a cere explicațiunile necesare în desemenea cazuri, a luat hotărîri care puteau depăși înțelesul ordinului Domnului Mareșal.

Pentru că am considerat că acele cazuri prezentate, meritau o revizuire, prin prizma celor menționate mai sus, Comisiunea a intervenit la Domnul Guvernator, cu adresa Nr. 9 din 20 Decembrie 1941, pentru a lua cunoștință și dispune.

#### 6. Constatări în ce privește administrarea bunurilor care urmău să revină în patrimoniul Statului.

In conformitate cu ordinul Domnului Mareșal I. Antonescu, Guvernământul Basarabiei, dă la 22 Iulie 1941, un ordin telegrafic tuturor Prefecturilor de județ, de a face imediat inventare pentru bunurile rămasse după ruși, germanii



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și evreii evacuați sau deportați, astfel că să i se poată prezenta situația generală, odată cu ocuparea întregului teritoriu.

Din cauza lipsei însă, a unei proceduri organizate, în Chișinău, acest inventar nici astăzi nu-i terminat și nici nu s'a putut ființe o evidență a mișcării acestor bunuri.

De aci, au rezultat foarte multe posibilități de sustragere, sau schimbări de destinație, a unei bune părți din patrimoniul Statului.

Trebue să adăugăm însă, activitatea în acest sector, a organelor Jandarmeriei din Inspectoratul Basarabiei, care s'a remarcat prin luarea și aplicarea unor măsuri immediate și judicioase, cu privire la bunurile rămase, de pe urma retragerii înamicului.

Anume prin Posturile de Jandarmi și toate organele erarhice, s'au adunat aceste bunuri, s'au inventariat cu formel legală și s'au conservat, punându-le la dispoziția Statului.

#### 7. Constatări în ce privește modul cum au lucrat comisiunile B.N.R.

Cumpărarea valorilor și schimbul Leilor, cu ocazia evacuării, s'a început după ce trecuse peste Mistrul lo coloane de evacuați, din cauza încunoștiințării <sup>fiecului</sup> cu întârziere a B.N.R-ului. —

Din toate informațiile culese, am stabilit că, operațiunea s'a desfășurat sub auspiciile cinstei desăvârșite.

#### 8. Constatări, în ce privește, modul de comportare a ofițerilor și trupei, în ghettou și traseele de evacuare.

Din numeroasele declarații date în fața Comisiunei, am constatat că, în general, omnia și bunul tratament, au fost criteriile de manifestare față de evrei, din partea ofițerilor și trupei de pază, precum și a jandarmilor-escorte. Au fost văzuți soldați care cu ocazia evacuării, ajutau pe evrei la imbarcarea în căruțe, sau își dădeau pâineu evreilor.

Jandarmii-escorte, erau percheziționați la terminarea conducerii fiecăruia eșalon.



9. Constatări cu privire la unele imputări, cuprinse în Notele Informativе ale Președintiei.

a. Privitor la ridicarea de mobilier și veselă, de către Corpul 3 Armată, din depozitul aflat în ghettou, am stabilit următoarele:

- La data de 23 Octombrie 1941, Corpul 3 Armată se sind de pe front în Garnizoana sa de reședință Chișinău și fiind cu totul lipsit de cele necesare instalării Comandamentului și popotei ofițerilor, a obținut aprobarea Comandamentului Militar a Municipiului și a delegat un ofițer să ridice din ghettou, mobilierul și vesela de care avea nevoie.

Toate obiectele ridicate au fost inventariate și înregistrate asupra Comandamentului. Constatarea a făcut-o și Guvernământul prin Int.Cpt. Iliescu, acoperind prin aceasta lipsa inițială a formalității că aprobarea trebuia cerută dela Guvernământ, iar nu dela Comandamentul Militar.

Totdeodata, ţinem să subliniem faptul constatat că, ofițerii Comandamentului Corpului 3 Armată și ai unităților în subordine stabiliți în Chișinău, deși erau veniți de pe front și meritau ca atare o solicitudine deosebită pentru cazarea lor, au fost instalați totuși în condiții submedioare. Funcționari inferiori și particulari veniți mai de mult în Chișinău, erau așezați în case bune, centrale și adeseori cu tot confortul, iar acești ofițeri, pioni ai eroismului și sacrificiului pentru țară, stau pe la periferii în condiții grele și în lipsuri.

b. Nu s'a putut constata că soldații care erau de pază la intrarea ghettoului, primeau bacășis pentru a îngădui intrările și eșirile. Cele câteva cazuri izolate ce nici nu semnalat, nu pot fi socotite ca o regulă generală.

c. Convoaiele de evrei, căruțe și bagaje, nu le primeau nemții la Nistru, ci formațiunile de jandarmi români, care-i și escortau la punctele de destinație, conform itinerariilor stabilite de Inspectoratul Jand. în Transnistria. Deasemenea, nu se verifică nici informația că mai târziu, convoaiele erau ajunse din urmă de mașini în care se încărcau evreii, iar căruțele cu bagajele lor rămâneau pe loc, pentru a fi însușite.

d. Maiorul Vasilescu, fostul Chestor dela Chișinău, a fost trimis în cercetarea Curții Martiale a C.3 Armată și constatându-se nevinovăția sa, ajacerea a fost clasată.



e. Cumpărarea de valori și schimburile, s-au făcut la Visterniceni și nu în ghettou, pentru că Comandantul Militar al Chișinăului, a refuzat Comisiunei B.N.R. îngăduința de a executa aceste operațiuni în ghettou, sub motiv că n'are local adeguat, iar evreii înștiințați, ar ascunde sau subtiliza valorile înainte de control, pe cătă vreme dacă nu știau despre acest control, care urma să li se facă, plecau în evacuare cu toate valorile asupra lor.

f. Inspectoratul de Jandarmi din Basarabia, a sancționat pe toți jandarmii de pe teritoriu, care au fost dovediți cu nereguli sau abuzuri.

Pentru cei mai mulți s'a intervenit la Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, pentru agravarea pedepselor, iar parte din ei au fost trimiși în fața instanțelor militare.

P R E S E D I N T E,

gl.C. Mărgărescu

M E M B R I:

General Negruțiu X înăscut

J. Preutescu

șef de la Unitatea de Apel.

Ireiache Niculescu -  
Procuror General -

Westonel magistrat

Iaduțac

O. Păunescu  
Inspector General B.N.R.



Raport Special



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RAPORT DE ANCHETA Nr. 2

AL COMISIUNEI INSTITUITA CONFORM ORDINULUI  
DOMNULUI MARESAL ION ANTONESCU, CONDUCĂTORUL STATULUI, PENTRU CERCETAREA HERGELOR DELA GHETTOUL DIN CHISINAU.

Cu ocazia cercetărilor executate de comisiune, s'a constatat unele stări de fapt desenate, care neputând fi înglobate în cuprinsul raportului principal, am socotit necesar să le expună separat, în raportul de față.

Aceste constatări sunt:

I. Situatia juridică a evreilor evacuați și a proprietăților imobiliare ale acestora.

A. Numărul evreilor internați și evacuați.

Dintr-o statistică sumară, prezentată comisiunei de către Lt. Colonel Pallade, delegatul Marelui Cartier General pentru înființarea lagărelor și evacuarea evreilor, rezultă că au și fost internați: la Vertuzeni 23.000 evrei, la Vărculești 11.000 evrei, la Edineți și Secureni 25.000 evrei și la Chișinău în ghettou 11.525 evrei. La această se mai adaugă, evreii dela Orhei, Cahul, Ismail, Chilia Nouă și Bolgrad, unde numărul lor nu a depășit 1000 de internați în fiecare localitate.

Aproximativ, au fost în total 75-80.000 evrei.

Din situația prezentată comisiunei, de către Inspectoratul de Jandarmi Chișinău, însărcinat ce executarea evacuării, rezultă că prin diferitele puncte de trecere stabilite,



pentru evacuare au fost trecuți din Basarabia 55.867 evrei, iar din Bucovina 45.538 evrei.

Total: 101.405 evrei.

In ce privește evreii din Basarabia, rezultă că între numărul celor internați de circa 75-80.000 evrei și numărul celor evacuați de 55.867 evrei, este diferență de circa 25.000 evrei, cari au murit de moarte naturală sau au evadat sau au fost împușcați după metodelor pe care le vom arăta mai jos.

B. Sistemele de identificare a evreilor internați și evacuați.

Pentru identificarea lor în lagăr, sau în ghettoul din Chișinău, nu a fost nici o dispoziție specială verbală sau scrisă.

Singur criteriul numeric era acela care determina atât capacitatea lagărelor, cât și formarea convoaielor de evacuați.

Numai în ghettoul din Chișinău, s'a încercat facerea unei statistici nominale, cu privire la evreii internați acolo, care însă nu fost terminată.

O primă consecință a acestei situații a fost neputința identificării evreilor evaizați din lagăre și deci implicit a imposibilității de a se descoperi, atât autorii, cât și acei care au înlesnit comiterea acestor infracțiuni.

In instrucțiile date la 7 Septembrie 1941, cu ocazia evacuării de către marele preștor, Generalul Topor, se recomandă expres ca trecerea evreilor peste Nistru să se făcă fără nici o formalitate.

Următor acestei norme, evreii au fost evacuați în loturi strict numerice, situație în care parcurgeau traseele și erau trecuți peste Nistru.



La punctele de trecere, s'au dat ord  
chiar de delegatul șefului Stat Major, șefor  
Tărlef, ca să se ridice dela evrei orice act  
s'ar afla asupra lor. (declarația Lt.rez. Po-  
popiu și Lt.Colonel Pallade). Deasemenea și  
lonelul Emil Broșteanu, Inspectorul Jandarmi  
din Transnistria, ne-a declarat că evreii erau  
primiti acolo, fără nici o identificare.

C. Consecințele ce decurg din această  
situație.

I. Stabilirea drepturilor de proprietari  
asupra diferitelor imobile din Basarabia.

In conformitate cu Decretul Lege Nr. 1  
din 3 Septembrie 1941, privitor la unele măsuri  
legislative pentru Basarabia și Bucovina de  
Statul Român intră prin efectul legilor de re-  
mâniazare intervenite după 28 Iunie 1940 și a  
acelei legi, în stăpânirea bunurilor situate  
pe teritoriul Basarabiei, ce aparțineau evreii  
lor sau persoanelor juridice evreiești la data  
de 28 Iunie 1940, ori pe care evreii sau per-  
soanele juridice evreiești le-au dobândit după a-  
ceastă dată.

Rezultă din această lege că sistemul  
de expropriere a imobilelor ce aparțin evreilor  
din Basarabia, se face după aceleași criterii  
ca pentru evreii din Vechiul Regat și că în c-  
secință, va trebui să se stabilească criterii  
de compensații și urmare de proceduri judicia-  
necesitate de o asemenea operăriune.

Procedura însă nu se va putea realiza  
din cauza lipsei de identitate în care se găsesc  
actualmente evreii evacuați. Pe de altă parte,  
evacuarea silită a evreilor peste Nistru, nu  
poate constitui situația prevăzută de lege.



-adică găsirea de bunuri abandonate- căci proprietarii nu au părăsit, prin libera lor voluntate, bunurile ce le aparțineau, ci ei au fost evacuați în mod silit.

In aceste împrejurări, legiuitorul trebuie să intervină în mod expres, soluționând problema, așa cum ea se găsea determinată de condițiunile de fapt.

## 2. Consecințe eventuale.

Pentru orice ipoteză de viitor, în casă ar putea din nou, în interesul superior al Tării, să se angajeze discuții referitoare la aşezarea evreilor care au locuit în Basarabia și Bucovina în momentul realipirii, se va pută exagera în mod voit, de către cei interesați, numărul acestora peste acel real și deasemeni se vor putea opera substituiri de persoane din cauza lipsei oricăror lucrări de statistică și identificare.

Mai menționăm că aceleasi serioase pledici și din aceleasi cauze, va întâmpina Statul, în orice altă lucrare de ordin legislativ sau administrativ, înainte de a se pune în dicuție, problemele mai sus enunțate.

## II. Impuscarea evreilor.

### 1. In timpul internării.

#### 1. Din ghettoul Chișinău.

La 1 August 1941, se prezintă președintelui Comunității din ghettoul Chișinău, un locotenent german, care a cerut să-i predea pentru lucru, în câteva ore, un număr de 250 bărbăți și 200 de femei.

Evreii au fost adunați, iar la ora hotărâtă s'a prezentat ofițerul german, însoțit de trei soldați care după ce i-a triat, alegând special intelectuali și femei frumoase, în



care scop, dintr-o declarătună din dosar, rezultă că a fost folosit chiar binoclu - a plecat cu acest grup de 450 evrei. În seara aceleiași zile, s'au întors dintre cei plecați, un număr de 39 evrei bătrâni, care au declarat că restul de 411 evrei au fost împușcați, lângă Visterniceni și că ei au fost special trimiși ca să anunțe acest eveniment.

A doua zi, a venit în ghettou chiar Locotenentul german, care a confirmat săvârșirea acestui fapt.

Verificarea s'a mai făcut de către însuși Președintele Comunității, însotit de 20 evrei cari au fost trimiși la groapa comună unde fusese să înmormântate cadavrele celor împușcați, pentru a o acoperi chiar ei, deoarece înhumarea, se făcuse cu totul superficial.

Acest fapt a fost confirmat și de Colonelul Tudose, Comandantul Militar al Chișinăului.

Menționăm că cu acest prilej, a fost omorât și creștinul Ion Carmen din Florești, care se afla în ghettou împreună cu soția sa evreică, Fenia Carmen, el fiind venit în Basarabia încă din luna Decembrie 1941, la familia sa, pe care o lăsase sub rușii.

Alt caz este acela întâmplat la 7-8 august 1941, când un inspector de drumuri s'a prezentat în ghettou și a cerut pentru lucru la șantierul Ghidighici un număr de 500 bărbați.. I s'au dat acești evrei și în plus 25 femei, ca să le pregătească hrana. După vreo săptămână, s'au întors dintre dânsii 200 evrei, cari deviniseră cu totul inapți pentru muncă, iar restul de 325, nu s'au mai întors nici până astăzi. (declarata lui Gutmann Landau și Sebel Ițico Diazic).



2. In lagărul Tătărăști, jud. Cetatea Albă.

In ziua de 9 August 1941, se prezintă Comandamentului lagărului din Tătărăști, Cpt. rez. Vetu Gh. Ioan, Sublt. german Heinrich Frölich din Marele Comandament al unității germane din Chișinău și îi comunică că din ordinul Domnului Mareșal I. Antonescu, toți cei 451 evrei, aflați în susmenționatul lagăr, trebuie execuții imediat.

Căpitanul Vetu, aduce faptul la cunoștința Comandamentului Legiunei, care îi ordonă să execute această dispoziție și urmăre că reia evreii au fost împușcați.

S'a încheiat un proces-verbal între ofițerul german și Cpt. de Jandarmi, proces-verbal care se alătură, în copie, la acte.

Menționăm că, cu prilejul acestei execuțări Cpt. Vetu și-a însușit, dela evreii omorâți, următoarele obiecte de valoare: trei cenusuri, un inel de aur, patru verighete de aur, un lanț de metal și suma de 20.000 lei. Inspectoratul Regional de Jandarmi a intervenit la Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei pentru ca ofițerul să fie trimis înaintea Consiliului de Reformă.

Urmează să se hotărască:

a. Dacă procesul-verbal original trebuie păstrat la Inspectoratul Jandarmeriei sau depozitat în altă parte.

b. Dacă este oportun ca ofițerul vinov de jefuire a cadavrelor, să fie trimis și în fața Curții Militiale, unde s-ar desfășura un proces public, sau este suficientă reformă.

3. In parcursul evacuării.

Cu privire la chipul în care organele de execuție a evacuării, urmau să se poarte fa-



de evrei care nu se supun, instrucțiunile din 7 Septembrie 1941 ale Generalului Topor, conțin următoarea dispoziție: "Modul de comportare față de cei ce nu se supun? (alexeanu)".

Declaratia Locotenentului Roșca Augustin din Legiunea de Jandarmi Roman și însărcinat cu evacuarea evreilor dela Securenți și Edineți, este edificatoare asupra înțelesului dispoziției menționate mai sus.

Intr'adevăr ofițerul declară în esență următoarele:

"Fiind chemat de către Lt. Colonelul Pal Iade, delegatul Marelui Cartier General, pentru a-i da instrucțiuni asupra modului de evacuare i-a comunicat cu acest prilej că va mai primi, fie prin jandarmerie, fie prin Cpt. Popescu, ofițer informator dela Atache, un consemn special.

Acest consemn special, i-a fost comunicat de către Comandantul Legiunei Hotin, maiorul Drăgulescu, care i-a spus că din ordinul Mareiui Cartier General, evreii care nu se vor putea ține de convoaie, fie din neputință, fie din boală, să fie execuți. În acest scop, i-ordonat să trimită, cu două zile înainte de plecarea fiecărui convoi, câte un reangajat pe traseu, cure cu ajutorul posturilor de jandarm din localitățile pe unde urmau să treacă evrei să facă din lo în lo kilometri câte o groapă pentru circa 100 persoane, unde vor fi adunați acei rămași de coloane, împușcați și înhumăți. La facerea gropilor și înhumarea celor împușcați, trebuiau să ajute și premilittarii din satele aflate pe traseul de evacuare.

Locotenentul Roșca, a executat întocmai dispozițiunile date, care au avut drept rezultat împușcarea a circa 500 evrei, dintre acei evauci pe traseul Securenți-Cosăuți.



Același sistem a fost întrebuințat și pentru convoaiele din traseul Edineț-Cosăuți, unde executarea evacuărilor a avut-o Locotenentul Popovici, din aceiași unitate și de sub ordinele Locotenentului Roșca Augustin.

Din cauza procedurei următe, pentru facerea gropilor și executarea înhumărilor, a luat cunoștință de evenimentele care urmau să se întâmple, țărani din satele de pe traseu, și care așteptau pe la marginea de drumuri, priporumburi și diferite ascunzișuri, faptul executărilor, pentru că se arunca asupra cadavrelor, spre a le jefui.

Din declarația verbală a Locotenentului Roșca Augustin, reiese că operațiunile de pregătire și mai ales executarea ordinelor de au înregistrat momente aşa de dramatice încât cei ce au luat parte, vor purta multă vreme impresiunile reținute în acele împrejurări.

PRESEDINTELE COMISIUNEI,

g. C. Mîrlescu

MEUBRI:

M. Negruțiu

• Prelucrare  
Fischiute bune de apăr.

Iraianu Niculescu  
Procuror șef

L. Vînclău  
Inspector General  
Francă Ialoveni

Atorbăciu zugravul  
M. Gheorghescu



**APPENDIX 2**

**Postcard From Orhei**



My paternal grandfather, Aaron-Iosef Cervinschi, with his second wife and her sister (my grandmother had died in 1933) were deported from the Kishinev Ghetto in October 1941. At the time he was 69 years old, a religious Jew and a hasid of the Skvere Rabbi who was also in the Ghetto. He has been an independent businessman and also a well known and recognized amateur cantor in Kishinev (Korn, 1971, p.994). The only thing that we know of his subsequent fate was the enclosed postcard that he wrote on the way to my aunt, his daughter, living in Romania in the city of Iasi. The postcard was written in Romanian, obviously by someone else since my grandfather did not know Romanian (the original postcard has been deposited some years ago at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, Israel).

It is addressed to "Mrs. Ghenea Fisman, Str. Anastasiu Panu No.5, Iasi", with the return address indicated as "Cervinski, Orhei"; it even bears a rubber stamp proclaiming "Censorship Orhei". Here is its translated text:

#### TRANSLATION FROM ROMANIAN

"Orhei, 29 October, 1941

Dear Ghenea,


We arrived here yesterday. From here I will travel further, where I do not yet know. We are all healthy. From David [my father] I have not received anything for 12 days since he moved. To you and to your family I write that you should move as soon as you can into a new house. Yours is humid and you should move where Nuta lives [Nuta was my grandfather's brother who, before WWI, immigrated to Haifa, Palestine]. Not notwithstanding the fact that this will be expansive, you should move. With money (alone) one cannot live. I do not like your house; it is humid and cold and can damage you with rheumatism. God should help us and we should see each other again at my brother Nuta. Kiss all, Your Father."



CARTE POSTALA

IMPERI

REINTREGIRII SUVERANE



Orhei 29 Octombrie 1941

Dragă Ghenea

Se sănătatea tăie venit eri acela de acela plec mai departe sende zice na stiu. Noi suntem ca totie sănătosii. Delă David n-am primit nimic. Timp de 12 zile de când s'a mutat. Te și familiici îți scriu ca să te muti cat mai repede într-o casă nouă fără că tu este imedată și da acolo unde Nita locu este. Cu toate că nu sa te coste scump tu dute și te mută. Cu banii nu se trăeste. Casa te numi place e amed și reacă și poți să te strice la reumatizare. Îți dă Dumnezeu să ne velem cu bine la fratele Nita. Tata



**APPENDIX 3**

**Ghetto Reports**



This Appendix 3 contains three reports originating from the Kishinev Ghetto. They are in the Romanian language and are copies certified by the National Archive of Moldova, in Kishinev (Chisinau), where the originals are kept in official files. In 1994, I first received hand written copies and in September 1995 obtained the certified xerox copies. I was not previously aware of the existence of these documents. Translations (aimed at conforming with the style and language of the originals) and a few comments follow:

(i) Document dated August 20, 1941

This is a declaration presented by my uncle Mihail (Misha) Apotecher to Ghetto authorities on August 20, 1941. At the time we did not know that the deportations and the liquidation of the Ghetto will start in less than two months. My uncle described accurately the suffering that the family underwent during the year under Soviet rule. As a result of this, and notwithstanding the experiences so far in the Ghetto, he apparently still had a naive believe in the "justice" of the Romanian authorities, their regard for the past and in the possibility of receiving back some of the stolen property!

I witnessed all the events described in the declaration and have vivid memories of them. All of us (my parents, brother, grandmother, uncle, aunt and her sister) were driven out of our home on Mihai Viteazu St. No.23 on the morning of Thursday, July 24, 1941. We went to the house of my paternal grandfather, Aaron-Iosef Cervinschi, on General Averescu St. No.66. Within hours the two Romanian soldiers appeared and robbed us. They threatened to kill us but did go away. I clearly remember my thoughts, at the age of fourteen, when I believed I was going to die! My six year old brother was put on a table with his hands held high in "surrender". Towards evening, frightened that the soldiers will return, we left to the area where the Ghetto was being established (we found a room for all of us at Alexandru Vlahuta St. No.19). Later that evening, the soldiers returned to my grandfather's house; he was reluctant to abandon his home earlier and was the "old Jew" mentioned in the declaration. The soldiers dragged him by his long beard to our new location where the events took place as described by my uncle. Notwithstanding his frightening experiences, my grandfather, a deeply religious Jew, performed an appropriate ritual later that night. It was the eve of the new Jewish lunar month of Av, 5701, and closing my eyes I can see my grandfather in the dark, with me at his side, blessing the new moon!



TRANSLATION FROM ROMANIAN

Declaration

The undersigned, Apotecher Mihail of the city of Chisinau - the son of the proprietor of the Leather Factory located at the Tighina Junction of the city of Chisinau and former proprietor of the furriery stores at Gen. S. Brosteanu St. No.57 - my father Apotecher Leib having been arrested by the Russians on July 10, 1940, and a manufacturer who gave a lot for the Romanian army, condemned to 8 years and sent to Siberia, I and my mother did not have the right to continue living in the city of Chisinau and not in any other city, nor to work, we were in hiding in Tighina and at the beginning of the war we returned to Chisinau, our houses and factory having been destroyed by fire. We were left only with our clothes which are even now at Mihai Viteazu St. No.23 - not removed, but the jewelry we had with us, when we left to the Ghetto, we went first to Gen. Averescu St. No.66 there two military men came (probably a sergeant and a soldier), who searched us and took everything, and wanted to kill us but after great tearful pleading they left us alive and said that we should remain there but fearing for our lives, we immediately moved to the Ghetto, at night they returned and found an old Jew there the soldiers insisted that the old man shows them where we were, the old man of about 70 years of age fearing that he will be killed, came with both of them to where we still live, these soldiers in a new search took our last shirt they mocked our women and took things also from the neighbors in the same house, a total of jewelry valued quite highly - of two million lei. A few days ago I saw them passing or patrolling in the ghetto.

I know the face and I can recognize him any time.

I make no demand to you to be returned all the items preferring only the wrist watch of my wife my own and my mother's, the rest I donate for the support of the army.

[Signature]

Chisinau 20 Aug. 1941



Declarare:  
Subsemnatul Apotecher Leihai din oraș  
Chisinau - fiul proprietarului Făbricei de  
Pelerie situată pe Bâriera Tighinei nr. Ch. 30.  
și fostul proprietarul a depozitei de Blâznică  
de pe str. gen. E. Brosteanu nr. 57 - Tatăl meu  
Apotecher Leib fiind în viață de 10 luni și 1/2 -  
arrestat de către Agenția G. C. fabricant care  
adă mult punctu în ceea ce privește armele  
române, condamnat la 8 ani, și în urmă la  
liberie, eu și mama mea avut drept să  
stăm în orasul chisinau, și nici la vreun  
oraș, nici la lemn, stăteam în orasul Tighina  
ascunsă, și la Precepitel rătăcitorii nu am ieșit  
la chisinau, casela și făbrica noastră este  
mutată. Am rămas uimai că în braconierile  
care sunt și acumă pe str. Iohai Vodă nr. 23 -  
nu scoase, dar băjtările care le fireau la  
noi, la plecarea noastră la ghetou, n'au  
șabădit din fericire pe str. gen. Arăescu nr. 66 - acolo  
ace venit doi militari /probabil sunți sergent  
și sunți soldat, care nu a făcut nicio greșeală și  
nu a luat foate, și ace venit să ne uide  
ansă ce urme regăsim de la crima, nu au  
pasat 50 de minute, și ace spus să reușim acolo,  
dar de frică de moarte, noi nu sunți uimit  
în ghetou de acuma, noapte au venit acolo  
încă odată acesti și ace jăsăi și un bărbat  
cruel acolo, lovituri au mistat să arăta bărbatul  
nu de stăiu, bărbatul de vreo 2-30 de ani



de frica să nu fie ușoară, a venit cu amărila  
la noi unde stăm și suntem, acest soldat. Îl  
o pereche de lice sau, ne au leuat pînă ultima  
cavata, au bat-jocerit de pe urile noastre -  
și de la beat lucru și de la vecini care erau  
la noi în casă. - În final bujorărie au luat  
peste o simea destul de importanță - (ceva  
aceea că treba să le (vreă să le) să vădă și  
frecănd său patulând în gheto. -

Eu suntem fata și pot să-l recunosc  
ori cănd,

N'au nici o probă a cărui suntem restituiri  
în regim, prețind nimic ceasul de mană  
a fotografului, și abia nule și a manu sub  
restul doar pește în gătit din cruce.

Craiova 20 Aug. 1941 *Lipshitz*



(ii) Document dated October 19, 1941

This report was filed four days after we escaped from the Ghetto on Wednesday, October 15, 1941. It was only my grandmother, Sarah Apotecher, who travelled by car with the help of Major Petre Mardare. The rest of us, a total of seven persons (my parents, I and my brother, my uncle and aunt, Misha and Ida Apotecher, and my aunt's sister, Mania Kanterman), escaped by train with the help of three police agents, as described in note #25. The "son of the Jew Leiba Apotecher, who has been in Bucharest since 1940" is my uncle Monia Apotecher. It was he who hired the agents, paid them a total of 700,000 lei (100,000 per person, and not the total of 250,000 mentioned on page 25 in the report) and saved us from the death march to Transnistria. He met the agents after they had brought out to Bucharest the lawyer Sudit. My uncle bought the car for Major Mardare and arranged for a driver. Major Mardare travelled to Kishinev with his girlfriend and brought out my grandmother posing as his mother.

TRANSLATION FROM ROMANIAN

INFORMATIONAL REPORT

File 29  
Entry N7851  
22 October 1941

F:29  
20 X 1941  
B. Security<sup>1</sup>

We are informed that the family Apotecher of Jewish ethnic origin who were evacuated in the Ghetto, living on Alexandru Vlahuta Street N.19, disappeared from that address together with the family Cervinschi with which they are related and it is rumored that in one of the past nights they were taken by a car and transported to Bucharest where there is a son of the Jew Leiba Apotecher, who has been there since 1940.

The family Apotecher is well known here as very rich having capital in a number of banks in Bucharest and in Ploesti where they have a furriery store.

19 October


Urgent  
Report to ...

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<sup>1</sup> The underlined words are in the original



Fos 24



Raport Informativ

24  
20. X. 1941 525  
B. coresponditor  
semnificativ 528

Suntem informați că familia Apotecher de origină etnică evreie care se găsea în Ghetou, locuind în strada Alexandru Vlăhiță Nr. 19, au dispărut dela acea adresă împreună cu familia Cervinschi cu care se înrudește și se vorbește că într-o noapte trecută ar fi fost ridicați cu un automobil și trimiși în București unde se află încă din anul 1940 un fiu al evreului Leiba Apotecher.

Familia Apotecher este cunoscută în localitate ca mari bogăți având capitaluri însemnante la mai multe Bănci din București și din Ploiești unde are un depozit de blanuri.

19 Octombrie 1941.

D. Apotecher  
Inspectoratul de poliție  
textil cedulă nr. 100



(iii) Document dated November 24, 1941

The family Apotecher was not "of mother and two daughters"! It is ironic and most probably coincidental that we were arrested in Bucharest on the evening of the very day that this document was written, November 24, 1941, (see note #25)!

TRANSLATION FROM ROMANIAN

Romania Personal  
Police Headquarters Municipality Chisinau  
Commissariat of Police Area II  
N 12  
24 November, 1941                      To  
    Police Headquarters Security Bureau

With reference to your order N.10817 5/941  
We have the honor of reporting that according to received  
information the following Jews left for Bucharest from the  
local Ghetto:

1. The family Apotecher of mother and two daughters
2. Mihal Apotecher
3. Calikman with wife
4. Sudit (lawyer) with wife
5. Cervinschi with wife and children

We beg to inform you that other information on this subject  
will be forthcoming.

Chief of Police Area 2  
Inspector [Blandu]

STAMP



ROMÂNIA



Chestura Poliției Municip. Chișinău  
Comisariatul Circ. II de Poliție  
Nr. 12  
194 / luna Noemvru ziua 28

10817

8.29

Personal 103

103

28.XI.94  
coșmarul tui

către

Chestura Poliției Siroul Sig.  
Chișinău.

In referire la ordinul Dvs. Nr. 10817 S/941  
Avem onoare să Vă raporta că din informațiile  
făcute rezultă că din ghetoul local au plecat  
la București evreii următori:

1. Familia Apotecher compusă din mamă și două fice.
2. Mihăl Apotecher.
3. Calikman cu soția.
4. Sudit (avocat) cu soția.
5. Cervinschi cu soția și copii.

Rugându-vă să binevoiți a cunoaște că alte  
informații în această materie se vor rapor-  
ta ulterior.



Seful Circ. 2-a Poliție

Comisar,

O. Balan



**APPENDIX 4**

**ACMECETCA**

**by**

**David Cervinschi**



ACMECETCA  
by  
David Cervinschi  
(from "The Destruction of the Jews of Bessarabia"  
Published by the Committee for Bessarabian Jews, Tel-Aviv,  
1944, pp.27-30)  
Translated from Hebrew

Such was the name of the horrible Transnistrian death camp. It was named after the nearby large Ukrainian village in the Dumanovca area, the district of Golta along the banks of the river Bug.

Two kilometers from the village, in the valley, stood four large pigsties built from clay and covered with a straw roof. They were used for the cultivation of thousands of pigs in the previous Soviet days. On the nearby hill stood a few wooden barracks and a couple of stone houses built for the pigsty staff.

In the spring of 1942, The Jew-hating governor of the Golta district, Modest Isopescu, acting on the advice of the Dumanovca area officer, attorney Balunaro, ordered all the deported Jews in the district who were unable to continue, due to their physical condition, the hard labor to which they were subjected in agriculture and road building to be assembled in the Acmechetca pigsty "so that they would not consume more food and would die of hunger and thirst".

On May 10, 1942 (a Romanian holiday) the order was implemented. From all over the Golta district weak and sick Jews who were unable to continue working, including many old people, women and children, were gathered and taken to that terrible place labeled by the Jewish community "der toiten lager", the death camp. The camp was surrounded by a wire fence and a deep trench and Ukrainian policemen were stationed on guard. Those who tried to escape were immediately executed.

A number of thousands of people were imprisoned there in inhumane conditions, without food or drinking water . Those who still had some money or jewels snatched in their clothes, sold it to the officers in charge for some bread, a piece fruit or anything else that they could eat.

The remaining Jews knew of the horrors their brothers were undergoing, wanted to help but could do very little. Jews were not allowed to travel from place to place and anyone who did was punishable by death. Nevertheless, after many efforts we, the members of the Dumanovca Jewish community which was established earlier, succeeded to obtain a permit in July of 1942 to visit the camp and bring them a cart of food. We, the remaining Jews, also did not have enough to feed on. Still we managed to spare some. We organized a day of fasting each week in order to save some of our meager supplies. The news from the camp were terrible and shocking.



We were told that they were starving, dying a slow death in the hundreds. One Sunday, at the beginning of August it became my duty to take the food cart to the camp. As I approached the camp a terrible sight was revealed to my eyes. Many people crowded by the fence waving and shouting. And when I got closer... it was terrible to look at those bare footed half naked people, some wearing only loincloths. I saw them: men, women, children, young women, dried out and skinny as bare sticks, dirty and with wild hair. Some were crawling on their swollen bellies and chewing the thin grass on the ground. I noticed a few of the women cooking something on a small dying fire. I cannot begin to describe the happiness when they saw the food cart. The outburst was so wild that we feared an attack.

We had to place the cart some distance away and ask a few people to guard it. The cart contained 96 loafs of bread, 10 bottles of oil and 5 kg of salt. I cut each loaf into five pieces and thus was able to give a piece of bread to each of the 5-600 people remaining from the 5,000 brought here in the first place. I asked them to enter their cells and, together with my friends, we started to distribute the pieces of bread, oil and salt that were meant to suffice until the next Sunday, when we would come again.

In the cells, I saw people who were too weak to stand on their feet and only in their eyes a fire was burning, the will to live. Among them I recognized people with whom I travelled the terrible road from Kishinev to Transnistria. I knew them as strong and healthy people, now they could hardly lift their hands to pick the meager ration, their starving bread.

On the same day I managed to buy from a nearby farm, "Duca Voda", a cart of tomatoes, to bring it to the camp and to distribute it to the people. Their joy had no limit. From every cell I heard cries: "Cervinschi, have pity on us, give us a couple more tomatoes, we want to live, don't let us starve".

In some of these cells I found the remnants of notable families, mother and two sons from the Hertzberg family, a rich family from Sorota near Akerman. The head of the family, who was one of the richest men in Akerman, had died . .

Seeing the young was the worst. They begged, they did not want to die, still they did not have the strength to survive. I left them whatever money I had of my own.

Agitated and disturbed, I started to leave the place when the "Duca Voda" farm manager, who supervised the camp, came and asked me to help gather everyone for he had something to tell them. Slowly they gathered. I had to translate because some of the Jews were Ukrainians and did not understand Romanian. He had an offer for them: since the autumn was coming and soon the rains and snow will begin, they ought to make bricks in order to fix the camp, build stoves and the "healthy" among them should collect materials for heating in the winter.



To that "generous and humane offer" they replied, as one, that if the authorities mean to keep us here until the winter, they better bring machine-guns and kill us all and get it over and done with. "We don't want stoves, we would rather die than see the winter in these conditions".

I left them with a heart full of bitterness and pain. They looked at us desperate as we left. As we walked away we could still hear them crying "don't forget us, save our souls".

It seems to me that even today I can still hear their voices, still see the shadows of the living dead in the Acmecetca death camp.

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